2. Day 1
09.30-10.00 Welcome and introductions
10.00-10.30 Behavioural design and social action
10.30-11.30 The importance of behavioural science
11.30-12.00 Break
12.00-13.00 The power of design
13.00-14.00 Activity: Disruptive hypotheses
14.00-15.00 Lunch
15.00-16.30 Activity: Ideas for the future
3. Hopes and fears
What are you most interested in?
What are you apprehensive about?
7. Behavioural science is a young field built on
a strong scientific heritage. It is broadly the
study of behaviour, seeking to understand
human choices and wellbeing by drawing on
insights and methods from psychology,
economics and neuroscience.
8. Behavioural science
Ask why?
Challenge assumptions
Avoid self-report
Experiment
The basic principles from
which a product or service
can be better designed.
Design thinking
Ask who?
Challenge the brief
Observe
Prototype ideas
Products and services that
guide and support, or help
people help themselves.
9.
10.
11. Ball: $0.10
Bat: $1.00
Total: $1.10
Ball: $0.05
Bat: $1.05
Total: $1.10
A bat and ball cost $1.10.
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
13. Information alone is not enough
The standard approach
Complex problems are due to a lack of
awareness, skills or will to change.
• Behaviours believed to be due to active
decisions.
• We compute intentions from actions.
• Solutions focus on raising awareness,
offering incentives or threatening sanctions.
16. “Just saying ‘No’ prevents teenage
pregnancy the way ‘Have a nice day’ cures
chronic depression.”
Faye Wattleton
Past President, Planned Parenthood
Conference speech, Seattle (1988)
17. Move beyond the message
A different approach
Complex problems are due to a number of uncertain
economic, environmental and psychological causes.
• Explore what people really need, want and desire.
• Understand why they behave the way they do.
• Use the design of products, services and places to
support them in realising their good intentions.
20. “The choice as I saw it was to go back to
sleeping in a bus station or do whatever it
took do avoid getting my head caved in by
raptor-eyed sociopaths. I had a choice, but
it wasn't much of a choice. In the same
situation, are you sure you know what
you'd do?”
Byron Vincent
Poet
Escape from the Sink Estate, BBC News (2014)
21. Models of decision making
Normative models
How we should ideally
reason and make
decisions.
• Task of philosophers.
• Rational choice theory.
Descriptive models
How people actually
think and make
decisions.
• Task of psychologists.
• Dual process models.
22. Standard decision framework
Acts
Options that someone must choose
between (walk or get the bus).
States
Possible states of the world (the
weather).
Outcomes
Possible consequences of each option
given each possible state (your mood).
23. State of the world
Option Sun Rain
Walk Feel happy Get wet
Bus Feel regret Stay dry
24. Rational choice theory
1. Assign probabilities to possible states (how
likely is is that it will rain?).
2. Assign utilities to outcomes (give your
different moods a number).
3. Calculate and sum Probability x Utility for all
possible outcomes of each act.
4. Choose act that maximises expected utility.
25. State of the world
Option Sun (p=0.5) Rain (p=0.5)
Walk Feel happy
+100
Get wet
-10
Bus Feel regret
-10
Stay dry
+5
26. State of the world
Option Sun (p=0.5) Rain (p=0.5)
Walk 0.5 x 100 = 50 0.5 x -10 = -5
Bus 0.5 x -10 = -5 0.5 x 5 = 2.5
50 - 5 = 45
-5 + 2.5 = -2.5
30. “Boundedly rational agents experience
limits in formulating and solving complex
problems and in processing (receiving,
storing, retrieving, transmitting)
information.”
Herbert Simon
Economist, psychologist, computer scientist
Simon (1982)
31. Models of decision making
Normative models
How we should ideally
reason and make
decisions.
• Task of philosophers.
• Rational choice theory.
Descriptive models
How people actually
think and make
decisions.
• Task of psychologists.
• Dual process models.
32. Dual process models
System 1
Intuitive
Heuristic
Associative
Fast
Effortless (automatic)
Unconscious
Implicit
Inaccessible to verbal
report
System 2
Analytic
Rule-based
Deliberative
Slow
Effortful
Conscious
Explicit
Accessible to verbal
report
Sloman (1996), Kahneman (2002)
33. Heuristics
Simple, efficient rules which people often
use to form judgments and make decisions.
Biases
Patterns of deviation in judgment, whereby
inferences about other people and situations
may be drawn in an illogical fashion.
