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Secure Internet of Things:
Challenges and potential approaches
Dr.-Ing. Konrad Wrona
NATO Communications and Information Agency
1
Internet of Things
2
Internet of Threats
3
Internet of Threats
4
Internet of Threats
§ A baby monitoring in Texas, USA
§ The newly-crowned Miss Teen USA
§ A botnet of over 100,000 hijacked everyday
consumer devices
§ Delivery of incorrect dosages of insulin,
§ Printers catching on fire
5
What is Internet of Things?
6
Attacks on SCADA and M2M
§ Theft of water (Gignac Canal System in France)
§ Release of raw sewage, Maroochy Shire Sewage
plant in Australia)
§ Interference with a Landsat-7 earth observation
satellite
§ Computer viruses infecting the ground-control
systems of the Predator and Reaper remotely
piloted aircraft
7
What are the solutions
§ Secure configuration of the devices and OS
§ Secure network communication
§ Secure storage
§ Physical security
§ Hack-proof security is unrealistic
•  Need for intrusion detection and response
§ Defence-in-depth approach
•  Several complementary security mechanisms
•  Context-aware security and broken-glass policies
8
TLS/DTLS/eDTLS
§ TLS – Transport Layer Security
•  The most widely deployed security protocol
•  Uses TCP: requires reliable, in-order packet delivery
§ DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security
•  Uses UDP: works with unreliable, out-of-order packet
delivery used in constrained platforms and networks
•  No multi-record stream cyphers
§ eDTLS on small embedded platforms
•  Reduced state-machine code size, data overhead,
compressed handshake protocol
•  More keying flexibility: Pre-shared, raw public/private,
X.509 certificate
9
Where are the problems
§ Network layer security is the easy part
§ Security provisioning and management is difficult
•  Constrained user interface
•  Amount of devices
•  Untrained users
§ Higher security means higher initial cost,
complexity, power
•  However, data or life loss might be more expensive
10
Internet of Threats
11
DARPA view on IoT security
12
So, does all military equipment
has military-level security?
13
Car hacking
14
Car hacking
15
Car hacking
16
Data recorded by automobile
manufacturers
§  BMW, Chrysler, Ford,
General Motors, Honda,
Hyundai, Jaguar Land
Rover, Mazda, Mercedes-
Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Porsche, Subaru, Toyota,
Volkswagen, and Volvo
§  Aston Martin, Lamborghini,
and Tesla did not respond
17
Data recorded by automobile
manufacturers
18
Data recorded by automobile
manufacturers
19
Data recorded by automobile
manufacturers
§  Physical location recorded at regular
intervals;
§  Previous destinations entered into
navigation system;
§  Last location parked.
§  Potential crash events, such as sudden
changes in speed;
§  Status of steering angle, brake
application, seat belt use, and air bag
deployment;
§  Fault/error codes in electronic systems.
§  Vehicle speed;
§  Direction/heading of travel;
§  Distances and times traveled;
§  Average fuel economy/
consumption;
§  Status of power windows, doors,
and locks;
§  Tire pressure;
§  Fuel level;
§  Engine RPM;
§  Odometer reading;
§  Mileage since last oil change;
§  Battery health;
§  Coolant temperature;
§  Engine status;
§  Exterior temperature and
pressure.
20
Why worry?
21
Why we need fine grained
access control?
22
How to protect customers
from the Internet of Threats?
§ Market design
•  Ask at the Business track of the school
§ Legislation
23
Example of Legislation: Security
and Privacy in Your (SPY) Car Act (2015)
§ Vehicle owners to be made aware of what data is
being collected, transmitted and shared
§ To be offered the chance to opt out of data
collection without losing access to key navigation
or other features where feasible
§ Requiring an easy method for consumers to
evaluate how well an automaker goes beyond the
minimums defined in the proposed law
24
§ Market design
•  Ask at the Business track of the school
§ Legislation
§ Secure design
•  Technology
•  Usability of configuration
•  Easy understanding of implications
25
How to protect customers
from the Internet of Threats?
OLP Dimensions
26
27
Proposed solution: CPR
•  Originator defines content description (attributes), not
confidentiality markings
•  Content attributes determine
–  Protection requirements
•  How the content is to be processed and stored
–  Release conditions
•  To whom it can be released
28
{PROTECTION	
  REQUIREMENTS}
{RELEASE	
  CONDITIONS}
Terminal	
  
attributes
User	
  attributes
ACCESS	
  REQUEST
D
D
+
RELEASE	
  DECISION
CPRESS
NATO Object Level Protection:
Content-based Protection and Release
29
CPR cryptographic access control:
Encryption
30
CPR cryptographic access control:
Decryption
31
BobAlice
sksk
Symmetric Key Encryption
Schemes
§ Same secret key used for encryption and
decryption.
