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Windows Security
Functions
- To make only one wish -
CODE BLUE 2018 1
Profile
Satoshi Ogawa
Mitsui Bussan Secure Direction(MBSD)
Twitter:abend@number3to4
Burp Suite Japan User Group
ISOG-WG1
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Profile
Speaker
• OWASP DAY 2014
• July Tech Festa 2015, 2017
• AVTOKYO2016
• Financials ISAC Japan Conference 2018
Writing
• Software Design
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Background
I have done penetration tests at many companies,
and I’ve Windows security functions at
each company.
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Things to inform in this session
is not always detected and blocked, so I
wanted to say that it’s important to only not enable
security functions, but to implement multilayered defense,
such as strengthening monitoring.
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Penetration Test
We suppose the scenario, and test from the point of
intrusion into servers and network devices.
Firewall
Attack from internet
Inside Jobs
Take over
Attack
・ what kind of authority
・ what we can do
Impact
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The Penetration Test scenarios
There are cases where we investigate whether or not we
can intrude servers assuming malware infection caused by
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).
Firewall
PC & Domain User Tester
User SegmentServer Segment
IPS
Access
Internet
Tester
Access
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View of attacker
In APTs, since an attacker with a clear intention and purpose
intends to steal information from a specific organization, we
assume that even if there are restricted by security functions, they
will bypass and accomplish their purpose.
authentication and intrude
security function restrictions
..etc
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View of attacker
In APTs, since an attacker with a clear intention and purpose
intends to steal information from a specific organization, we
assume that even if there are restricted by security functions, they
will bypass and accomplish their purpose.
authentication and intrude
security function restrictions
..etc
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This Session
Steps in APT
Preparation Intrusion
Lateral
Movement
Action
• Gathering information from Target
• Intrusion into Target
• Intrusion into the important servers
• Stealing confidential information and hiding log
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Steps in APT
“Preparation“ doesn’t concern so I won’t
talk about it this time.
Preparation Intrusion
Lateral
Movement
Action
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Steps in APT
Preparation Intrusion
Lateral
Movement
has to do with anti-viruses and monitoring,
but I won’t talk about it this time.
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Action
Steps in APT
I’ll be talking about which may be used
when intruding PCs etc.
Preparation Intrusion
Lateral
Movement
Action
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Lateral Movement
• Operation in the intruded PCs
• Searching for other vulnerable PCs and expanding intrusion
• Intrusion into servers using the collected information
Gathering informationOperation
Intrusion into servers
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Lateral Movement
https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement
• AppleScript
• Application Deployment Software
• Distributed Component Object Model
• Replication Through Removable Media
• Windows Remote Management
• Exploitation of Vulnerability
• Remote Desktop Protocol
• Remote File Copy
• Logon Scripts
• Pass the Hash
• SSH Hijacking
• Shared Webroot
• Remote Services
• Taint Shared Content
• Third-party Software
• Windows Admin Shares
Japanese
https://github.com/abend9999/lateralmovement
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How to protect Windows
There are security functions to protect Windows
against various attack methods.
• AppLocker
• Software Restriction Policy
• Windows Defender
• UAC (User Account Control)
..etc
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Security restrictions on Windows
• Cannot install application (excluding PowerUser)
• Cannot change PC setting
• Cannot execute applications that are inadequate
for business
• Do not grant local administrator authority
• Restricts execution of specific applications
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Result
AppLocker control object
Based on the publisher, file path, and file hash , AppLocker
currently supports the following file extensions.
• Executables (.exe, .com)
• Windows Installers (.msi, .mst, .msp)
• Scripts (.vbs, .js, .ps1, .cmd, .bat)
• Dlls (.ocx, .dll)
• Packaged app installers (.appx)
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AppLocker settings
AppLocker simply specifies conditions such as the
types of files you want to control execution.
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Note about AppLocker
If the service "Application Identity" is not running,
AppLocker cannot be activated.
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Advantages of AppLocker
If you have applications that you do not plan to use
such as cmd.exe, restricting them may increase the
security level.
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From here, I will introduce examples of
security restrictions in penetration testing.
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Restricting Drive Access - Background
In cases where access to an arbitrary drive is
prohibited, access to C drive is often prohibited or
hidden.
