Helmut Griesser from ADVA Optical Networking discusses quantum-safe cryptography and quantum key distribution. He explains that quantum computers pose a threat to current public key encryption algorithms. Quantum key distribution provides absolute security by using quantum properties, but has limitations such as decreasing key rates with distance. Post-quantum or quantum-safe cryptography relies on unproven computational assumptions rather than physical properties. The best approach may be to combine diverse key exchange mechanisms like post-quantum, quantum key distribution, and classic public key encryption to strengthen security.
Gave rise to a lot of speculations [1]:
* Can the NSA break ECC?
* Are the NIST curves weak?
* Does the NSA know something the outside world doesn’t about quantum computers?
* Can the NSA break (certain) QRAs?
* Does the NSA want distract from Snowden?
[1] A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma, Neal Koblitz and Alfred J. Menezez
https://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/pqc.pdf
The authors in [1] argue that the announcement was probably motivated mainly by political considerations (distracting from Snowden reveals).
Bennett and Brassard in 1984
vulnerable to PNS attacks
* PQC: post quantum cryptography
* QRA: quantum resistant algorithm
* QSA: quantum save algorithms
are synonymous for algorithms that are based on mathematical problems that () cannot be solved by a quantum computer in polynomial time