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1. 1
Title:
An Examination of Anthony Eden and the Spanish Civil War
Course: HSTY2651
Submitted to: Professor Judith Keene
Submitted by: Bahman Kargosha
Submission Date: 12 October 2015

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This essay is an examination of Anthony Eden s role in the Spanish Civil War. The focus is on
his role in formulating and implementing the non-intervention policy. More specifically, the
discussion is about how the failure in reaching an agreement with Mussolini changed his
attitude towards the Axis power. Moreover, it discusses the source of disagreement
between Eden and Chamberlain which resulted in his resignation in 1938.
1936 was a critical year for both Europe and Anthony Eden who had recently been
appointed as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fascism had started flexing its
muscles; communist expansion was a potential threat to the west and democracies were on
the defensive everywhere. While the Abyssinian crisis had not yet been resolved, Hitler
successfully remilitarized the Rhineland- a military bluff which was not called by Britain and
France and resulted in a crucial geopolitical shift in the continent. For Eden who had been
actively engaged in European affairs, the international situation was already extremely
worrying. In 1935, as the minister for the League of Nations, he had encountered difficulties
in dealing with Fascist Ital s a itio s, hereas, i his e role, he had far ore deli ate
diplomatic issues to face and more complicated problems to solve.1
In one of his earliest
reports to the cabinet on the 6th
of July 1936, he e pressed his gra e o er s a out Hitler s
new aggression and frankly admitted that British policy was suffering from serious
limitations.2
Like most British diplomats and the majority of people, he had not recovered
from the horrors of the Great War. He was firmly convinced that war should be avoided and
if that was not attainable, Britain must stay out of it. When war broke out in Spain, Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin, troubled with the abdication crisis and health problem, urged
Eden not to compel him to intervene in this new political imbroglio.3
Subsequently, it was
initially Eden who was directly responsible in determining and implementing the policy
to ards Spai a ordi g to the British s i terest.4
Nevertheless, this did not mean that he
and his colleagues did not know where their sympathy laid.5
1
A.R.Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office 1931-1938, Ne York, St Marti s Press, 1 6 , p.116.
2
Ibid p.222
3
Anthony Eden, the Eden Memoirs, Facing the dictators, (London, CASSELL & Company LTD, 1962), p.410.
4
Ibid p.403
5
David Carlton, Eden, Blum &the Origins of Non-Intervention, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 3
(1971), p52

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Both sides in the Spanish conflict needed continuous supply for arms. This was the
explanation for the initial internationalisation of the war. Moreover, in pursuit of their own
interests, all the conflicting regimes of the era with antithetical ideologies immediately
sought to interfere in the crisis. Traditionally, British foreign policy was concerned only
about direct threats towards its interest, mainly to India, and obviously this was not the case
for Spain. However, Eden was fearful that the Spanish conflict would spark a broader
European confrontation which could undermine the British national interest. He also
believed that Britain should avoid taking the risk of making an enemy by supporting the
wrong side of the war.6
Consequently, when on the 26th
of July 1936 the French government
officially announced its Non-Intervention policy, it was embraced by Eden. Nevertheless,
this was understandably interpreted, mainly by the Left, as the result of the pressure of the
British Right o Blu s government which its first reaction had been to provide military aid
to the Spanish government. Was the French government prompted by the British Foreign
Office to make such decision? It is a perfectly legitimate question to be raised.
The origin of the non-intervention policy has remained controversial. In reply to the official
opposition in parliament, Eden clearly stated that although he would have been glad to be
the author of this proposal, the initiative of the non-intervention policy had actually come
from the French government.7
Conversely, the Spanish Prime minister, Jose Giral, severely
riti ized the British Foreig Offi e for for i g the ha d of Paris .8
Later in 1947, Blum also
admitted that he had received a word of caution from Eden during his visit to London in late
July.9
Furthermore, a respected historian like Hugh Thomas points out that on the 7th
of
August the British ambassador, Sir George Clerk, paid M. Del os a perso al isit and
cautioned the French foreign minister against the export of armaments to the government
hi h ight ha e ee dire ted the ost e tre e a ar hist ele e ts .10
The
ambassador warned that if a conflict with Germany ensued from such reckless intervention
in Spain, his government would not feel obliged to aid France in accordance with the
6
Anthony Eden, the Eden Memoirs, Facing the dictators, p.401.
7
Ibid pp.403-405
8
David Carlton, Eden, Blum &the Origins of Non-Intervention, p.42
9
Ibid p.45
10
Ibid p.50

