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Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incident Command:
The far side of the edge
Lisa Phillips
Tom Daly
Maarten Van Horenbeeck
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
30 POPs; 5 Continents; ~7Tb/sec Network
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Inspiration
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Program Goals
● FEMA National Incident Management
● Fire Department and Police
● Business Crisis Management
● Technology Peers who came before us
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incidents
• Fastly sees a variety of events that could classify as an incident
– Distributed Denial of Service attacks
– Critical security vulnerabilities
– Software bugs
– Upstream network outages
– Datacenter failures
– Third Party service provider events
– “Operator Error”
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
What you defend against
• It’s helpful to categorize:
– Issues that affect reliability of the CDN
– Issues that affect security of customer data and traffic or the business
• Both require very different handling, and addressing them requires a different
approach (“minimize harm”)
• Events happen at various levels of customer impact and business risk.
– While teams can deal with some events autonomously, others require
more high level engagement and coordination
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Identifying the issue
• Fastly does not have a NOC
• We have several team-monitored systems, in addition to some critical
cross-business monitoring
– Ganglia / Icinga
– ELK Stack
– Graylog
– Third party service providers (e.g. Datadog, Catchpoint)
• Immediate escalation to engineers is needed
• Engineering teams must own their own destiny and have control over their
alert stream. When they don’t respond, they are empowered to improve
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
People
• It’s all about having the right people at the right time engaged
• Engineers have human needs
– Private space and time is a necessity
– Randomization costs more than just the time spent on an interruption
– Minimize thrash by being specific about inclusion
• Teams have individual pager rotations
• Company maintains a company wide pager rotation (Incident Commander)
• Global Customer Service Focused Engineers
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incident Commander
• Deep systems understanding of Fastly
• Well versed in each team’s role and its leaders
• Organizational Trust
• Focuses on:
– Coordinating actions across multiple responders;
– Alerting and updating stakeholders— or during major events;
– designating a specific person to do so;
– Evaluate the high-level issue and understand its impact;
– Consult with team experts on necessary actions;
– Call off or delay other activities that may impact resolution.
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Communicating status
• Identify audiences
– Customers
– Our Customers’ Customers
– Executives
– Investors and other interested parties
– The rest of the company
• Identify quickly the questions that need answering, and communicate
effectively to address them
• Think through “rude Q&A”: it helps you respond to the incident better!
• Ensure communication channels are highly available
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Continuous improvement
• Every incident is logged and tracked in JIRA
• Incident Commander or executive leader owns generating an Incident
Report and if necessary, a service/security advisory
• Five why’s!
– Intermediate answers help identify mitigation strategies
– Final answer tells us the root cause we need to address
• Some mitigations are no longer part of the incident. Be clear where you cut
off into new projects, and who owns them
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
How we put it together!
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
• Develop definitions of impact
• Define severity levels
• Define response and communication
requirements
• Define post-incident activities
Incident Response Framework
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incident Response Process
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
• Regular incident reviews
– Review with all commanders past incidents, ensure documentation is up-
to-date, and there’s an open forum to review interaction
• Regular training
– Onboarding of new Incident Commanders
– Walkthrough of the process
• Table top exercises
– Scenario written by an incident commander, with input from a small
group of partner teams, focusing on worst cases
– Group walkthrough
– Document inefficiencies and mitigation plans
Exercises
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Security Incident Response Plan
• Employees trained to always invoke IC
• Anyone can invoke the Security Incident Response Plan (SIRP) by
paging the security team
• Split responsibilities but close coordination:
– IC focuses on restoring business operations and reducing
customer impact
– SIRP focuses on investigating the security incident, and ensuring
security impact is directly communicated to executive levels
– IC typically has priority on restoring operations. When IC action has
security implications SIRP guarantees appropriate escalation
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
• Security Incident Response Plan convenes a group of executives:
– Marketing
– IT
– Business Operations
– Engineering
– Security
– HR
– Legal
• Process is owned by the Chief Security Officer, who reports to CEO
Security Incident Response Plan
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
• Phase I: Incident Reporting
• Phase II: SIRT notification
• Phase III: Investigation
• Phase IV: Notification
Security Incident Response Plan
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Case study:
Breach at a supplier
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Saturday morning e-mail
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach
• DataDog notification received via e-mail
• 13:24 GMT: Escalation to the security team
• 13:38 GMT: IC is engaged
– Initial assessment and questions
• Partner has suffered a security incident
• Potential disclosure of metrics data
• Rotation of credentials is required
– Initial action items
• Engage appropriate teams: SRE and Observability
• Implement Incident Command bridge and meetings
• Plan for rotation of keys, as advised by vendor
• Identify all locations where keys are in use
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach
• 13:46 GMT: SIRT is engaged
– Initial assessment and questions
• Vendor has suffered a security incident
• Has the vendor contained the incident?