§ Any user can generate keys.
§ Relies on an authenticated distribution
mechanism.
32
BobAlice
pk
CA
sk
pk
sk
Public-Key Encryption Schemes
§ Different keys for encryption and decryption
•  The encryption key is made public
•  The decryption key is kept secret
§ Any user can generate keys.
§ Relies on authenticated distribution mechanism
for public keys.
33
BobAlice
sk
alice@email.com bob@email.com
Key	
  Distribution
sk
Identity-Based Encryption
Schemes
§ Public-key encryption scheme with custom-
formatted public keys
§ No longer relies on authenticated distribution
mechanism for public keys
§ Private keys need to be generated by a central
entity
34
BobAlice
Key	
  Distribution
Female
MSc
Management
Male
Medical
Trainee
Female	
  ˅	
  Trainee
Attribute-Based Encryption
Schemes
§ Extension of IBE where users can be assigned
various attributes
•  Users receive private keys corresponding to their attributes.
•  Ciphertexts are linked with a predicate on the attributes.
•  Decryption ciphertext possible by a user if and only if the linked
predicate evaluates to TRUE on its user attributes.
35
§ Predicate Encryption (PE)
•  Also incorporates schemes that support predicate
hiding.
§ Functional Encryption (FE)
•  Also incorporates schemes where the outcome of a
decryption is a non-trivial function of the involved
message, predicate and key.
§ Relationship: 𝑃𝐾𝐸⊂ 𝐼𝐵𝐸⊂ 𝐴𝐵𝐸⊂ 𝑃𝐸⊂ 𝐹𝐸.
Other Related Encryption
Schemes
9/4/15 36NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PFP
Hybrid Encryption with ABE
§ Concept
•  Encrypt plaintext with symmetric encryption scheme.
•  Encrypt symmetric key using ABE.
§ Motivation
•  The overhead of using ABE is relative to the size of
the data it encrypts.
•  Symmetric keys tend to be much smaller than the
plaintext to be encrypted.
•  Limited overhead when using symmetric encryption.
•  This significantly reduces the overhead of using ABE
relative to the plaintext to be encrypted.
37
Definition Attribute-Based
Encryption
§ Let 𝑃: 𝐾× 𝐼→{0,1} be a PT predicate.
§ ABE consists of four PPT algorithms:
Ø ( 𝑝𝑘, 𝑚𝑠𝑘)← 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝(​1↑𝜆 )
Ø  𝑠𝑘← 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛( 𝑚𝑠𝑘, 𝒌)
Ø  𝑐← 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡( 𝑝𝑘,  (𝒊𝒏𝒅, 𝑚))
Ø  𝑦← 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝑠𝑘, 𝑐)
where 𝑘∈ 𝐾 and 𝑖𝑛𝑑∈ 𝐼 and
Ø  𝑦={█■𝑚      if   𝑃( 𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑑)=1⁠⊥      if   𝑃(𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑑)=0  
38
Key Policy
§ The key space 𝐾 consists of 𝑛-variable Boolean
formulas 𝜙.
§ Elements 𝑖𝑛𝑑= 𝑧=(​ 𝑧↓1 ,​ 𝑧↓2 ,⋯,​ 𝑧↓𝑛 ) from the index
space 𝐼∈​{0,1}↑𝑛  are interpreted as
representations of 𝑛 Boolean values.
§  𝑃(𝜙, 𝑧)={█■1        if   𝜙(𝑧)=1        ⁠0        otherwise              
39
Ciphertext Policy
§ The key space 𝐾=​{0,1}↑𝑛  consists of
representations 𝑘= 𝑧=(​ 𝑧↓1 ,​ 𝑧↓2 ,⋯,​ 𝑧↓𝑛 ) of 𝑛
Boolean values.
§ Elements 𝑖𝑛𝑑= 𝜙 from the index space 𝐼 are
𝑛-variable Boolean formulas.
