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Fake News, Electronic
Information and Transaction
Law, and Civil Society
Initiatives in Indonesia
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Dire...
Kyoto Imperial Palace
2
3
1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia
2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of...
QUESTIONS
• How fake news developed and spread in Indonesia?
• How civil society movement evolved to help combating the fa...
INDONESIA DIGITAL
IN A NUTSHELL
6
7
8
9
10
MILLENIALSGEN Z
THE STORY OF THE MOST POPULAR
FAKE NEWS IN INDONESIA
10 MILLIONS OF ILLEGAL CHINESE WORKERS
(DECEMBER 2016)
12
CLARIFICATIONS IN ONLINE MEDIA
13
15	September	2016
CLARIFICATIONS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
14
TRENDS OF THE TOPIC
MAINSTREAM VS
ALTERNATIVE MEDIA
POLARIZATION
GOVERNMENT SOLUTION: BLOCKS THE WEB
SITES
18
NEW	DOMAIN	CREATEDDOMAIN	BLOCKED
WHAT WE LEARN?
• Massive fake news can be a part of a propaganda.
• It uses non-mainstream (alternative) web sites to supp...
IS THERE ANY IMPACT BY LIMITING
ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA?
PROTEST AND RIOT IN JAKARTA (21ST MAY 2019)
REJECTING PRESIDENTIAL POLL RESULT
21
22
TREN HARIAN FACEBOOK DAN TWITTER
START STOP
TREN HARIAN INSTAGRAM DAN YOUTUBE
START STOP
IMPACT ON WHATSAPP GROUP TRAFFIC
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
26.84526.20825.533
21.001
10.729
18.713
15.567
-42%-30% -6...
IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘JOKOWI’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
424
488
327 323
77 67
186
-76%-42%
START STOP
IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘PRABOWO’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
618
482
405 407
123
27
155
-70%-61% -93%
START STOP
TREND OF CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘VPN’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
23
7
9
START STOP
IMPACT FROM LIMITING ACCESS TO SOCIAL
MEDIA AND MESSAGING
• No significant impact on social media traffic.
• Significant i...
CYBER TROOPS AND POLITICAL
POLARISATION IN INDONESIA
31
JAN 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
FIRST DEBATE
32
2017
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi
7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
SECOND DEBATE
33
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-SandiAgus-Sylvi
MCA
2017
17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION
34Pro Anies
Pro Ahok
IDEA FLOW:
MESSAGE DIFFUSES ACROSS PLATFORMS
35
TRAFFIC: SEWORD (PARTISAN) SURPASSED
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
36
37
Via Social Media:
Seword
Via Google:
Kompasiana
Antaranews
Tempo
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON JOKOWI DURING THE
2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti...
WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI
FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON PRABOWO DURING THE
2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Te...
WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO
WHAT WE LEARN?
• Cyber troops usually rise during political events, especially
regional or general elections.
• They creat...
INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER MOVEMENT
In	this	graph	of	echo	chambers	in	the	Twittersphere,	purple	dots	represent	
people	spreading	false	claims	about	the	Truthy...
INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER SOCIETY
(MAFINDO) DECLARED IN 2017
45
CONVERSATION ABOUT THE MOVEMENT ‘Anti
Hoax’
46
47
DISTRUST TOWARD THE
MOVEMENT
48
MAFINDO ACTIVITIES
KEEP MOVING ON
49
50
HOAX CHECKING
51
FACT CHECKER (CEKFAKTA.ID)
52
IMPACT OF FACT CHECK ON FACEBOOK STORY
53
HOT LINES FOR REPORTING
NEGATIVE CONTENT
MEDIA AS INFORMATION ARBITRAGE
CASE STUDY: SOCIAL NETWORK DURING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DEBATE
02
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS
ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE
WHAT WE LEARN?
• Media is playing an important role in the world of post-truth and
polarization.
• Media should become inf...
THE PROBLEM WITH MEDIA:
CLICK BAIT AND PARTISANSHIP
MEDIA: CLICK BAIT, NOT COVERING RELATED
SIDES
60
MEDIA: COVERING PARTIAL SIDES
61
FOUR DAYS OF UNCERTAINTY
62
63
1 2
3
4
5
1
2
Arrahmahnews.com
*Gara-gara Dukung Ahok,
Jenazah Nenek 78 Tahun
Dilarang Dishalatkan di
Mushala*
3
4
5
ON...
64
MEDIA IS THE MAIN REFERENCE FOR
MOST PROPAGANDA/CLAIMS
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
FINALLY: A MEDIA COVER ‘ALL’ SIDES
65
WHAT WE LEARN?
