1. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
for the New Decade
- The “CHANGE” for the Success -
Koichi Nishitani
Visiting Fellow, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Colonel, Japan Air Self-Defense Force

2. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed or implied in this presentation are solely
those of the author and do not represent the views of
the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Japan Ministry of
Defense, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or any
other government organization in Japan.

3. Who is Col. NISHITANI?
Who is Col. NISHITANI?
Mini-Bio
Jul 2007 - Logistics Planning Div., Air Staff Office
Sep 2006 - Visiting Fellow, CISAC, Stanford University
Sep 2005 - Weapon Systems Programs Div., Air Staff Office
Feb 2003 - Defense Plans and Programs Div., Air Staff Office
National Defense Program Guidelines 2004 and Mid-Term
Defense Program (Fy2005 – 2009)
Mar 2000 - Commander, Periodic Maintenance Squadron (Okinawa)
Mar 1999 - Air Command and Staff Course, Air Staff College
Dec 1997 - Defense Plans and Programs Div., Air Staff Office
1987 Graduated from National Defense Academy
- Others
Apr 2001: Joint Forces Staff College and Defense Language Institute
Nov 1992: Germany, France, and Belgium (incl. NATO HQ)

4. “CHANGE” in Japan
“CHANGE” in Japan
Japanese TV drama “CHANGE”
“Maybe you could change Japan.” DPJ Manifesto
“Change of Government”

5. Contents
Contents
I. Introduction: “CHANGE” in Japan
II. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Rationale, Current
Situation, and Challenges
1. Rationale for Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
2. Current Situation of Air Defense Capabilities in Japan
3. Challenges for the Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
III. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Its Desirable Future
1. Preconditions
2. Key Elements in Japan’s Future Air Defense Capabilities
IV. Conclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the Past

6. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
Japan’s air defense capabilities mean:
- Similar in content to the air power
- Embody the exclusively defense-oriented policy
- Include all air assets of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
- Aircrafts, radars, missiles, command and control systems, etc.
- Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) shoulders the core

7. Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
(a) Critically important capabilities for defense of Japan
- Air superiority has been absolutely critical to win modern warfare;
also critical for defending Japan
- Island country: vital to assure the safety of sea lanes of communication
- Lack of strategic depth:
・ NE to SW: 3,800km, NW to SE: 380km
・ High population density
(b) Seamless Mobilization of assets throughout peacetime to wartime
(provide safety of Japanese airspace, which is a common goods)
- Jet fighters on 24-hour alert to prevent/repel violation of airspace
- Crews always watch/listen carefully to provide security information
- Provide air cover for maritime and ground forces in crises/war

8. Lack of Strategic Depth
Lack of Strategic Depth
km
800
3,
38
38
38
0k
0k
0k
m
mm
NE-SW: 3,800km
NE-SW: 3,800km
NW-SE: 380km
NW-SE: 380km
High population density
High population density

9. Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
(a) Critically important capabilities for defense of Japan
- Air superiority has been absolutely critical to win modern warfare;
also critical for defending Japan
- Island country: vital to assure the safety of sea lanes of communication
- Lack of strategic depth:
・ NE to SW: 3,800km, NW to SE: 380km
・ High population density
(b) Seamless Mobilization of assets throughout peacetime to wartime
(provide safety of Japanese airspace, which is a common goods)
- Jet fighters on 24-hour alert to prevent/repel violation of airspace
- Crews always watch/listen carefully to provide security information
- Provide air cover for maritime and ground forces in crises/war

10. Current Situation
Current Situation
Current Situation of Air Defense Capabilities in Japan
(a) In the transformation from the legacy capability during the
Cold War
(b) Recent developments in the regional security environment

11. Current Situation (1/2)
Current Situation (1/2)
(a) In the transformation from the legacy capability during
the Cold War
- During the Cold War
・ Exclusively air-defense-oriented systems that ultimately
prepare for large-scale invasion
- After the Cold War
・ Cold-War legacy remained in East Asia with Cold-War
mentality
- After the 9/11
・ Government of Japan revised National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004
・ More responsive, flexible, and multi-purpose capability
- Current
・ Still in the process of transforming
・ Not sufficient to accomplish the concept of 2004 NDPG

12. Current Situation (2/2)
Current Situation (2/2)
(b) Recent developments in the regional security environment
North Korea
- Development of nuclear capability
- Nodong missile can reach almost all parts of Japan
China
- High-paced military modernization
- Lack of transparency of defense budget
- Increasing offensive capability in airpower
Fourth-generation fighter, air refueling tanker, AWACS, large cargo
- Fifth-generation fighter in 10 to 12 years
Russia
- Progress in the modernization
- Fifth-generation fighter much earlier than China
- Recovering operational proficiency level in activities
ROK
- Modernizing Navy and Air Force (e.g. F-15K)
- Around 10% increase of defense budget in recent years