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Restricting Drive Access - Trial
But it can be referenced in command prompt and
can be accessed by directly specifying the path.
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Restricting Drive Access - Trial
But it can be referenced in command prompt and
can be accessed by directly specifying the path.
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This can be bypassed too easily ...
Restricting Drive Access –
Assumption
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWind
owsCurrentVersionPolicesExplorerNoViewOnD
rive
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It is possible to specify and restrict the drive with
the following registry key, therefore we assume
that this was controlled by the registry.
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Restricting Applications - Background
There was a case where presumably the following
countermeasures were implemented to restrict specific
applications (such as notepad and command prompt):
• Disabled “Run”
• Hid C drive
• Deleted program menu
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Restricting Applications - Trial
I ran Notepad with "View source" in Internet Explorer, generated a
bat file to run cmd.exe, and then executed it.
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Restricting Applications - Trial
I ran Notepad with "View source" in Internet Explorer, generated a
bat file to run cmd.exe, and then executed it.
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If you choose GOOD ADVICE and even IE is stopped.
Restricting Application –
Assumption
• Control “Run” in the registry:
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HKEY_CURRENT_USER¥SOFTWARE¥Microsoft¥Windows¥CurrentVersion¥Policies¥Explorer
NoRun
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPolicesExplorerN
oViewOnDrive
• Control Drive display setting in the registry:
C:¥ProgramData¥Microsoft¥Windows¥Start Menu¥Programs
• Control program menu in the folder:
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Restricting IE - Background
When execution of Internet Explorer is restricted
using AppLocker ...
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Restricting IE – Trial 1
Send GET Request with PowerShell.
$req = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create("https://www.google.com")
$response = $req.GetResponse()
$stream = $response.GetResponseStream()
$res = (new-object System.IO.StreamReader $stream).ReadToEnd()
write-host $res
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Restricting IE – Trial 2
If you can render jquery in your brain, this is enough.
<!doctype html><html itemscope="" itemtype="http://schema.org/WebPage" lang="ja"><head><meta content="&#1999
0;&#30028;&#20013;&#12398;&#12354;&#12425;&#12422;&#12427;&#24773;&#22577;&#12434;&#26908;&#32034;&#
12377;&#12427;&#12383;&#12417;&#12398;&#12484;&#12540;&#12523;&#12434;&#25552;&#20379;&#12375;&#1239
0;&#12356;&#12414;&#12377;&#12290;&#12373;&#12414;&#12374;&#12414;&#12394;&#26908;&#32034;&#27231;&#
33021;&#12434;&#27963;&#29992;&#12375;&#12390;&#12289;&#12362;&#25506;&#12375;&#12398;&#24773;&#2257
7;&#12434;&#35211;&#12388;&#12369;&#12390;&#12367;&#12384;&#12373;&#12356;&#12290;" name="description">
<meta content="noodp" name="robots"><meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"><meta co
ntent="/logos/doodles/2018/world-cup-2018-day-19-6211393811382272.3-law.gif" itemprop="image"><meta content="&
#12527;&#12540;&#12523;&#12489;&#12459;&#12483;&#12503; - Day 19" property="twitter:title"><meta content="&#1
2373;&#12354;&#35430;&#21512;&#38283;&#22987;&#12391;&#12377;&#65281;&#20170;&#26085;&#12398;#Google
Doodle &#12391; &#19990;&#30028;&#20013; &#127758;&#127757;&#127759;&#12398; &#9917;&#12434;&#24540;&#
25588;&#12375;&#12424;&#12358;&#65281;" property="twitter:description">
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Restricting IE – Trial 3
Using HTML helper to refer to help files like CHM
format.
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Restricting IE – Trial 4
Specify URL as an argument in HTML Help.
 hh http://www.google.com
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Restricting IE – Trial 4
Specify URL as an argument in HTML Help.
 hh http://www.google.com
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I understood that I managed without a browser.
Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (1)
Direct access to https site → Error
Sites redirected from http to https → No problem
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hh.exe can also operate as an explorer.
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Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (2)
hh.exe can also open certain files (such as txt and
xml files).
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Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (3)
hh.exe cannot open if access is restricted to C drive.