Simon (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1974)
34. Endowment effect
Method
• Three groups of subjects, A, B, C.
• A offered pen (worth about £5).
• B offered mug (worth about £5).
• C offered choice between mug and pen.
• Group A and B are offered the opportunity to exchange mug or pen.
Result
• 50% of C choose mug or pen.
• More than 80% of A and B decline exchange.
Interpretations
• Losses are given more weight than gains (loss aversion).
• People put more value on things they own (endowment effect).
(Example of non-standard preferences)
Knetsch (1989)
35. Overconfidence
Method
We would like to know about what you think about how safely you drive an
automobile. All drivers are not equally safe drivers. We want you to compare
your own skill to the skills of the other people in this experiment. By definition,
there is a least safe and a most safe driver in this room. We want you to
indicate your own estimated position in this experimental group. Of course, this
is a difficult question because you do not know all the people gathered here
today, much less how safely they drive. But please make the most accurate
estimate you can. (Rate on a scale of 1 – 10).
Svenson (1981)
Result
• 93 percent of subjects rated their driving skill as above the median.
Interpretation
• There was a strong tendency to believe oneself as safer and more skillful
than the average driver.
(Example of non-standard beliefs)
37. Fast and frugal heuristics
Using heuristics in a way that is principally
accurate and thus eliminating most cognitive
bias (focus on effectiveness not failure).
Gigerenzer (2000)
38. Types of rationality
Instrumental
rationality
We perform actions in
accordance with our
goals, adhering to a
normative theory.
Ecological
rationality
We are well designed
for solving the
adaptive problems
our ancestors faced.
44. “One should describe design as a plan for
arranging elements to accomplish a
particular purpose.”
Charles Eames
Designer
Q&A with Charles Eames / Mdm L Amic (1972)
47. “Design thinking is a human-centred
approach to innovation that draws from
the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs
of people, the possibilities of technology,
and the requirements for business success.”
Tim Brown
CEO of IDEO
IDEO
51. “Designers resist the temptation to jump immediately to a
solution to the stated problem. Instead, they first spend
time determining what the basic, fundamental (root) issue
is that needs to be addressed. They don't try to search for a
solution until they have determined the real problem, and
even then, instead of solving that problem, they stop to
consider a wide range of potential solutions. Only then
will they finally converge upon their proposal. This
process is called Design Thinking.”
Donald Norman
Psychologist, designer
Rethinking Design Thinking, Core77 (2013)
59. Why be people centred?
• Don’t create ideas in a vacuum.
• Seek to understand people’s wants and
needs by understanding reality.
• Observing people in context up close can
reveal new opportunities.
66. Why visualise?
• Working visually makes things simpler
• Making things simpler aids
communication.
• Communication is key to developing ideas
and innovating quicker and more
successfully.
73. Why prototype?
• Testing an idea early helps manage risk.
• Quick and cheap mock-ups provide early
feedback and can save money.
• Almost anything can be prototyped before big
investments are made.
• Encourages smart failure.
81. Activity
What is the opposite of the current
expectation?
Where are there opportunities/ideas to
challenge what’s normal?
Notes de l'éditeur
Norman, D. (2013). The design of everyday things: Revised and expanded edition. Basic Books (AZ).
Adam Smith (L), Daniel Kahneman (R)
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, 49-81.
Petrosino, A., Turpin-Petrosino, C., & Buehler, J. (2003). Scared Straight and other juvenile awareness programs for preventing juvenile delinquency: A systematic review of the randomized experimental evidence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 589(1), 41-62.
Koehler, D. J., & Harvey, N. (Eds.). (2008). Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making. John Wiley & Sons.
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28(9), 1059-1074.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded economic reason (Vol. 3). MIT press.
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological bulletin, 119(1), 3.
Kahneman, D. (2002). Maps of bounded rationality: A perspective on intuitive judgment and choice. Nobel prize lecture, 8, 351-401.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded economic reason (Vol. 3). MIT press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.
Knetsch, J. L. (1989). The endowment effect and evidence of nonreversible indifference curves. The american Economic review, 1277-1284.
Svenson, O. (1981). Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers?. Acta psychologica, 47(2), 143-148.
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. Groups, leadership, and men. S, 222-236.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & ABC Research Group, T. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press.
Danziger, S., Levav, J., & Avnaim-Pesso, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(17), 6889-6892.