13. Challenges
Challenges
Challenges for the Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities
(a) Deterrence and response
(b) Information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and network
(c) Joint operation capabilities
(d) Interoperability under the US-Japan Alliance
(e) International peace cooperation activities
(f) Defense infrastructures for equipments and manpower

14. Challenges (1/6)
Challenges (1/6)
(a) Deterrence and response
(1) Considerable delay in modernization
- Reducing defense budget under serious financial difficulties
- Focused on building up ballistic missile defense (BMD)
- F-X and C-X: behind original schedule
- Can not afford any further delay in weapons modernization
(2) Dependence on the US nuclear umbrella and offensive strike
capability
- Nuclear deterrence is likely to be settled in the balance of the US
nuclear umbrella and BMD capability
- Possible for Japan to depend on the US for the offensive strike
capability, but Japan also needs to shoulder the burden to defend Japan
(3) Absence of dynamic deterrence
- Dynamic deterrence: demonstrate defense capabilities through
display of exercise, forward deployment of units, etc.
- Static deterrence: build-up and maintenance of defense capabilities
- Dynamic deterrence may lead to the escalation of tension, but it can
be sometimes more effective in preventing conflicts

15. Challenges (2/6)
Challenges (2/6)
(b) Information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and network
(1) Warning and surveillance-centric sensors that suffer gap
- Sensor system (fixed ground radars and airborne radars)
suffers serious gap in coverage as well as vulnerability
- Need of multi-layered sensor system including satellite and UAV
(2) Insufficient capability for the network-centric warfare
- Highly sophisticated C2 system, but not optimized platform
- Time-consuming and labor-intensive process of information
gathering, analyses, and distribution
- Enhance NCW capability asap to share information among platform
instantly and to provide properly to decision makers
(3) Dependence on US capabilities outside Japanese territory
- Inevitable for Japan to depend on the US capabilities
- Necessary to continue efforts to enhance information capability for
overseas operations (i.e., PKO, humanitarian assistance)

16. Challenges (3/6)
Challenges (3/6)
(c) Joint operation capabilities
(1) Trend to strengthen joint operation capability
- Joint Staff has taken the initiative fully in operation since 2006
- Joint Staff would become more functional by merging the Bureau of
Operational Policy (2008 report of JMOD reform)
- Room for improvement especially in the field of ISR
(2) Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces’ independently
operated systems
- JGSDF/JMSDF/JASDF independently own assets and systems
- Potential jointness
・ Helicopter (CH-47, UH-60), SAM
・ Logistics
- Need to be tailored for each service’s needs

17. Challenges (4/6)
Challenges (4/6)
(d) Interoperability under the US-Japan Alliance
(1) Insufficient capabilities for bilateral operation with the US forces
- US forces are the most modern/sophisticated forces in the world
- JSDF might become a drag on US forces in an operation, particularly
in the air
- Good communication capability is mandatory requirement for
successful bilateral operations
(2) Appropriate division of roles between the US and Japan
- Important for implementation of the alliance
- More specific allocation of roles should be further examined
- Question: whether JASDF should focus on more autonomous
defense capabilities, or should focus more on the capabilities that will
allow much deeper operational cooperation with USAF?
- More cooperative capabilities for USAF could be a significant option
from the affordability standpoint

18. Challenges (5/6)
Challenges (5/6)
(e) International peace cooperation activities
(1) Insufficient transportation capability
- Lack of capability (range and payload) for international use
- KC-767 is good for passenger transportation
- Strong expectation for Domestically-developing C-X for
transportation of equipments/supplies
(2) Overworked C-130 Wing
- 1st Tactical Airlift Wing has been bearing the overwhelming burden
・ The only one airlift wing holding the only one C-130 squadron
- Overburden should be removed

19. Challenges (6/6)
Challenges (6/6)
(f) Defense infrastructures for equipments and manpower
(1) Weakened defense industrial base
- Continuously support JMOD/JSDF for build-up of defense capabilities
and sustainment of systems/equipments
- Structural difficulties
・ Clients are limited almost exclusively to JMOD
・ Defense business accounts only 3% of total company-wide sales
・ International competitiveness has been relatively deteriorating
- Dependence on foreign companies for parts and licenses to build up
equipments
- Withdrawal of small/medium-sized enterprises from defense business
under decreasing defense budget
- Need to stop weakening and maintain vitality
(especially in the area of jet fighter (over 1,000 companies))
(2) Pilot recruitment and retention difficulty
- Trend toward fewer children per family
- Pilot: required intelligence, mental strength, physical fitness
- Military jet pilot is too dangerous a career path for children
- Hard to recruit and retain qualified pilots