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Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (4)
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Restricting PowerShell
By restricting PowerShell, you can prevent file-less
attacks using PowerShell.
If file-less, it is hard to
detect for Antiviruses
Running a malicious script using Pass the Hash
CODE BLUE 2018 48
PowerShell without PowerShell
"PowerShell without PowerShell" released in August
2016 bypasses AppLocker and runs PowerShell.
https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/powershell-without-powershell-how-to-byp
ass-application-whitelisting-environment-restrictions-av/
CODE BLUE 2018 49
PowerShell without PowerShell
• Compile C# program with CSC.exe to run PowerShell as
action at uninstall
• Uninstall output compiled with InstallUtil.exe
• PowerShell runs
CSC.exe
InstallUtil.exe
C# SourceOverride Uninstall and
specify PowerShell command
①Compile
②Output
Binary file
③Uninstall
Run PowerShell
specified in C#
CODE BLUE 2018 50
PowerShell without PowerShell
When running PowerShell, the process runs as
InstallUtil.exe.
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PowerShell without PowerShel
It can be executed with user privilege.
• Compiling CSC.exe
• Uninstalling InstallUnite.exe
CODE BLUE 2018 52
PowerShell without PowerShell
PowerShell runs in the background, but depending
on the PowerShell script you run, it may be easy to
get shell.
InstallUtil.exe
Binary File
Uninstall
Run PowerShell
specified in C#
CODE BLUE 2018 53
PowerShell without PowerShell
You can easily obtain shell by running a script that
performs reverse connect.
Device that restricts
PowerShell
• Acquire script via IEX using
Powershell without PowerShell
• Execute file-less
Reverse connect target
CODE BLUE 2018 54
• Acquire script via IEX using
Powershell without PowerShell
• Execute file-less
PowerShell without PowerShell
You can easily obtain shell by running a script that
performs reverse connect.
CODE BLUE 2018 55
Device that restricts
PowerShell
Reverse connect target
CODE BLUE 2018 56
Q.Which same One?
It is easier than this problem.
by using Install Option
I found another method ( by using Install
Option), so I would like to introduce it.
• PowerShell without Powershell
⇒ User privilege
by using Install Option
⇒ Administrator privilege required
CODE BLUE 2018 57
AppLocker’s intended target
AppLocker can restrict 5 types of files:
• Executables (.exe, .com)
• Windows Installers (.msi, .mst, .msp)
• Scripts (.vbs, .js, .ps1, .cmd, .bat)
• Dlls (.ocx, .dll)
• Packaged app installers (.appx)
CODE BLUE 2018 58
Differences depending on the
extension
I thought that if I changed the extension of the EXE
file in various ways, I could AppLocker.
• Change to COM file
→ AppLocker blocked
• Change to BAT file
→ AppLocker blocked
• Change to MSI file
→ Error showing that it's not package file
CODE BLUE 2018 59
Trial ①
I tried to build cmd.exe so that it can be installed as
an MSI file without causing an error.
CODE BLUE 2018 60
Trial ②
I noticed the Custom Option and built it to run
cmd.exe as an Install Option.
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Behavior after ①
I could run cmd.exe by specifying in Install Option,
but I got an error when I “dir” in C drive.
CODE BLUE 2018 64
When cmd.exe is restarted, it operates normally
with SYSTEM privilege.
Behavior after ②
CODE BLUE 2018 65
cmd.exe launched after can run all
applications restricted by AppLocker.
Behavior after ③
CODE BLUE 2018 66
By the way
Even if notepad.exe is restricted via AppLocker, it can be
launched by “view source” in Internet Explorer.
CODE BLUE 2018 67
Let’s not forget
There are some settings that we tend to forget when
restricting cmd.exe or powershell.exe with AppLocker.
CODE BLUE 2018 68
Let’s not forget
CODE BLUE 2018 69
Run powershell_ise.exe
Let’s not forget
CODE BLUE 2018 70
Run powershell_ise.exe
Run powershell_ise.exe
You can run powershell_ise.exe, but it will be
blocked when you start a new PowerShell process
within it.
CODE BLUE 2018 71
One wish
I asked MSRC if I could do something to solve this,
but I got a similar answer.