• What data do we store with the vendor?
• How are customers affected?
– Initial action items
• Outreach to vendor to understand scope
• Identify data stored at vendor
• Investigate customer use of vendor product
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach
• Addressing Fastly’s internal use of the vendor
– 14:10 GMT: All use of API keys across Fastly is identified
– 14:30 GMT: Plan of action is defined to rotate keys
– 15:45 GMT: Production keys have been revoked
– 16:05 GMT: All other integrations have been disconnected.
– 17:05 GMT: IC is shut down as imminent risk has been addressed.
• Identify and mitigate customer exposure and security exposure
– 14:30 GMT: Scope of customer API exposure is identified.
– 15:05 GMT: SIRT is virtually convened.
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach
• Identify and mitigate customer exposure and security exposure
– 15:10 GMT: Plan in place to identify and contact all affected customers,
and notify them of potential API key exposure.
– 00:07 GMT: Customers have been warned and made aware of new
product features that limit key exposure.
• Regular check-ins to measure compliance with the customer notification.
• Based on information available, deep dive into Fastly’s network assets to
review whether a similar attack could have affected us.
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach
Incident Command: mitigate immediate business impact
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Security Incident Response Plan:
Identify exposure of customer information, coordinate containment, mitigation and
customer notification
Vendor security breach
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Vendor security breach: lessons learned
• Identify automated methods for core vendors to report incidents;
• Create partnership models that enable secure integrations;
• When sharing data with a supplier, you continue to own making sure the
data is secure;
• Educate customers on how to use features securely.
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Case study:
Denial of Service
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Sunday Morning DDoS (and Coffee)
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Sunday Morning DDoS
• March 6, 2016:
– 16:50 GMT: Monitoring systems detect problems in Frankfurt POP
– 16:52 GMT: Monitoring systems detect problems in Amsterdam POP
– 16:53 GMT: Incident Command initiated
– 16:58 GMT: Status posted reflecting impact to EU performance
– 17:00 GMT to 04:50 GMT+1d: Bifurcation / isolated based mitigation
across POPs
• March 7, 2016
– Ongoing: DDoS flows move to Asia POPs
– 04:50 GMT: Mitigations hold; attack subsides
– 04:55 GMT+1d: Incident Command concluded
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
DDoS: Characteristics
• Shape shifting, with a mix of:
– UDP floods; notably DNS reflection
– TCP ACK floods
– TCP SYN floods
• Internet Wide Effects:
– Backbone congestion
– Elevated TCP Retransmission
– We saw a few hundred Gb/ssec, but it was quite likely more than that...
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
DDoS: Retrospective
• Incident Command: ensure ongoing CDN availability and reliability
• Security Incident Response Plan: Engage security community to identify
flow sources; bad actors; malware; and future capabilities.
• Lessons learned:
– Pre-planned bifurcation techniques proved invaluable in time to mitigate
– Mitigation options were limited by IP addressing architecture
– DDoS can often mask other system availability events
• Improvements:
– Separation of Infrastructure and Customer IP addressing; as well a DNS-
based dependencies
– Continued threat intelligence gathering to understand future TTP vectors
– Emphasis on team health for long running events; rotations and food.
