Giacomo Corneo (1995). National wage bargaining in an
internationally integrated product market, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.11, page 503-520
Solution manual for Intermediate Accounting, 11th Edition by David Spiceland...
Topics in IO
1. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
National wage bargaining in an
internationally integrated product market
Giacomo Corneo (1995). European Journal of Political Economy, vol.11,
page 503-520
Marko Ledic
Topics in IO - Assignment
University of Milan
2. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Introduction
The process of integration of product markets (among countries or
regions) influences the strategic decisions made by firms which
brings upon a change in national wage setting mechanism as well.
The effect of product market integration on the labour market
should take into account heterogeneity in the institutional settings,
like the degree of centralization in collective bargaining, trade union
density, minimum wage, unemployment benefits and the government
role in the wage bargaining.
Literature that combined the wage bargaining and imperfect
competition while assuming a symmetric bargaining games:
Dixon (1988), Dorwick (1989), De Fraja (1993).
3. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Introduction
Corneo (1995) develops a model of integrated product market
leaving out the assumption of symmetry.
Products are supplied by oligopolistic firms located in different
countries.
Wage costs of each firm determined by idiosyncratic wage
bargaining.
The main aim of the model is to investigate:
The impact of product market integration on international wage
differentials.
The form of externalities among countries that affect wage settings.
How centralization and coordination of wage bargaining affect
employment and social welfare.
4. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
The Model
Model’s assumptions:
Homogeneous commodity with a linear inverse demand function
p(Q) = a − bQ.
There are j = 1, ..., n identical profit maximizing firms that supply
the commodity.
Firms technology exhibits a CRS with respect to labour and qj = lj
where qj is output and lj is employment level.
Two countries model: A (with firms j = 1, ..., m) and B (with firms
j = m + 1, ..., n).
In both countries each worker supplies labour to one of the firms and
workers are supplied with one unit of labour.
Each firm hire from a continuum of workers of equal size.
Workers preferences are given by the indirect utility function
Uj = sj (lj )wj + (1 − sj (lj )) ¯wj where sj represents the survival
probability and ¯wj represents expected income of a worker who loses
his/her job in the firm.
Union’s bargaining power, union’s utility and degree of centralization
of bargaining power can differ across countries.
5. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
The Model
Model’s assumptions:
Wage bargaining is either simultaneous or sequential.
The game starts with wage bargaining in each country and then
firms simultaneously choose their level of employment which gives
the equilibrium output and price.
Under the assumption of homogeneous labour institutions across
countries, Corneo’s (1995) model transforms into the case of
Dowrick (1989) model that can be taken as a benchmark.
Equilibrium wage under industry-level bargaining
wind∗
= ¯w +
γ(a − ¯w)
2
(1)
Equilibrium wage under decentralized bargaining
wfirm∗
= ¯w +
γ(a − ¯w)
2n − γ(n − 1)
(2)
By comparing these two equilibrium wage levels we see that under
industry-level bargaining the equilibrium wage level is lower due to
absence of competitive mechanism.
6. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Decentralized Bargaining
Country Specific Case
This section departs from the assumption of institutional symmetry
as in the benchmark model and assumes that firm-level bargaining
takes place simultaneously in countries A and B.
The asymmetry across countries arises from different reservation
wage and union bargaining power.
The equilibrium wage for firm A and B in the simultaneous game:
wfirm∗
A = ¯wA +
γA [(a − wA) (2n + γB ) − (wA − wB ) (n − m) (2n − γB n)]
(2n + γA) [2n − γB (n − 1)] 2nm (γA − γB )
(3)
wfirm∗
B = ¯wB +
γB [(a − wB ) (2n + γA) − (wB − wA) (n − m) (2n − γAn)]
(2n + γB ) [2n − γA (n − 1)] 2nm (γB − γA)
(4)
Equations 3 and 4 collapse to equilibrium wage level under
decentralized wage bargaining (equation 2) if γA = γB = γ and if
wA = wB = ¯w.
7. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Decentralized Bargaining - Country specific case
Country Specific Case
Proposition 1
The wage level in one country is an increasing function of union
bargaining power and the reservation wage in both countries.
We can notice a positive externality between wage levels in countries
A and B. Wage level in any of these two countries arises when the
bargaining power of unions increases in one country (due to
increasing γ or ¯w).
In the case of single product market, this increase in wage will lower
the impact of competition for the firms abroad since the later firms
will acquire higher wage costs.
8. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization
Synchronized Bargaining
In this setting the wage level in country A is determined at
industry-level bargaining while in country B the wage level is
determined under decentralized bargaining.