“Applocker generally does not meet the bar
for MSRC case.”
CODE BLUE 2018 72
CODE BLUE 2018 73
In order to protect myself from bypass, I noticed that I had to do
something for myself.
Countermeasures
• Use AppLocker with a whitelist
• If it’s difficult to operate a whitelist, set strict
restrictions for AppLocker along with other group
policies
• Detect problems using multilayer defense such as
monitoring operation logs
CODE BLUE 2018 74
Countermeasures
By implementing the following restrictions, I could
not the methods introduced in this talk.
I restricted the following using AppLocker:
• iexplorer.exe
• csc.exe
• powershell.exe
• powershell_ise.exe
• cmd.exe
• Installing non-Microsoft software
※ There is possibility of other operations being affected by implementing these restrictions.
Please do so at your own risk.
CODE BLUE 2018 75
Summary
• There are many methods of Windows
security functions, and it is very difficult to
completely prevent them
• It is important to acquire logs, restrict and
monitor networks, etc. on the premise that you
will get
CODE BLUE 2018 76
Reference
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-
overview
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-
with-applocker-rules
• https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/powershell-without-powershell-how-to-bypass-application-whitelisting-environment-restrictions-
av/
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-
software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies
• https://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/AD_report_20170314.pdf
• https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement
• http://eternalwindows.jp/security/securitycontext/securitycontext17.html
CODE BLUE 2018 77

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Bypassing Windows Security Functions(en)

  • 1. Windows Security Functions - To make only one wish - CODE BLUE 2018 1
  • 2. Profile Satoshi Ogawa Mitsui Bussan Secure Direction(MBSD) Twitter:abend@number3to4 Burp Suite Japan User Group ISOG-WG1 CODE BLUE 2018 2
  • 3. Profile Speaker • OWASP DAY 2014 • July Tech Festa 2015, 2017 • AVTOKYO2016 • Financials ISAC Japan Conference 2018 Writing • Software Design CODE BLUE 2018 3
  • 4. Background I have done penetration tests at many companies, and I’ve Windows security functions at each company. CODE BLUE 2018 4
  • 5. Things to inform in this session is not always detected and blocked, so I wanted to say that it’s important to only not enable security functions, but to implement multilayered defense, such as strengthening monitoring. CODE BLUE 2018 5
  • 6. Penetration Test We suppose the scenario, and test from the point of intrusion into servers and network devices. Firewall Attack from internet Inside Jobs Take over Attack ・ what kind of authority ・ what we can do Impact CODE BLUE 2018 6
  • 7. The Penetration Test scenarios There are cases where we investigate whether or not we can intrude servers assuming malware infection caused by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Firewall PC & Domain User Tester User SegmentServer Segment IPS Access Internet Tester Access CODE BLUE 2018 7
  • 8. View of attacker In APTs, since an attacker with a clear intention and purpose intends to steal information from a specific organization, we assume that even if there are restricted by security functions, they will bypass and accomplish their purpose. authentication and intrude security function restrictions ..etc CODE BLUE 2018 8
  • 9. View of attacker In APTs, since an attacker with a clear intention and purpose intends to steal information from a specific organization, we assume that even if there are restricted by security functions, they will bypass and accomplish their purpose. authentication and intrude security function restrictions ..etc CODE BLUE 2018 9 This Session
  • 10. Steps in APT Preparation Intrusion Lateral Movement Action • Gathering information from Target • Intrusion into Target • Intrusion into the important servers • Stealing confidential information and hiding log CODE BLUE 2018 10