• Media plays very important role in finding facts from the real
worlds.
• Readers and even Anti-Slander So...
UU ITE / ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AND
TRANSATION LAW
THE STORY OF SARACEN
68
THE RISE OF “MCA” OR “Muslim Cyber Army”
1 Mei 2016 – 31 Desember 2016
Sebelum pertengahan Desember 2016,
penyebutan “MCA”...
MCA IN 2017
Chat HRS
Seruan HRS terkait GMBI
Saracen
Aksi Bela Palestina
THE STORY OF MCA GROUPS (Moslem Cyber
Army)
71
TASKS	OF	MCA:
• Reports	opponent	targets
• Take	down	target	accounts
• Send...
CYBER TROOPS
72
CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public...
CRITICS OR DEFAMATION?
73
UU ITE USED EASILY BY CORPORATIONS
74
WHAT WE LEARN?
• UU ITE (Electronic Information and Transaction Law) of 2008
has been revised in 2016 for not violating hu...
THE FUTURE
Current Situation:
Vicious cycle of noises
77
Government
Noise
Opposition
Noise
Buzzers Buzzers
OUTSOURCE OUR THINKING TO ALGORITHM
78
WHAT WE NEED
• Strengthen the civil society movements to combat fake news.
• We need the law against fake news in Indonesi...
BOOKS “READING INDONESIA”
80
THANK YOU
81
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Fake News, Electronic Information and Transaction Law, and Civil Society Initiatives in Indonesia

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The Phenomenon of Fake News and The Implementation of UU ITE and Civil Society Initiatives to combat Fake News in Indonesia

My presentation in this workshop will address these questions: how fake news developed in Indonesia, how the Indonesian government and civil society combat the fake news, and whether limiting internet access will reduce the fake news. For that purpose, I will explain: the short history of fake news and social media polarization since 2014 in Indonesia political context; data on law enforcements using the Law concerning Electronic Information and Transaction (UU ITE, 2008 and its revision 2016) and the initiatives of Indonesian civil society on combating fake news; how the social media platform companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google responded the requests from Indonesian government to limit the dissemination of fake news; and the evaluation on the effectiveness of the last social media access limitation by Indonesian government during and after the 21st of May 2019 riots. At the end of this presentation I will provide conclusions and lesson learned.

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Fake News, Electronic Information and Transaction Law, and Civil Society Initiatives in Indonesia

  1. 1. Fake News, Electronic Information and Transaction Law, and Civil Society Initiatives in Indonesia Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D. Director Media Kernels Indonesia (Drone Emprit) Lecturer at the University of Islam Indonesia Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP CSEAS KYOTO UNIVERSITY - KYOTO 22nd JULY 2019
  2. 2. Kyoto Imperial Palace 2
  3. 3. 3 1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia 2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL 2004 – 2009 Doctor, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL 2009 – Now Engineer at Weborama (Paris/Amsterdam) 2014 – Now Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company 2015 – Now Consultant at Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch 2017 – Now Lecturer at the IT Magister Program of the Universitas Islam Indonesia Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D. Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com
  4. 4. QUESTIONS • How fake news developed and spread in Indonesia? • How civil society movement evolved to help combating the fake news? • How Electronic Information and Transaction Law implemented? 4
  5. 5. INDONESIA DIGITAL IN A NUTSHELL
  6. 6. 6
  7. 7. 7
  8. 8. 8
  9. 9. 9
  10. 10. 10 MILLENIALSGEN Z
  11. 11. THE STORY OF THE MOST POPULAR FAKE NEWS IN INDONESIA
  12. 12. 10 MILLIONS OF ILLEGAL CHINESE WORKERS (DECEMBER 2016) 12
  13. 13. CLARIFICATIONS IN ONLINE MEDIA 13 15 September 2016
  14. 14. CLARIFICATIONS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 14
  15. 15. TRENDS OF THE TOPIC
  16. 16. MAINSTREAM VS ALTERNATIVE MEDIA
  17. 17. POLARIZATION
  18. 18. GOVERNMENT SOLUTION: BLOCKS THE WEB SITES 18 NEW DOMAIN CREATEDDOMAIN BLOCKED
  19. 19. WHAT WE LEARN? • Massive fake news can be a part of a propaganda. • It uses non-mainstream (alternative) web sites to support the claims, and takes benefits from the algorithm in social media to viralize the messages. • Blocking the web sites is a quick solution but might not be effective for a long term solution, as the can be created using different names easily. 19
  20. 20. IS THERE ANY IMPACT BY LIMITING ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA?
