This document discusses cyber troops and computational propaganda in Indonesia. It describes how these techniques have been used increasingly since 2012 around major political events like elections to manipulate public opinion on social media. It provides examples from the 2014, 2017 and 2019 elections where cyber troops on Twitter and other platforms spread polarized messages and disinformation supporting different candidates. The document also examines the types of accounts and messaging strategies used by these cyber troops. It concludes that cyber troops and computational propaganda have become more professionalized over time.

1. CYBER TROOPS &
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
DALAM DEMOKRATISASI
INDONESIA
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Direktur PT. Media Kernels Indonesia (Drone Emprit)
Dosen Magister Universitas Islam Indonesia
Wakil Ketua Komisi Infokom MUI
Angota Majelis Dikdasmen PP Muhammadiyah
LHKP PP MUHAMMADIYAH
30 SEPTEMBER 2021
LEMBAGA HIKMAH DAN
KEBIJAKAN PUBLIK

2. 2
1992 – 1997 S1, Teknik Elektro, ITB
2003 – 2004 S2, Information Science, Universitas Groningen, Belanda
2004 – 2009 S3, Information Science, Universitas Groningen, Belanda
2000 – 2003 Inisiator IndonesiaDLN (Digital Library Network pertama di Indonesia)
Mengembangkan Ganesha Digital Library (GDL)
Mendirikan Knowledge Management Research Group (KMRG) ITB
Membangun Digital Library ITB
2009 – Sekarang Engineer di Weborama, Perusahaan berbasis big data (Paris/Amsterdam)
2014 – Sekarang Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company
2015 – Sekarang Konsultan Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch
2017 – Sekarang Dosen Tetap Magister Teknik Informatika Universitas Islam Indonesia
2021 – Sekarang Wakil Ketua Komisi Infokom, Majelis Ulama Indonesia Pusat
2021 – Sekarang Anggota Majelis Dikdasmen, PP Muhammadiyah
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com
Lahir: Bojonegoro, 1974
Founder Media Kernels Indonesia

3. AGENDA
• Cyber troops & Computational Propaganda
• Industrialized Disinformation
• Political Social Media Polarization in Indonesia (2014-2017)
• Cyber troops in DKI Jakarta Governor Election (2017)
• Cyber troops and Computational Propaganda in the Presidential Election
(2019)
• Bots in a black campaign (2019)
• Government’s Responses
3

4. CYBER TROOPS & COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA

5. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
5
Since 2012 until now, we
have seen bots, algorithms
and other forms of
automation are used by
political actors in countries
around the world to
manipulate public opinion
over major social
networking platforms, such
as Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and YouTube.

6. CYBER TROOPS
6
CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public opinion
over social media.

7. 7
FACEBOOK TWITTER

8. 8
FACEBOOK TARGETING

9. INTERNATIONAL
INFLUENCE OPERATION

10. 10

11. 11

12. 12

13. 13

14. 14

15. INDUSTRIALIZED DISINFORMATION

16. OXFORD UNIVERSITY – RESEARCH PROJECT
16

17. CYBER TROOP ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO RISE
GLOBALLY
17

18. PLATFORM COMPANIES COMBAT CYBER TROOP
ACTIVITY THROUGH ACCOUNT TAKEDOWNS
18
Take down from January 2019
and November 2020:
• 10,893 Facebook accounts,
• 12,588 Facebook pages,
• 603 Facebook groups,
• 1,556 Instagram accounts, and
• 294,096 Twitter accounts

19. TIPE AKUN PALSU
19

20. STRATEGI JENIS PESAN
20

21. STRATEGI KOMUNIKASI
21

22. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
22

23. KESIMPULAN OXFORD
We find that industrialized disinformation:
•has become more professionalized,
•and produced on a large scale by major
governments, political parties, and public
relations firms.
23

24. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL
SOCIAL MEDIA POLARIZATION IN 2014 - 2017

25. JANUARY 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
MEDIA AND CYBER TROOP SUPPORTS
PRO
KONTRA
2014
BOT

26. FEBRUARY 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
BEFORE REGISTERING THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
PRO
KONTRA
2014

27. MARCH 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
JOKOWI PROMOTED AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
PRO
KONTRA
KONTRA
2014

28. JUNE-JULY 2014, JOKOWI AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
DURING A CAMPAIGN PERIOD
PRO
KONTRA
2014

29. APRIL 2015, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
FIRST YEAR
PRO
KONTRA
2015

30. APRIL 2016, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
SECOND YEAR
PRO
KONTRA 2016

31. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2017, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
AFTER THE JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
PRO
KONTRA
2017
PRO

32. CYBER TROOPS IN
2017 DKI JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION

33. 33

34. JAN 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
FIRST DEBATE
34
2017
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi

35. 7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
SECOND DEBATE
35
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi
MCA
2017

36. 12 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 1ST ROUND ELECTION
36
Agus-Sylvi
Anies-Sandy
Ahok-Djarot
MCA
2017

37. 17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION
37
Pro Anies
Pro Ahok

38. TRAFFIC: SEWORD (PARTISAN) SURPASSED
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
38

39. 39
Via Social Media:
Seword
Via Google:
Kompasiana
Antaranews
Tempo
MAINSTREAM MEDIA

40. 40
Via Medsos:
Seword
Posmetro
Via Google:
Portalpiyungan
PARTISAN MEDIA

41. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA IN
THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