20. Desirable Future
Desirable Future
Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Its Desirable Future
1. Preconditions
(a) Severe fiscal constraints
(b) Aging population
(c) Expectations from international community
2. Key Elements in Japan’s Future Air Defense Capabilities
(a) Effective deterrence and response
(b) Information superiority
(c) Better joint operation capabilities
(d) Enhancement of the capability for international peace
cooperation activities
(e) Strengthening defense infrastructures
(f ) Structural reform for affordability

21. Preconditions
Preconditions
(a) Severe fiscal constraints
- Balance of Japanese government debt has reached around 180% of
GDP (2007)
- Japanese severe fiscal condition will continue
(b) Aging population
- Population is going to decrease, particularly in younger age
・ Child population likely decrease: 17 (2008) to 13 (2020) million
・ Working population likely decrease: 82 to 74 million
・ Older population likely increase: 28 to 36 million
(c) Expectations from international community
- Expected Japan to fulfill responsibility and burdens appropriately for
its place in the world
- Case for international assistance could become more complex/difficult
- Expectation for JSDF’s participation in overseas activities will only
increase

22. Key Elements (1/6)
Key Elements (1/6)
(a) Effective deterrence and response
- Weapons modernization
・ F-X program is the most important
Jet fighter: main asset to ensure air superiority
represent strength of air defense to deter adversaries
- Dynamic deterrence
・ Need of contemplate utilization of dynamic deterrence
International multilateral exercise could be more effective
- Division of roles
・ Need to consult with US more deeply
Examine the concept: more cooperative capability to USAF

23. The Best for F-X
The Best for F-X

24. Key Elements (2/6)
Key Elements (2/6)
(b) Information superiority
- Enhance cooperation with US
・ Need to develop own ISR capability
Unique and useful by using geographical advantage
- Improve quality/timeliness/security
・ Multi-layered sensor system (incl. satellite/UAV/fighter)
・ Efficient information flow (incl. data-link)
・ Better information assurance
Strengthen NCW capability at the same time
- One idea for information cooperation
・ US-Japan bilateral operation of ISR assets
Need to examine carefully according to Japanese law and basic
policies, and to obtain confidence of US for information security

25. Key Elements (3/6)
Key Elements (3/6)
(c) Better joint operation capabilities
- Common air vehicle
・ Efforts to consult in the concept/build-up phase
For a long-term, concentration of air defense assets into JASDF
- Logistics support
・ Treat deliberately whether should be jointed or not
JASDF logistics system could be a role-model
> Logistics specialist in officers
> Centralized logistics support system

26. Key Elements (4/6)
Key Elements (4/6)
(d) Enhancement of the capability for international peace
cooperation activities
- Air transportation capability
・ All efforts for development of C-X
Incl. preparation of logistics support for international operations
- International operation other than airlift
・ E-767/E-2C for surveillance and control of air traffic
・ KC-767 for aerial refueling
Mitigate the burden on C-130 Wing

27. Key Elements (5/6)
Key Elements (5/6)
(e) Strengthening defense infrastructures
- Maintain defense industrial base
・ Creative ideas under severe fiscal condition
> Multi-year contract
> Performance based logistics (PBL)
> Multi-national development
> Priority for domestically-developed/produce equipment
- Recruit talented personnel / retain well-trained soldiers
・ Especially for pilots
> Review/improve curriculum
> Improvement of status/image/payment (incl. danger allowance)

28. Key Elements (6/6)
Key Elements (6/6)
(f) Structural reform for affordability
- Concentrated investment to air defense capabilities
・ Eligible for investment in current security environment
Concentrated investment can reduce cost by mass production
- Drastic scrap of low-effective assets
・ Examine assets and programs and dare to scrap low-
effective ones
Sustainment/modernization needs considerable budget
Possible strong resistance against above two ideas

29. Conclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the Past
Conclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the Past
Always going back to the basics, this spirit of self-sacrifice
and the attitude of people-oriented seems the key to successful
result for the next decade for the JMOD/JSDF.
I hope, putting the past behind us, the Japan can positively
change its mind-set to the bold new ideas.
To establish the new Japan’s air defense capabilities, it must
be the most important “CHANGE” to success.

30. Any comments & questions ?