  • 11. Steps in APT “Preparation“ doesn’t concern so I won’t talk about it this time. Preparation Intrusion Lateral Movement Action CODE BLUE 2018 11
  • 12. Steps in APT Preparation Intrusion Lateral Movement has to do with anti-viruses and monitoring, but I won’t talk about it this time. CODE BLUE 2018 12 Action
  • 13. Steps in APT I’ll be talking about which may be used when intruding PCs etc. Preparation Intrusion Lateral Movement Action CODE BLUE 2018 13
  • 14. Lateral Movement • Operation in the intruded PCs • Searching for other vulnerable PCs and expanding intrusion • Intrusion into servers using the collected information Gathering informationOperation Intrusion into servers CODE BLUE 2018 14
  • 15. Lateral Movement https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement • AppleScript • Application Deployment Software • Distributed Component Object Model • Replication Through Removable Media • Windows Remote Management • Exploitation of Vulnerability • Remote Desktop Protocol • Remote File Copy • Logon Scripts • Pass the Hash • SSH Hijacking • Shared Webroot • Remote Services • Taint Shared Content • Third-party Software • Windows Admin Shares Japanese https://github.com/abend9999/lateralmovement CODE BLUE 2018 15
  • 16. How to protect Windows There are security functions to protect Windows against various attack methods. • AppLocker • Software Restriction Policy • Windows Defender • UAC (User Account Control) ..etc CODE BLUE 2018 16
  • 17. Security restrictions on Windows • Cannot install application (excluding PowerUser) • Cannot change PC setting • Cannot execute applications that are inadequate for business • Do not grant local administrator authority • Restricts execution of specific applications CODE BLUE 2018 17 Result
  • 18. AppLocker control object Based on the publisher, file path, and file hash , AppLocker currently supports the following file extensions. • Executables (.exe, .com) • Windows Installers (.msi, .mst, .msp) • Scripts (.vbs, .js, .ps1, .cmd, .bat) • Dlls (.ocx, .dll) • Packaged app installers (.appx) CODE BLUE 2018 18
  • 19. AppLocker settings AppLocker simply specifies conditions such as the types of files you want to control execution. CODE BLUE 2018 19
  • 20. Note about AppLocker If the service "Application Identity" is not running, AppLocker cannot be activated. CODE BLUE 2018 20
  • 21. Advantages of AppLocker If you have applications that you do not plan to use such as cmd.exe, restricting them may increase the security level. CODE BLUE 2018 21
  • 22. From here, I will introduce examples of security restrictions in penetration testing. CODE BLUE 2018 22
  • 24. Restricting Drive Access - Background In cases where access to an arbitrary drive is prohibited, access to C drive is often prohibited or hidden. CODE BLUE 2018 24
  • 25. Restricting Drive Access - Trial But it can be referenced in command prompt and can be accessed by directly specifying the path. CODE BLUE 2018 25
  • 26. Restricting Drive Access - Trial But it can be referenced in command prompt and can be accessed by directly specifying the path. CODE BLUE 2018 26
  • 27. CODE BLUE 2018 27 This can be bypassed too easily ...
  • 28. Restricting Drive Access – Assumption HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWind owsCurrentVersionPolicesExplorerNoViewOnD rive CODE BLUE 2018 28 It is possible to specify and restrict the drive with the following registry key, therefore we assume that this was controlled by the registry.
  • 30. Restricting Applications - Background There was a case where presumably the following countermeasures were implemented to restrict specific applications (such as notepad and command prompt): • Disabled “Run” • Hid C drive • Deleted program menu CODE BLUE 2018 30
  • 31. Restricting Applications - Trial I ran Notepad with "View source" in Internet Explorer, generated a bat file to run cmd.exe, and then executed it. CODE BLUE 2018 31
  • 32. Restricting Applications - Trial I ran Notepad with "View source" in Internet Explorer, generated a bat file to run cmd.exe, and then executed it. CODE BLUE 2018 32
  • 33. CODE BLUE 2018 33 If you choose GOOD ADVICE and even IE is stopped.