§  𝑃(𝑧, 𝜙)={█■1        if   𝜙(𝑧)=1        ⁠0        otherwise              
40
Challenger Adversary
(Setup)
(Query	
  Phase	
  1)
(Challenge	
  set	
  selection)
(Plaintext	
  submission)
(Query	
  Phase	
  2)
(Guess)
(Challenge	
  response)
public	
  parameters
key	
  queries
attribute	
  set	
  S	
  not	
  accepted	
  by	
  queried	
  keys
challenge	
  messages	
  m0,	
  m1
Encrypt(pk,(S,m0))	
  or	
  Encrypt(pk,(S,m1))
queries	
  for	
  keys	
  with	
  policy	
  not	
  accepting	
  S
m0	
  or	
  m1
Full Security
§ Security defined by the following game:
41 41
Challenger Adversary
(Setup)
(Query	
  Phase	
  1)
(Challenge	
  set	
  selection)
(Plaintext	
  submission)
(Query	
  Phase	
  2)
(Guess)
(Challenge	
  response)
public	
  parameters
attribute	
  set	
  S
challenge	
  messages	
  m0,	
  m1
Encrypt(pk,(S,m0))	
  or	
  Encrypt(pk,(S,m1))
queries	
  for	
  keys	
  with	
  policy	
  not	
  accepting	
  S
m0	
  or	
  m1
queries	
  for	
  keys	
  with	
  policy	
  not	
  accepting	
  S
Selective Security
§ Security defined by the following game:
4242
Selective Security Limitations
§ Can only use policies that accept the challenge
attribute set.
§ Can only use attributes in the challenge attribute
set.
•  This in particular makes selective security unsuitable
for ABE schemes that need to support both positive
and negative attributes.
§ Therefore, we mainly focus on fully secure
schemes.
43
§ Attribute assignments are Boolean.
•  E.g., a person may get assigned the attribute
“member”, “not a member” or no attribute related to
membership at all.
§ Relatively efficient inequality comparisons
involving static integers are however possible.
•  Uses attributes corresponding to bit representations.
•  E.g., 6 encodes as the set {“1∗∗”,  “∗1∗”,  “∗∗0”}.
•  E.g, 𝑎  <  5 encodes as “0∗∗”  ∨  (“∗0∗”  ∧  “∗∗0”).
Inequalities in Policies
9/4/15 44NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PFP
Revocation
§ Revocation mechanism types
•  Indirect revocation
•  Direct revocation
§ Efficiency-enhancing techniques for revocation
45
USE CASES
46
§  Provide protection
of information in an
environment where both
communication
and data storage
infrastructure are
controlled by a third
party
§  Support all standard
information exchange
scenarios
CPR cryptographic access control:
Infrastructure
47
CPR Example: Information
sharing for Passive Missile Defence
48
NATO Desktop located
in Class I areaNATO employee with
NATO Secret clearance
NATO contractor with
NATO Restr. clearance
NATO
laptop
Red Cross worker Unknown
terminal
Full view
Partial view
Public information
only
CPR
Thank you!
konrad.wrona@ncia.nato.int

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Senzations’15: Secure Internet of Things

  • 1. Secure Internet of Things: Challenges and potential approaches Dr.-Ing. Konrad Wrona NATO Communications and Information Agency 1
  • 5. Internet of Threats § A baby monitoring in Texas, USA § The newly-crowned Miss Teen USA § A botnet of over 100,000 hijacked everyday consumer devices § Delivery of incorrect dosages of insulin, § Printers catching on fire 5
  • 6. What is Internet of Things? 6
  • 7. Attacks on SCADA and M2M § Theft of water (Gignac Canal System in France) § Release of raw sewage, Maroochy Shire Sewage plant in Australia) § Interference with a Landsat-7 earth observation satellite § Computer viruses infecting the ground-control systems of the Predator and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft 7
  • 8. What are the solutions § Secure configuration of the devices and OS § Secure network communication § Secure storage § Physical security § Hack-proof security is unrealistic •  Need for intrusion detection and response § Defence-in-depth approach •  Several complementary security mechanisms •  Context-aware security and broken-glass policies 8
  • 9. TLS/DTLS/eDTLS § TLS – Transport Layer Security •  The most widely deployed security protocol •  Uses TCP: requires reliable, in-order packet delivery § DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security •  Uses UDP: works with unreliable, out-of-order packet delivery used in constrained platforms and networks •  No multi-record stream cyphers § eDTLS on small embedded platforms •  Reduced state-machine code size, data overhead, compressed handshake protocol •  More keying flexibility: Pre-shared, raw public/private, X.509 certificate 9