  21. 21. PROTEST AND RIOT IN JAKARTA (21ST MAY 2019) REJECTING PRESIDENTIAL POLL RESULT 21
  22. 22. 22
  23. 23. TREN HARIAN FACEBOOK DAN TWITTER START STOP
  24. 24. TREN HARIAN INSTAGRAM DAN YOUTUBE START STOP
  25. 25. IMPACT ON WHATSAPP GROUP TRAFFIC DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS 26.84526.20825.533 21.001 10.729 18.713 15.567 -42%-30% -60% START STOP
  26. 26. IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘JOKOWI’ DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS 424 488 327 323 77 67 186 -76%-42% START STOP
  27. 27. IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘PRABOWO’ DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS 618 482 405 407 123 27 155 -70%-61% -93% START STOP
  28. 28. TREND OF CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘VPN’ DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS 23 7 9 START STOP
  29. 29. IMPACT FROM LIMITING ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA AND MESSAGING • No significant impact on social media traffic. • Significant impact only on WhatsApp traffic. • VPN is now widely known by internet users in Indonesia to bypass current and future limitation by the government (e.g. Internet Positive). • Suggestion: • Limiting access could be useful during a riot, and should not be extended after the riot is over. 29
  30. 30. CYBER TROOPS AND POLITICAL POLARISATION IN INDONESIA
  31. 31. 31
  32. 32. JAN 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017 FIRST DEBATE 32 2017 Ahok-Djarot Anies-Sandi Agus-Sylvi
  33. 33. 7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017 SECOND DEBATE 33 Ahok-Djarot Anies-SandiAgus-Sylvi MCA 2017
  34. 34. 17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017 BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION 34Pro Anies Pro Ahok
  35. 35. IDEA FLOW: MESSAGE DIFFUSES ACROSS PLATFORMS 35
  36. 36. TRAFFIC: SEWORD (PARTISAN) SURPASSED MAINSTREAM MEDIA 36
  37. 37. 37 Via Social Media: Seword Via Google: Kompasiana Antaranews Tempo MAINSTREAM MEDIA
  38. 38. FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON JOKOWI DURING THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN Unfulfilled Promises Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama PKI China Leadership
  39. 39. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI
  40. 40. FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON PRABOWO DURING THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN Hoaxes Lack of experiences Religion Khilafah Temperamental Human Rights
  41. 41. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO
  42. 42. WHAT WE LEARN? • Cyber troops usually rise during political events, especially regional or general elections. • They create polarization to get as bigger as supports from public. • Advanced computational propaganda techniques used by the cyber troops incorporating web sites, SEO, and social media algorithms will help advancing polarization. 42
  43. 43. INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER MOVEMENT
  44. 44. In this graph of echo chambers in the Twittersphere, purple dots represent people spreading false claims about the Truthy research project; the two accounts that sought to debunk the false information are in orange on the far left. (Research by Indiana University, 2016) INDIANA UNIVERSITY: HOW TO STOP THE SPREAD OF FAKE NEWS Hoax Buster https://www.inverse.com/article/24361-misinformation- social-media-can-technology-save-us
  45. 45. INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER SOCIETY (MAFINDO) DECLARED IN 2017 45
  46. 46. CONVERSATION ABOUT THE MOVEMENT ‘Anti Hoax’ 46
  47. 47. 47 DISTRUST TOWARD THE MOVEMENT
  48. 48. 48 MAFINDO ACTIVITIES KEEP MOVING ON
  49. 49. 49
  50. 50. 50
  51. 51. HOAX CHECKING 51
  52. 52. FACT CHECKER (CEKFAKTA.ID) 52
  53. 53. IMPACT OF FACT CHECK ON FACEBOOK STORY 53
  54. 54. HOT LINES FOR REPORTING NEGATIVE CONTENT
  55. 55. MEDIA AS INFORMATION ARBITRAGE
  56. 56. CASE STUDY: SOCIAL NETWORK DURING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DEBATE 02 01 01 EXTRA CYBER TROOPS
  57. 57. ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE
  58. 58. WHAT WE LEARN? • Media is playing an important role in the world of post-truth and polarization. • Media should become information arbitrate, that bridges information between polarized worlds. • Fact-checking by the media once used by social media platform, can reduce the dissemination of false news. 58
  59. 59. THE PROBLEM WITH MEDIA: CLICK BAIT AND PARTISANSHIP