  • 34. Restricting Application – Assumption • Control “Run” in the registry: CODE BLUE 2018 34 HKEY_CURRENT_USER¥SOFTWARE¥Microsoft¥Windows¥CurrentVersion¥Policies¥Explorer NoRun HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPolicesExplorerN oViewOnDrive • Control Drive display setting in the registry: C:¥ProgramData¥Microsoft¥Windows¥Start Menu¥Programs • Control program menu in the folder:
  • 36. Restricting IE - Background When execution of Internet Explorer is restricted using AppLocker ... CODE BLUE 2018 36
  • 37. Restricting IE – Trial 1 Send GET Request with PowerShell. $req = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create("https://www.google.com") $response = $req.GetResponse() $stream = $response.GetResponseStream() $res = (new-object System.IO.StreamReader $stream).ReadToEnd() write-host $res CODE BLUE 2018 37
  • 38. Restricting IE – Trial 2 If you can render jquery in your brain, this is enough. <!doctype html><html itemscope="" itemtype="http://schema.org/WebPage" lang="ja"><head><meta content="&#1999 0;&#30028;&#20013;&#12398;&#12354;&#12425;&#12422;&#12427;&#24773;&#22577;&#12434;&#26908;&#32034;&# 12377;&#12427;&#12383;&#12417;&#12398;&#12484;&#12540;&#12523;&#12434;&#25552;&#20379;&#12375;&#1239 0;&#12356;&#12414;&#12377;&#12290;&#12373;&#12414;&#12374;&#12414;&#12394;&#26908;&#32034;&#27231;&# 33021;&#12434;&#27963;&#29992;&#12375;&#12390;&#12289;&#12362;&#25506;&#12375;&#12398;&#24773;&#2257 7;&#12434;&#35211;&#12388;&#12369;&#12390;&#12367;&#12384;&#12373;&#12356;&#12290;" name="description"> <meta content="noodp" name="robots"><meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"><meta co ntent="/logos/doodles/2018/world-cup-2018-day-19-6211393811382272.3-law.gif" itemprop="image"><meta content="& #12527;&#12540;&#12523;&#12489;&#12459;&#12483;&#12503; - Day 19" property="twitter:title"><meta content="&#1 2373;&#12354;&#35430;&#21512;&#38283;&#22987;&#12391;&#12377;&#65281;&#20170;&#26085;&#12398;#Google Doodle &#12391; &#19990;&#30028;&#20013; &#127758;&#127757;&#127759;&#12398; &#9917;&#12434;&#24540;&# 25588;&#12375;&#12424;&#12358;&#65281;" property="twitter:description"> CODE BLUE 2018 38
  • 39. Restricting IE – Trial 3 Using HTML helper to refer to help files like CHM format. CODE BLUE 2018 39
  • 40. Restricting IE – Trial 4 Specify URL as an argument in HTML Help.  hh http://www.google.com CODE BLUE 2018 40
  • 41. Restricting IE – Trial 4 Specify URL as an argument in HTML Help.  hh http://www.google.com CODE BLUE 2018 41
  • 42. CODE BLUE 2018 42 I understood that I managed without a browser.
  • 43. Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (1) Direct access to https site → Error Sites redirected from http to https → No problem CODE BLUE 2018 43
  • 44. hh.exe can also operate as an explorer. CODE BLUE 2018 44 Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (2)
  • 45. hh.exe can also open certain files (such as txt and xml files). CODE BLUE 2018 45 Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (3)
  • 46. hh.exe cannot open if access is restricted to C drive. CODE BLUE 2018 46 Restriction of IE - Behavior of hh.exe (4)
  • 48. Restricting PowerShell By restricting PowerShell, you can prevent file-less attacks using PowerShell. If file-less, it is hard to detect for Antiviruses Running a malicious script using Pass the Hash CODE BLUE 2018 48
  • 49. PowerShell without PowerShell "PowerShell without PowerShell" released in August 2016 bypasses AppLocker and runs PowerShell. https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/powershell-without-powershell-how-to-byp ass-application-whitelisting-environment-restrictions-av/ CODE BLUE 2018 49
  • 50. PowerShell without PowerShell • Compile C# program with CSC.exe to run PowerShell as action at uninstall • Uninstall output compiled with InstallUtil.exe • PowerShell runs CSC.exe InstallUtil.exe C# SourceOverride Uninstall and specify PowerShell command ①Compile ②Output Binary file ③Uninstall Run PowerShell specified in C# CODE BLUE 2018 50
  • 51. PowerShell without PowerShell When running PowerShell, the process runs as InstallUtil.exe. CODE BLUE 2018 51
  • 52. PowerShell without PowerShel It can be executed with user privilege. • Compiling CSC.exe • Uninstalling InstallUnite.exe CODE BLUE 2018 52
  • 53. PowerShell without PowerShell PowerShell runs in the background, but depending on the PowerShell script you run, it may be easy to get shell. InstallUtil.exe Binary File Uninstall Run PowerShell specified in C# CODE BLUE 2018 53
  • 54. PowerShell without PowerShell You can easily obtain shell by running a script that performs reverse connect. Device that restricts PowerShell • Acquire script via IEX using Powershell without PowerShell • Execute file-less Reverse connect target CODE BLUE 2018 54
  • 55. • Acquire script via IEX using Powershell without PowerShell • Execute file-less PowerShell without PowerShell You can easily obtain shell by running a script that performs reverse connect. CODE BLUE 2018 55 Device that restricts PowerShell Reverse connect target
  • 56. CODE BLUE 2018 56 Q.Which same One? It is easier than this problem.