42. POLLING ROBOTS
42
Ater the leader of Mahaka Group,
Erick Thohir officially becomes
the head of the campaign team
for Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin in
the 2019 Election, who you will
vote for?
1. Jokowi-Maruf Amin (Retweet)
2. Prabowo-Sandiaga (Like)

43. POLLING ROBOTS
Foreign
names with
0-1 followers

44. USERS BY NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS
#PrabowoSandi
19.51%
3.82%
10.84%
9.82%
#JokowiAmin

45. TWITS BY USERS WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS
ABOUT JOKOWI

46. USERS BY NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS
IN CONVERSATIONS ABOUT PRABOWO
3.33%

47. TWITS BY USERS WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS
ABOUT PRABOWO

48. BOTS WITH THOUSANDS FOLLOWERS
AVOIDING TWITTER SPAM DETECTION

49. TALKING ABOUT JOKOWI
Interaction Rate
2.91
Pro 01
Pro 02
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots Iklan
Bots
Bots
Total Users
293,041

50. TALKING ABOUT PRABOWO
Interaction Rate
6.30
Pro 01
Pro 02
Bots Pro 02
Bots Nasdem
Bots MetroTV
Bots
Bots Iklan
Bots Pro 01 Pro 02
Total Users
177,394

51. BOTS IN A BLACK CAMPAIGN

52. SCANDAL: A BLACK CAMPAIGN ATTACKING A
CANDIDATE
52

53. TREND: HOW THE BLACK CAMPAIGN
DELIVERED
53
INITIALLY, BOTS POST THE MESSAGES
RESPONDED BY THE TARGET
REPORTED
BY MEDIA

54. SCANDAL: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
54

55. ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS: BOTS GET NO
RESPONSE
55
TWITS WITH NO RESPONSE
TWITS WITH
RESPONSES

56. THE BEGINNING OF THE BLACK CAMPAIGN
56
ROBOT WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS

57. OPINION MANIPULATION
(PILPRES 2019)

58. SOCIAL NETWORK BEFORE DEBATE
02
01

59. SOCIAL NETWORK DURING DEBATE
02
01
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

60. SOCIAL NETWORK DURING DEBATE WITH TOPICS
02
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

61. ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

62. ISU-ISU TENTANG JOKOWI
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama
PKI
China
Leadership

63. PRO-KONTRA TENTANG JOKOWI

64. ISU-ISU TENTANG PRABOWO
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Temperamental
Human Rights

65. PRO-KONTRA TENTANG PRABOWO

66. PERANG TAGAR DALAM ISU
OMNIBUS LAW (2020)

67. TREN OMNIBUS LAW
67
Omnibus Law (sepi)
#MosiTidakPercaya
#TolakOmnibusLaw
K-poppers turun tangan
#OmnibusLawBawaBerkah
8 Oktober:
Demo Mahasiswa
dan Buruh
13 Oktober:
Demo PA 212,
Petinggi KAMI
ditangkap
4 Oktober:
RUU Omnibus
Law dibawa ke
Paripurna
5 Oktober:
UU Omnibus Law
Disahkan
16 Oktober:
Demo
Mahasiswa
15 Oktober:
Konpers Pentinggi
KAMI ditangkap
#OmnibusLawBasmiKorupsi
Penangkapan petinggi KAMI secara
signifikan berhasil menurunkan
volume percakapan tentang
Omnibus Law yang dominan berisi
penolakan.

68. SNA OMNIBUS LAW (5 OKT 2020: 17:00– 22:00)
68
OPOSISI
MEDIA
AKADEMISI
BEM
LSM
AKTIVIS
K-POPERS

69. TREN TAGAR TERKAIT OMNIBUS LAW
69
1
2
1
3
2
2 3 3

70. SAAT PERGESERAN NARASI
70

71. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

72. SINGAPORE’S APPROACH TO COUNTERING
ONLINE FALSEHOOD
1. Defamation Act
2. Sedition Act
3. Protection from Harassment Act
(POFHA)
4. Protection from Online
Falsehoods & Manipulation Act
(PFMA)
INFLUENCE OPERATION
1. Political Donation Act
2. Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act
3. Internal Security Act
72

73. POFHA (FOR PUBLIC)
73

74. POFMA (FOR PLATFORM)
74

75. INDONESIA’S APPROACHES
• UU ITE
• Internet Throttling
• Penapisan Konten Negatif
• Multi-stakeholder Fact-checking and Public Literacy
(Cekfakta)
75

76. PENUTUP

77. SUMMARY
• Cyber troops and computational propaganda has been used in Indonesia
since as early as 2012.
• The main drivers of the activities are political events, especially general
elections.
• However, after the 2014 presidential election, the polarization is getting
bigger, supported by many new cyber troops and better computational
propaganda techniques.
• The platform mainly used by cyber troops and computational propaganda
is Twitter, then incorporates blogs, Facebook, IG, YouTube, and now
WhatsApp to disseminate their messages.
• In the future, cyber troops and computational propaganda will likely still
be used with better techniques and platforms.
77

78. SARAN
Tingkatkan riset, ekspose, dan
edukasi publik tentang “opinion
manipulation” oleh buzzer, bot, dan
kepentingan politik dan ekonomi,
nasional dan internasional.
78

79. THANK YOU FOR LISTENING
79