Equilibrium wage in country A under industry-level bargaining
wind−firm∗
A = ¯w +
γ(2n + γ)(a − ¯w)
Z
(5)
Equilibrium wage in country B under decentralized bargaining
wind−firm∗
B = ¯w +
γ[Z + γm(2n + γ)](a − ¯w)
[2n − γ(n − m − 1)]Z
(6)
where Z is a positive constant
9. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization
Synchronized Bargaining
Proposition 2
Under synchronized wage setting, wages in the country with
industry-level bargaining are higher than in the country with firm-level
bargaining. The wage level is lower in the former country then under
overall industry-level bargaining (and vice versa).
Setting a uniform wage in country A hampers union/firm pairs in
lowering wages and therefore the wage in county A will be higher
then under decentralized wage bargaining.
Decentralized wage setting in country B yields a higher wage.
10. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization
Sequential Bargaining
In this setting, first the bargaining process at the industry level
happens for country A (leader), then for country B (follower), the
wage is bargained at firm-level and at the end we have a Cournot
competition in the single product market.
Solving the game by backward induction the following results apply:
The best response wage-function for the follower in country B
wB (wA) = ¯w +
γ[a − ¯w + m(wA − ¯w)]
2n − γ(n − m − 1)
(7)
The equlibrium wage for a leader in country A
wind−firm∗
A,leader = ¯w +
γ[(2n + γ)(a − ¯w) + γ ¯w(n − m)(n − 2)]
2[(n + 1 − m)(2n − γn + γ) + γm]
(8)
11. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization
Sequential Bargaining
Proposition 3
Under heterogeneity in degrees of centralization, wages in both countries
are higher and industry employment is lower when bargaining is
sequential rather than synchronized.
In this case there exist a positive externality between the wage level
in country A and B.
Higher wage can be obtained in country A at the industry-level
under simultaneous bargaining (than it was the case for
synchronized bargaining) and the same bargaining motives apply for
wage bargaining for firms in country B.
In sequential bargaining we have a lower level of employment and
output, a higher product price than it was the case in synchronized
bargaining.
12. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Industry-level Bargaining
Synchronized Bargaining
Assuming that the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level
in both countries, the equilibrium wages are as follows:
wind−ind∗
A = ¯w +
γ(a − ¯w)[(2(m + 1) + γ(n − m)]
4(n + 1 − m)(m + 1) − γ2m(n − m)
(9)
wind−ind∗
B = ¯w +
γ(a − ¯w)[(2(m + 1) + γ(m)]
4(n + 1 − m)(m + 1) − γ2m2
(10)
Proposition 4
Under synchronized national bargaining at the industry-level, the wage
level is higher in the larger country. Wages in both countries are lower
then in the case of overall industry-level bargaining.
In other words, under the integrated product market setting, large
countries have the advantage in determining the wage level that can
be increased, while small countries are absence of this advantage.
13. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Industry-level Bargaining
Sequential Bargaining
Assuming that the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level
in both countries but country A is the leader and country B is the
follower
The best response wage-function for the follower in country B
wB (wA) = ¯w +
γ[a − ¯w + m(wA − ¯w)]
2(m + 1)
(11)
The equlibrium wage for a leader in country A
wind−ind∗
A,leader = ¯w +
γ(a − γ)[(2(m + 1) + γ(n − m)]
2(n + 1 − m)(m + 1) − γm(n − m)
(12)
Proposition 5
Under national bargaining at the industry-level, wages in both countries
are higher and industry employment is lower, when bargaining is
sequential rather than synchronized.
Comparing the equations 9 and 10 with the equations 11 and 12 we
can notice that sequential bargaining yields a higher wage level for
both countries that it was the case under synchronized
bargaining(note that γ ∈ (0, 1)).
14. Introduction The Model Decentralized Bargaining Heterogeneous Degree of Centralization Industry-level Bargaining Conclusion
Conclusion
Corneo’s (1995) model indicated the possible externalities that
might emerge on integrated product markets from the heterogeneity
in institutional settings between countries.
One implication of the following model is that even after integration
of product market, the wage differentials are still pertinent as a
result of heterogeneous labour market institutions across countries.
When bargaining takes place at the industry-level and when a
country is characterized by ”stronger” unions, then the equilibrium
wages are higher and equilibrium employment is lower then it would
be the case for a country with firm-level bargaining.
The model showed that synchronized wage bargaining across
countries would imply a lower wage and higher employment then in
sequential bargaining case.