  60. 60. MEDIA: CLICK BAIT, NOT COVERING RELATED SIDES 60
  61. 61. MEDIA: COVERING PARTIAL SIDES 61
  62. 62. FOUR DAYS OF UNCERTAINTY 62
  63. 63. 63 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 Arrahmahnews.com *Gara-gara Dukung Ahok, Jenazah Nenek 78 Tahun Dilarang Dishalatkan di Mushala* 3 4 5 ONLINE MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA RESONANCE 10 – 11 MARCH 2017 Kumparan.com Kesaksian Warga Setiabudi Tentang Jenazah Nenek Hindun yang Disalatkan Tabloidbintang.com Jenazah Nenek 78 Tahun Ini Dilarang Dishalatkan di Mushala Karena Semasa Hidup Mendukung Ahok
  64. 64. 64 MEDIA IS THE MAIN REFERENCE FOR MOST PROPAGANDA/CLAIMS POSITIVE NEGATIVE
  65. 65. FINALLY: A MEDIA COVER ‘ALL’ SIDES 65
  66. 66. WHAT WE LEARN? • Media plays very important role in finding facts from the real worlds. • Readers and even Anti-Slander Society rely heavily on the media reports about events in the real worlds. • Media can be a double-edged sword. • Partisan media disseminating fake news or half-truth news could incite polarization and hate. • Media should cover not only both sides, but sometimes ‘all’ sides. 66
  67. 67. UU ITE / ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AND TRANSATION LAW
  68. 68. THE STORY OF SARACEN 68
  69. 69. THE RISE OF “MCA” OR “Muslim Cyber Army” 1 Mei 2016 – 31 Desember 2016 Sebelum pertengahan Desember 2016, penyebutan “MCA” semua merefer pada sebuah partai uni-ras di Malaysia, yaitu Malaysian Chinese Association. Mulai pertengahan Desember 2016, kita akan sering menemukan “MCA” atau “muslim cyber army” dalam percakapan Twitter di Indonesia.
  70. 70. MCA IN 2017 Chat HRS Seruan HRS terkait GMBI Saracen Aksi Bela Palestina
  71. 71. THE STORY OF MCA GROUPS (Moslem Cyber Army) 71 TASKS OF MCA: • Reports opponent targets • Take down target accounts • Send virus The similar tasks were also done by pro government’s cyber troops.
  72. 72. CYBER TROOPS 72 CYBER TROOPS: government, military or political party teams committed to developing or manipulating public opinion over social media.
  73. 73. CRITICS OR DEFAMATION? 73
  74. 74. UU ITE USED EASILY BY CORPORATIONS 74
  75. 75. WHAT WE LEARN? • UU ITE (Electronic Information and Transaction Law) of 2008 has been revised in 2016 for not violating human rights due to excessive punishment. • UU ITE has been used widely to fights against anti-government groups (e.g. SARACAN and MCA). • Individuals (pro and anti government) who were punished using UU ITE because they disseminate false news and slander, usually are the victims of the fake news. The first creators of the fake news are difficult to reveal. • The minimum understanding of the public and police about UU ITE has caused those expressing critics or opinions to be persecuted. 75
  76. 76. THE FUTURE
  77. 77. Current Situation: Vicious cycle of noises 77 Government Noise Opposition Noise Buzzers Buzzers
  78. 78. OUTSOURCE OUR THINKING TO ALGORITHM 78
  79. 79. WHAT WE NEED • Strengthen the civil society movements to combat fake news. • We need the law against fake news in Indonesia, but we need to increase public’s and law enforcer’s understanding about the law (UU ITE). • Information literacy through education since in primary school. 79
  80. 80. BOOKS “READING INDONESIA” 80
  81. 81. THANK YOU 81
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The Phenomenon of Fake News and The Implementation of UU ITE and Civil Society Initiatives to combat Fake News in Indonesia My presentation in this workshop will address these questions: how fake news developed in Indonesia, how the Indonesian government and civil society combat the fake news, and whether limiting internet access will reduce the fake news. For that purpose, I will explain: the short history of fake news and social media polarization since 2014 in Indonesia political context; data on law enforcements using the Law concerning Electronic Information and Transaction (UU ITE, 2008 and its revision 2016) and the initiatives of Indonesian civil society on combating fake news; how the social media platform companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google responded the requests from Indonesian government to limit the dissemination of fake news; and the evaluation on the effectiveness of the last social media access limitation by Indonesian government during and after the 21st of May 2019 riots. At the end of this presentation I will provide conclusions and lesson learned.

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