18. 以降,自治体へのヒアリング等を通じて日本における学校選択制の現状について調査する
とともに,学校選択制に関する最新の学術成果や海外における制度変更の事例を研究しな
がら,望ましい学校選択制の制度設計に他の参加メンバーと共同で取り組んでいる23.本
稿でも触れたように,学校選択制に関する分析は日進月歩の状態で,次々と新たな成果が
明らかにされている.こうした最先端の学術的な知見を活かしつつ,教育現場と連携を取
りながら現実と理論をうまく融合させ,よりよい学校選択制の実現を目指して積極的に活
動していきたい.
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