  • 10. Where are the problems § Network layer security is the easy part § Security provisioning and management is difficult •  Constrained user interface •  Amount of devices •  Untrained users § Higher security means higher initial cost, complexity, power •  However, data or life loss might be more expensive 10
  • 12. DARPA view on IoT security 12
  • 13. So, does all military equipment has military-level security? 13
  • 17. Data recorded by automobile manufacturers §  BMW, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar Land Rover, Mazda, Mercedes- Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo §  Aston Martin, Lamborghini, and Tesla did not respond 17
  • 18. Data recorded by automobile manufacturers 18
  • 19. Data recorded by automobile manufacturers 19
  • 20. Data recorded by automobile manufacturers §  Physical location recorded at regular intervals; §  Previous destinations entered into navigation system; §  Last location parked. §  Potential crash events, such as sudden changes in speed; §  Status of steering angle, brake application, seat belt use, and air bag deployment; §  Fault/error codes in electronic systems. §  Vehicle speed; §  Direction/heading of travel; §  Distances and times traveled; §  Average fuel economy/ consumption; §  Status of power windows, doors, and locks; §  Tire pressure; §  Fuel level; §  Engine RPM; §  Odometer reading; §  Mileage since last oil change; §  Battery health; §  Coolant temperature; §  Engine status; §  Exterior temperature and pressure. 20
  • 22. Why we need fine grained access control? 22
  • 23. How to protect customers from the Internet of Threats? § Market design •  Ask at the Business track of the school § Legislation 23
  • 24. Example of Legislation: Security and Privacy in Your (SPY) Car Act (2015) § Vehicle owners to be made aware of what data is being collected, transmitted and shared § To be offered the chance to opt out of data collection without losing access to key navigation or other features where feasible § Requiring an easy method for consumers to evaluate how well an automaker goes beyond the minimums defined in the proposed law 24
  • 25. § Market design •  Ask at the Business track of the school § Legislation § Secure design •  Technology •  Usability of configuration •  Easy understanding of implications 25 How to protect customers from the Internet of Threats?
  • 27. 27
  • 28. Proposed solution: CPR •  Originator defines content description (attributes), not confidentiality markings •  Content attributes determine –  Protection requirements •  How the content is to be processed and stored –  Release conditions •  To whom it can be released 28 {PROTECTION  REQUIREMENTS} {RELEASE  CONDITIONS} Terminal   attributes User  attributes ACCESS  REQUEST D D + RELEASE  DECISION CPRESS
  • 29. NATO Object Level Protection: Content-based Protection and Release 29
  • 30. CPR cryptographic access control: Encryption 30
  • 31. CPR cryptographic access control: Decryption 31
  • 32. BobAlice sksk Symmetric Key Encryption Schemes § Same secret key used for encryption and decryption. § Any user can generate keys. § Relies on an authenticated distribution mechanism. 32
  • 33. BobAlice pk CA sk pk sk Public-Key Encryption Schemes § Different keys for encryption and decryption •  The encryption key is made public •  The decryption key is kept secret § Any user can generate keys. § Relies on authenticated distribution mechanism for public keys. 33
  • 34. BobAlice sk alice@email.com bob@email.com Key  Distribution sk Identity-Based Encryption Schemes § Public-key encryption scheme with custom- formatted public keys § No longer relies on authenticated distribution mechanism for public keys § Private keys need to be generated by a central entity 34
  • 35. BobAlice Key  Distribution Female MSc Management Male Medical Trainee Female  ˅  Trainee Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes § Extension of IBE where users can be assigned various attributes •  Users receive private keys corresponding to their attributes. •  Ciphertexts are linked with a predicate on the attributes. •  Decryption ciphertext possible by a user if and only if the linked predicate evaluates to TRUE on its user attributes. 35