  • 57. by using Install Option I found another method ( by using Install Option), so I would like to introduce it. • PowerShell without Powershell ⇒ User privilege by using Install Option ⇒ Administrator privilege required CODE BLUE 2018 57
  • 58. AppLocker’s intended target AppLocker can restrict 5 types of files: • Executables (.exe, .com) • Windows Installers (.msi, .mst, .msp) • Scripts (.vbs, .js, .ps1, .cmd, .bat) • Dlls (.ocx, .dll) • Packaged app installers (.appx) CODE BLUE 2018 58
  • 59. Differences depending on the extension I thought that if I changed the extension of the EXE file in various ways, I could AppLocker. • Change to COM file → AppLocker blocked • Change to BAT file → AppLocker blocked • Change to MSI file → Error showing that it's not package file CODE BLUE 2018 59
  • 60. Trial ① I tried to build cmd.exe so that it can be installed as an MSI file without causing an error. CODE BLUE 2018 60
  • 61. Trial ② I noticed the Custom Option and built it to run cmd.exe as an Install Option. CODE BLUE 2018 61
  • 64. Behavior after ① I could run cmd.exe by specifying in Install Option, but I got an error when I “dir” in C drive. CODE BLUE 2018 64
  • 65. When cmd.exe is restarted, it operates normally with SYSTEM privilege. Behavior after ② CODE BLUE 2018 65
  • 66. cmd.exe launched after can run all applications restricted by AppLocker. Behavior after ③ CODE BLUE 2018 66
  • 67. By the way Even if notepad.exe is restricted via AppLocker, it can be launched by “view source” in Internet Explorer. CODE BLUE 2018 67
  • 68. Let’s not forget There are some settings that we tend to forget when restricting cmd.exe or powershell.exe with AppLocker. CODE BLUE 2018 68
  • 69. Let’s not forget CODE BLUE 2018 69 Run powershell_ise.exe
  • 70. Let’s not forget CODE BLUE 2018 70 Run powershell_ise.exe
  • 71. Run powershell_ise.exe You can run powershell_ise.exe, but it will be blocked when you start a new PowerShell process within it. CODE BLUE 2018 71
  • 72. One wish I asked MSRC if I could do something to solve this, but I got a similar answer. “Applocker generally does not meet the bar for MSRC case.” CODE BLUE 2018 72
  • 73. CODE BLUE 2018 73 In order to protect myself from bypass, I noticed that I had to do something for myself.
  • 74. Countermeasures • Use AppLocker with a whitelist • If it’s difficult to operate a whitelist, set strict restrictions for AppLocker along with other group policies • Detect problems using multilayer defense such as monitoring operation logs CODE BLUE 2018 74
  • 75. Countermeasures By implementing the following restrictions, I could not the methods introduced in this talk. I restricted the following using AppLocker: • iexplorer.exe • csc.exe • powershell.exe • powershell_ise.exe • cmd.exe • Installing non-Microsoft software ※ There is possibility of other operations being affected by implementing these restrictions. Please do so at your own risk. CODE BLUE 2018 75
  • 76. Summary • There are many methods of Windows security functions, and it is very difficult to completely prevent them • It is important to acquire logs, restrict and monitor networks, etc. on the premise that you will get CODE BLUE 2018 76
  • 77. Reference • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker- overview • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working- with-applocker-rules • https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/powershell-without-powershell-how-to-bypass-application-whitelisting-environment-restrictions- av/ • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using- software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies • https://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/AD_report_20170314.pdf • https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement • http://eternalwindows.jp/security/securitycontext/securitycontext17.html CODE BLUE 2018 77