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Lessons
• Start with the basics
– Incident discovery
– Incident management runbooks
– Clear communication, both up and down
– A strong focus on post-mortem
• Empower your engineers to deal effectively with workload
• Continue to let incidents teach you
• Partner closely with all stakeholders
Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
Q&A
lisa@fastly.com
tjd@fastly.com
maarten@fastly.com

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Incident Command: The far side of the edge

  • 1. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Incident Command: The far side of the edge Lisa Phillips Tom Daly Maarten Van Horenbeeck
  • 2. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge 30 POPs; 5 Continents; ~7Tb/sec Network
  • 3. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Inspiration
  • 4. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Program Goals ● FEMA National Incident Management ● Fire Department and Police ● Business Crisis Management ● Technology Peers who came before us
  • 5. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
  • 6. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Incidents • Fastly sees a variety of events that could classify as an incident – Distributed Denial of Service attacks – Critical security vulnerabilities – Software bugs – Upstream network outages – Datacenter failures – Third Party service provider events – “Operator Error”
  • 7. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge What you defend against • It’s helpful to categorize: – Issues that affect reliability of the CDN – Issues that affect security of customer data and traffic or the business • Both require very different handling, and addressing them requires a different approach (“minimize harm”) • Events happen at various levels of customer impact and business risk. – While teams can deal with some events autonomously, others require more high level engagement and coordination
  • 8. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Identifying the issue • Fastly does not have a NOC • We have several team-monitored systems, in addition to some critical cross-business monitoring – Ganglia / Icinga – ELK Stack – Graylog – Third party service providers (e.g. Datadog, Catchpoint) • Immediate escalation to engineers is needed • Engineering teams must own their own destiny and have control over their alert stream. When they don’t respond, they are empowered to improve
  • 9. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge People • It’s all about having the right people at the right time engaged • Engineers have human needs – Private space and time is a necessity – Randomization costs more than just the time spent on an interruption – Minimize thrash by being specific about inclusion • Teams have individual pager rotations • Company maintains a company wide pager rotation (Incident Commander) • Global Customer Service Focused Engineers
  • 10. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Incident Commander • Deep systems understanding of Fastly • Well versed in each team’s role and its leaders • Organizational Trust • Focuses on: – Coordinating actions across multiple responders; – Alerting and updating stakeholders— or during major events; – designating a specific person to do so; – Evaluate the high-level issue and understand its impact; – Consult with team experts on necessary actions; – Call off or delay other activities that may impact resolution.
  • 11. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Communicating status • Identify audiences – Customers – Our Customers’ Customers – Executives – Investors and other interested parties – The rest of the company • Identify quickly the questions that need answering, and communicate effectively to address them • Think through “rude Q&A”: it helps you respond to the incident better! • Ensure communication channels are highly available
  • 12. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Continuous improvement • Every incident is logged and tracked in JIRA • Incident Commander or executive leader owns generating an Incident Report and if necessary, a service/security advisory • Five why’s! – Intermediate answers help identify mitigation strategies – Final answer tells us the root cause we need to address • Some mitigations are no longer part of the incident. Be clear where you cut off into new projects, and who owns them
  • 13. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge How we put it together!
  • 14. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge • Develop definitions of impact • Define severity levels • Define response and communication requirements • Define post-incident activities Incident Response Framework
  • 15. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Incident Response Process
  • 16. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge • Regular incident reviews – Review with all commanders past incidents, ensure documentation is up- to-date, and there’s an open forum to review interaction • Regular training – Onboarding of new Incident Commanders – Walkthrough of the process • Table top exercises – Scenario written by an incident commander, with input from a small group of partner teams, focusing on worst cases – Group walkthrough – Document inefficiencies and mitigation plans Exercises
  • 17. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Security Incident Response Plan • Employees trained to always invoke IC • Anyone can invoke the Security Incident Response Plan (SIRP) by paging the security team • Split responsibilities but close coordination: – IC focuses on restoring business operations and reducing customer impact – SIRP focuses on investigating the security incident, and ensuring security impact is directly communicated to executive levels – IC typically has priority on restoring operations. When IC action has security implications SIRP guarantees appropriate escalation