  • 36. § Predicate Encryption (PE) •  Also incorporates schemes that support predicate hiding. § Functional Encryption (FE) •  Also incorporates schemes where the outcome of a decryption is a non-trivial function of the involved message, predicate and key. § Relationship: 𝑃𝐾𝐸⊂ 𝐼𝐵𝐸⊂ 𝐴𝐵𝐸⊂ 𝑃𝐸⊂ 𝐹𝐸. Other Related Encryption Schemes 9/4/15 36NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PFP
  • 37. Hybrid Encryption with ABE § Concept •  Encrypt plaintext with symmetric encryption scheme. •  Encrypt symmetric key using ABE. § Motivation •  The overhead of using ABE is relative to the size of the data it encrypts. •  Symmetric keys tend to be much smaller than the plaintext to be encrypted. •  Limited overhead when using symmetric encryption. •  This significantly reduces the overhead of using ABE relative to the plaintext to be encrypted. 37
  • 38. Definition Attribute-Based Encryption § Let 𝑃: 𝐾× 𝐼→{0,1} be a PT predicate. § ABE consists of four PPT algorithms: Ø ( 𝑝𝑘, 𝑚𝑠𝑘)← 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝(​1↑𝜆 ) Ø  𝑠𝑘← 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛( 𝑚𝑠𝑘, 𝒌) Ø  𝑐← 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡( 𝑝𝑘,  (𝒊𝒏𝒅, 𝑚)) Ø  𝑦← 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝑠𝑘, 𝑐) where 𝑘∈ 𝐾 and 𝑖𝑛𝑑∈ 𝐼 and Ø  𝑦={█■𝑚      if   𝑃( 𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑑)=1⁠⊥      if   𝑃(𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑑)=0   38
  • 39. Key Policy § The key space 𝐾 consists of 𝑛-variable Boolean formulas 𝜙. § Elements 𝑖𝑛𝑑= 𝑧=(​ 𝑧↓1 ,​ 𝑧↓2 ,⋯,​ 𝑧↓𝑛 ) from the index space 𝐼∈​{0,1}↑𝑛  are interpreted as representations of 𝑛 Boolean values. §  𝑃(𝜙, 𝑧)={█■1        if   𝜙(𝑧)=1        ⁠0        otherwise               39
  • 40. Ciphertext Policy § The key space 𝐾=​{0,1}↑𝑛  consists of representations 𝑘= 𝑧=(​ 𝑧↓1 ,​ 𝑧↓2 ,⋯,​ 𝑧↓𝑛 ) of 𝑛 Boolean values. § Elements 𝑖𝑛𝑑= 𝜙 from the index space 𝐼 are 𝑛-variable Boolean formulas. §  𝑃(𝑧, 𝜙)={█■1        if   𝜙(𝑧)=1        ⁠0        otherwise               40
  • 41. Challenger Adversary (Setup) (Query  Phase  1) (Challenge  set  selection) (Plaintext  submission) (Query  Phase  2) (Guess) (Challenge  response) public  parameters key  queries attribute  set  S  not  accepted  by  queried  keys challenge  messages  m0,  m1 Encrypt(pk,(S,m0))  or  Encrypt(pk,(S,m1)) queries  for  keys  with  policy  not  accepting  S m0  or  m1 Full Security § Security defined by the following game: 41 41
  • 42. Challenger Adversary (Setup) (Query  Phase  1) (Challenge  set  selection) (Plaintext  submission) (Query  Phase  2) (Guess) (Challenge  response) public  parameters attribute  set  S challenge  messages  m0,  m1 Encrypt(pk,(S,m0))  or  Encrypt(pk,(S,m1)) queries  for  keys  with  policy  not  accepting  S m0  or  m1 queries  for  keys  with  policy  not  accepting  S Selective Security § Security defined by the following game: 4242
  • 43. Selective Security Limitations § Can only use policies that accept the challenge attribute set. § Can only use attributes in the challenge attribute set. •  This in particular makes selective security unsuitable for ABE schemes that need to support both positive and negative attributes. § Therefore, we mainly focus on fully secure schemes. 43
  • 44. § Attribute assignments are Boolean. •  E.g., a person may get assigned the attribute “member”, “not a member” or no attribute related to membership at all. § Relatively efficient inequality comparisons involving static integers are however possible. •  Uses attributes corresponding to bit representations. •  E.g., 6 encodes as the set {“1∗∗”,  “∗1∗”,  “∗∗0”}. •  E.g, 𝑎  <  5 encodes as “0∗∗”  ∨  (“∗0∗”  ∧  “∗∗0”). Inequalities in Policies 9/4/15 44NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PFP
  • 45. Revocation § Revocation mechanism types •  Indirect revocation •  Direct revocation § Efficiency-enhancing techniques for revocation 45
  • 47. §  Provide protection of information in an environment where both communication and data storage infrastructure are controlled by a third party §  Support all standard information exchange scenarios CPR cryptographic access control: Infrastructure 47
  • 48. CPR Example: Information sharing for Passive Missile Defence 48 NATO Desktop located in Class I areaNATO employee with NATO Secret clearance NATO contractor with NATO Restr. clearance NATO laptop Red Cross worker Unknown terminal Full view Partial view Public information only CPR