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Locarno Treaty.11
This unauthorized act was later approved by Eden12
, who was completely
in touch with London and Halifax during this time while he was on holiday.13
Whether the decision of the French cabinet was affected by the British foreign office or
internal considerations precipitated this reversal of position, Eden encountered
considerable difficulty in implementing the plan in a way that would produce the desired
effect. His first aim was to separate the Spanish issue fro the League of Natio s legislati e
agenda and, as he later told Ribbentrop on the 17th
of May 1937, he intended to discuss it
through the normal diplomatic channels .14
In order to reduce the pressure on the French
government, Eden agreed that the committee should come together in London. This
decision chiefly affected the Republican government in Madrid which had representatives in
Geneva but not in London. On the other hand, Germany and Italy were members of the
committee. While they did not belong to the League of Nations anymore, Germany and Italy
were able to undermine its effectiveness. Eden later admitted that his premature
announcement on the 9th
August in regard to Britai s unilateral arms embargo on Spain
had been a political mistake. He had not yet fully appreciated that Hitler and Mussolini
would interpret this action to suit their interests.15
It was a lesson which he was about to
learn.
The immediate effect of the non-intervention policy on the Spanish government did not
concern Eden. At the end of September in Geneva, the Spanish foreign minister Del Vayo,
provided him documents about the violation of the agreement by Germany and Italy, but
Eden did not feel obliged to express any hesitation about the change of policy.16
In fact, he
was under some pressure from the Labour Party, which objected to the violation of the
pledge not to intervene. He hoped that Nationalist would soon become victorious and the
situation would change.17
In his speech on the 29th
of October in the House of Commons, he
o i ed at the A is s i ter e tio a d principally blamed the Soviet Union but this
11
Ibid p42
12
Ibid p51
13
Anthony Eden, the Eden Memoirs, Facing the dictators, p.401.
14
Dante A.Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers 1936-41, (New York, 1962), p190
15
Anthony Eden, the Eden Memoirs, Facing the dictators, p.403.
16
Ibid p.408
17
Ibid p.411

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prag ati poi t of ie did ot last u til the e d of the year.18
On the 17th
of November,
while the Nationalists forces were approaching Madrid, Franco, whose administration was
now recognised as the legal government of Spain by the Axis, announced his intention to
impose a blockade of war material on Barcelona. To give force to this declaration, Franco
wanted the Non-i ter e tio Co ittee to gra t hi the elligere t rights . Despite the
fact that some British wished to follow the Axis powers on this matter, due to the
international reasons rather than Spanish ones, Eden did not agree. By then, he had realised
that non-intervention without effective supervision could not work and with the Axis
heavily engaged in Spain the promises given were worthless. He knew that a new phase of
his policy had begun and this time it was British hegemony which was under challenge. He
did not want to adopt a conciliatory approach, preferring to sho a tooth i the
Mediterranean.19
Eden wished to employ a more forceful method and gain exclusive authority at sea, but also
to reinforce the Royal Navy s supervisory role in the Mediterranean, he first needed to forge
real alliances.20
By making concessions to Turkey at the Montreux Conference, he
accomplished this key objective. Having seen that Britain was supported by France and
Turkey, Mussolini, who believed that no settlement could be reached without him in Mare
Nostrum, made his move and publicly declared his policy of the oli e ra h over the
forest of eight illio s a o ets . The opportunistic character of the Duce’ was apparent to
Eden, but to reduce the tension he decided to enter into a Ge tle a s Agree e t , as
proposed by the Italian dictator. Eden s policy was to demonstrate the evidence of good
will ut surre der o ital i terest . Eventually on the 2nd
of January 1937, in a course that
he considered to be fair, without actually recognizing Ital s conquest of Abyssinia he was
able to extract from Mussolini a guara tee to respe t Spai s territorial integrity. Eden
should have been satisfied with the outcome; however, in less than a couple of days, he
realized that a new wave of Fascist volunteers landed on Spanish soil.
The failure of the Ge tle a s Agree e t as a tur i g poi t i Ede s attitude towards
the Spanish war. He realised that Spain was a theatre in which Hitler and Mussolini were
18
Ibid p.412
19
Ibid p.413
20
Ibid p.418

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striving to lay the foundation for further domination. He came to the conclusion that their
victory in Spain would be a real threat to the peace in Europe and from the early months of
1937, his support shifted towards a Republican victory.21
On the other hand, in regard to the
British interests in Spain, in particular to Majorca, he was still trying to be pragmatic. In his
opinion, nothing had been given to Italy yet and in spite of the damaging effect of
Mussoli i s a tio , the political result that he wanted was still achievable.22
He still firmly
believed in the non-intervention policy since anything else presented greater
complications.23
Subsequently, in his memorandum on the 7th
of January, he proposed an
international patrol led by the ‘o al Na s superiorit as a diplo ati le erage to pi the
other po ers to a tio . Unfortunately for Eden, his plan was not embraced by his
colleagues in the Conservative Party. They were cautious and preferred to work for a more
effective version of the Non-I ter e tio Co ittee s e isti g s he e.24
However, the
spring of 1937 would bring an appalling tragedy which altered British apathy.
On the 21st
of March, the military attention of Franco s forces diverted from Madrid to the
Basque region and its industrial capital, Bilbao. Franco declared a blockade with the
intention of preventing any supplies to reach the Republican forces. Britai s concerns then
turned to the Basque government due to their important economic links. In the Cabinet s
meeting of the 7th
of April, Eden, by then enjoying the public s support, successfully opposed
Sir Samuel Hoare, the first Lord of the Admiralty who favoured Franco and wished to accord
him the belligerent rights. Eden made it clear that any act of hostility by Franco s navy
would be responded to ith all Britai s ight. Having been threatened with the powerful
Royal Navy, Franco abandoned his plan. However, on the 26th
of April, in response to the
defeat at sea, Guernica was devastated by Axis bombing. On the 4th
of May, Eden
confronted Ribbentrop on this issue. Threatening that Germany would withdraw from the
committee, Ribbentrop claimed that the reports were inaccurate and that the ‘eds were
responsible for the bombing.25
Over the next few weeks the foreign office was engaged in
humanitarian operation in Spain ith Fra e s ooperatio .26
For Eden, the days when he
21
Ibid p.441
22
Ibid p.433
23
Ibid p.440
24
Ibid p.436
25
Ibid p.443
26
Ibid p.444