  • 18. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge • Security Incident Response Plan convenes a group of executives: – Marketing – IT – Business Operations – Engineering – Security – HR – Legal • Process is owned by the Chief Security Officer, who reports to CEO Security Incident Response Plan
  • 19. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge • Phase I: Incident Reporting • Phase II: SIRT notification • Phase III: Investigation • Phase IV: Notification Security Incident Response Plan
  • 20. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Case study: Breach at a supplier
  • 21. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge
  • 22. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Saturday morning e-mail
  • 23. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach • DataDog notification received via e-mail • 13:24 GMT: Escalation to the security team • 13:38 GMT: IC is engaged – Initial assessment and questions • Partner has suffered a security incident • Potential disclosure of metrics data • Rotation of credentials is required – Initial action items • Engage appropriate teams: SRE and Observability • Implement Incident Command bridge and meetings • Plan for rotation of keys, as advised by vendor • Identify all locations where keys are in use
  • 24. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach • 13:46 GMT: SIRT is engaged – Initial assessment and questions • Vendor has suffered a security incident • Has the vendor contained the incident? • What data do we store with the vendor? • How are customers affected? – Initial action items • Outreach to vendor to understand scope • Identify data stored at vendor • Investigate customer use of vendor product
  • 25. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach • Addressing Fastly’s internal use of the vendor – 14:10 GMT: All use of API keys across Fastly is identified – 14:30 GMT: Plan of action is defined to rotate keys – 15:45 GMT: Production keys have been revoked – 16:05 GMT: All other integrations have been disconnected. – 17:05 GMT: IC is shut down as imminent risk has been addressed. • Identify and mitigate customer exposure and security exposure – 14:30 GMT: Scope of customer API exposure is identified. – 15:05 GMT: SIRT is virtually convened.
  • 26. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach • Identify and mitigate customer exposure and security exposure – 15:10 GMT: Plan in place to identify and contact all affected customers, and notify them of potential API key exposure. – 00:07 GMT: Customers have been warned and made aware of new product features that limit key exposure. • Regular check-ins to measure compliance with the customer notification. • Based on information available, deep dive into Fastly’s network assets to review whether a similar attack could have affected us.
  • 27. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach Incident Command: mitigate immediate business impact
  • 28. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Security Incident Response Plan: Identify exposure of customer information, coordinate containment, mitigation and customer notification Vendor security breach
  • 29. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Vendor security breach: lessons learned • Identify automated methods for core vendors to report incidents; • Create partnership models that enable secure integrations; • When sharing data with a supplier, you continue to own making sure the data is secure; • Educate customers on how to use features securely.
  • 30. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Case study: Denial of Service
  • 31. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Sunday Morning DDoS (and Coffee)
  • 32. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Sunday Morning DDoS • March 6, 2016: – 16:50 GMT: Monitoring systems detect problems in Frankfurt POP – 16:52 GMT: Monitoring systems detect problems in Amsterdam POP – 16:53 GMT: Incident Command initiated – 16:58 GMT: Status posted reflecting impact to EU performance – 17:00 GMT to 04:50 GMT+1d: Bifurcation / isolated based mitigation across POPs • March 7, 2016 – Ongoing: DDoS flows move to Asia POPs – 04:50 GMT: Mitigations hold; attack subsides – 04:55 GMT+1d: Incident Command concluded
  • 33. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge DDoS: Characteristics • Shape shifting, with a mix of: – UDP floods; notably DNS reflection – TCP ACK floods – TCP SYN floods • Internet Wide Effects: – Backbone congestion – Elevated TCP Retransmission – We saw a few hundred Gb/ssec, but it was quite likely more than that...
  • 34. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge DDoS: Retrospective • Incident Command: ensure ongoing CDN availability and reliability • Security Incident Response Plan: Engage security community to identify flow sources; bad actors; malware; and future capabilities. • Lessons learned: – Pre-planned bifurcation techniques proved invaluable in time to mitigate – Mitigation options were limited by IP addressing architecture – DDoS can often mask other system availability events • Improvements: – Separation of Infrastructure and Customer IP addressing; as well a DNS- based dependencies – Continued threat intelligence gathering to understand future TTP vectors – Emphasis on team health for long running events; rotations and food.
  • 35. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Lessons • Start with the basics – Incident discovery – Incident management runbooks – Clear communication, both up and down – A strong focus on post-mortem • Empower your engineers to deal effectively with workload • Continue to let incidents teach you • Partner closely with all stakeholders
  • 36. Incident Command: the far side of the Edge Q&A lisa@fastly.com tjd@fastly.com maarten@fastly.com