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was in charge of the Spanish policy were numbered. On the 28th
of May, a new Prime
Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was elected who was more interested in foreign policy than
his predecessor and had devised a different policy.27
Eden had a challenging time in the new cabinet. The Spanish civil war had ignited a much
broader conflict in the Mediterranean where submarines were threatening international
shipping and British interests. Using the Nationalist flags, Italian submarines attacked ships
while their volunteers pouring into Spain.28
In late August, the French government suggested
that Britain and France should initiate a meeting of all Mediterranean powers with a view to
reaching an agreement on naval patrol to end this piracy . The conference took place in
Nyon in September and the result was relatively satisfactory for the western powers.29
In his
speech on the 15th
of October, Eden reaffirmed Britai s commitment to the non-
intervention policy while emphasizing the i porta e of respe ti g Spai s territorial
integrity. In short, he was indifferent to the war within Spain but not to issues where
Britai s interests were at stake.30
The Nyon conference did ot ha ge Mussoli i s poli i Spain. However, it was successful
in restricting the submarine warfare. By the end of 1937, Mussolini was getting more and
more bogged down in Spain and, therefore, turned to Hitler for help. For Chamberlain, the
Berlin-Rome alliance was the worst possible outcome and he was determined to prevent it
at a ost. Ede did ot share the Pri e Mi ister s approach towards the dictators. He had
ee o i ed that Mussoli i had the e talit of a ga gster hereas Cha erlai
believed that the dictators were moody characters needed to be approached with
appropriate timing.31
The Prime Minister had already bypassed his foreign secretary once
when in July 1937 he directly corresponded with Mussolini.32
By 1938, Hitler posed a more
serious threat than Mussolini who intended to give Hitler free hand in Austria. Chamberlain
wanted a better relationship with Mussolini but Eden did not intend to be part of this new
28
Ibid p.445
29
Ibid p.460
30
Ibid p.468
31
Ibid p.473
32
Ibid pp.451 & 456
33
Ibid p.453

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appeasement policy. He did not believe in concessions rooted in fear and insisted that, in
negotiation with Italy, Spain was the main issue and Britain should stand firm on its demand
that the Axis forces should withdraw.33
This view was not in accord with the cabinet. By then
Eden saw little choice but to resign and on 20th
of February 1938 his contribution to British
foreign policy in 1930s came to an end.
George Orwell was right in saying that the outcome of the Spanish war was settled in
London, Paris, Rome and Berlin — at any rate not in Spain .34
The poli of o -
i ter e tio de ised A thony Eden had a profound impact on the course of war. While it
subjected Spai s offi ial go er e t to international isolation, it did not prevent the Axis
powers from aiding Franco. The war in Spain forced Eden to engage heavily in negotiations
with the Fascist regimes. His appreciations of the threats emanating from the dictatorships
changed during the war. However, the valuable lessons he learned from the Spanish tragedy
were ignored by another appeaser at 10 Downing Street. This was a fatal error which
plunged Europe into a war far more devastating than the Spanish Civil War.
33
Ibid pp.589 & 590
34
The University of Adelaide,(2014), Looking back on the Spanish War – George Orwell, from
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/o/orwell/george/looking-back/

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Bibliography
Primary sources:
Eden Anthony, the Eden Memoirs, Facing the dictators,
(London: CASSELL & Company LTD, 1962),
Secondary sources:
Aster Sydney, Anthony Eden, (London , Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
Beevor Anthony, The Battle for Spain, The Spanish Civil War 1936-9, (London , Weidenfeld &
Nicolson,2006)
Carlton David, Eden, Blum &the Origins of Non-Intervention, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6,
No. 3 (1971)
Peters A.R , Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office 1931-1938, Ne York, St Marti s Press, 1 6
Puzzo Dante A, Spain and the Great Powers 1936-39, (New York Columbia University Press, 1962)
Stone Glyn, Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo-French cooperation 1936-38, Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 17:4, pp 799-820, (2006)