SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 42
Download to read offline
Protecting Protecting 
your home and office your home and office 
in the era of IoTin the era of IoT
Marian HackMan MarinovMarian HackMan Marinov
Chief System ArchitectChief System Architect
SiteGround.comSiteGround.com
❖❖ Who am I?Who am I?
- Chief System Architect of SiteGround.com- Chief System Architect of SiteGround.com
- Sysadmin since 1996- Sysadmin since 1996
- Organizer of OpenFest, BG Perl- Organizer of OpenFest, BG Perl
Workshops, LUG-BG and othersWorkshops, LUG-BG and others
- Teaching Network Security and- Teaching Network Security and
Linux System AdministrationLinux System Administration
courses in Sofia Universitycourses in Sofia University
and SoftUniand SoftUni
❖❖ What is an IoT device?What is an IoT device?
- a Thermostat- a Thermostat
- a WiFi enabled light bulb- a WiFi enabled light bulb
- Smart TV- Smart TV
- Smart toys- Smart toys
- home/office IP camera- home/office IP camera
- home/office WiFi router- home/office WiFi router
- home/office NAS- home/office NAS
❖❖ What information may leakWhat information may leak
from IoT devices?from IoT devices?
❖❖ Presence informationPresence information
(are you at home/office/car)(are you at home/office/car)
❖❖ Electricity usageElectricity usage
❖❖ What devices are you usingWhat devices are you using
at your networkat your network
❖❖ Voice and videoVoice and video
conversationsconversations
(streaming audio/video)(streaming audio/video)
Samsung privacy statement:Samsung privacy statement:
http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv/http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv/
❖❖ HabitsHabits
❖❖ Private filesPrivate files
(pictures, documents and(pictures, documents and
videos)videos)
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices
have poor securityhave poor security
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices
have poor securityhave poor security
- manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with
usabilityusability
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices
have poor securityhave poor security
- manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with
usabilityusability
- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices
have poor securityhave poor security
- manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with
usabilityusability
- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more
- use of default passwords is widespread- use of default passwords is widespread
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network
http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai
nst-itself/nst-itself/
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network
http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai
nst-itself/nst-itself/
- security of the low cost devices is almost non-- security of the low cost devices is almost non-
existentexistent
❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security?
- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network
http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai
nst-itself/nst-itself/
- security of the low cost devices is almost non-- security of the low cost devices is almost non-
existentexistent
- and to top all that, there is the Shodan search- and to top all that, there is the Shodan search
engine, which helps to search for such devicesengine, which helps to search for such devices
❖❖ The number of attacks made by IoT devicesThe number of attacks made by IoT devices
is increasing while businesses and customersis increasing while businesses and customers
are searching for easier to use devices...are searching for easier to use devices...
❖❖ Most of the IoT devices work in "The Cloud"Most of the IoT devices work in "The Cloud"
- your data is as secure as the company that- your data is as secure as the company that
keeps itkeeps it
- your devices are sharing information with- your devices are sharing information with
other companies via APIsother companies via APIs
- some of your devices can not function without- some of your devices can not function without
"The Cloud""The Cloud"
❖❖ IoT device updatesIoT device updates
- some of these devices get no updates- some of these devices get no updates
- most of the Chinese devices will NEVER get- most of the Chinese devices will NEVER get
software updatessoftware updates
- some of the very small IoT devices don't even- some of the very small IoT devices don't even
have a mechanism for over the air upgradehave a mechanism for over the air upgrade
- a lot of the devices that do support updates,- a lot of the devices that do support updates,
do not have a mechanism to actually verify thedo not have a mechanism to actually verify the
update images, so anyone can provide falseupdate images, so anyone can provide false
imagesimages
❖❖ IoT as TrojansIoT as Trojans
- single compromised IoT device can be used to- single compromised IoT device can be used to
circumvent company firewalls and open yourcircumvent company firewalls and open your
networks to a lot of different attacksnetworks to a lot of different attacks
❖❖ A lot of these missing security features areA lot of these missing security features are
because adding the security would actuallybecause adding the security would actually
introduce complexity for the customersintroduce complexity for the customers
❖❖ Once compromised the devices are no longerOnce compromised the devices are no longer
under your controlunder your control
❖❖ Sometimes compromised devices maySometimes compromised devices may
remain under your control but simply waitingremain under your control but simply waiting
for a command by the C&C serversfor a command by the C&C servers
❖❖ What am I doing to protect my selfWhat am I doing to protect my self
and to protect the Internet from me?and to protect the Internet from me?
❖❖ I personally, try to avoid devices that requireI personally, try to avoid devices that require
access to the manufacturer's sitesaccess to the manufacturer's sites
❖❖ I personally, try to avoid devices that requireI personally, try to avoid devices that require
access to the manufacturer's sitesaccess to the manufacturer's sites
❖❖ This prevents the possibility of remotelyThis prevents the possibility of remotely
disabling or changing my devicedisabling or changing my device
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs
and allow only themand allow only them
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs
and allow only themand allow only them
❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not
require thatrequire that
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs
and allow only themand allow only them
❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not
require thatrequire that
❖❖ When I need to update the SW or FW of theWhen I need to update the SW or FW of the
device I allow them Internet accessdevice I allow them Internet access
❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is
given static IP addressgiven static IP address
❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs
and allow only themand allow only them
❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not
require thatrequire that
❖❖ When I need to update the SW or FW of theWhen I need to update the SW or FW of the
device I allow them Internet accessdevice I allow them Internet access
❖❖ After upgrade I test what the device is tryingAfter upgrade I test what the device is trying
to access againto access again
❖❖ I would never give internet access to VoiceI would never give internet access to Voice
and Video devicesand Video devices
❖❖ In 2015 unprotected baby monitors leakedIn 2015 unprotected baby monitors leaked
audio and video conversations by unsuspectingaudio and video conversations by unsuspecting
familiesfamilies
❖❖ A lot of surveillance give you false sense ofA lot of surveillance give you false sense of
security by providing you user/passwordsecurity by providing you user/password
prompts, but their video streams are protectedprompts, but their video streams are protected
with DEFAULT users and passwordswith DEFAULT users and passwords
❖❖ In 2015 unprotected baby monitors leakedIn 2015 unprotected baby monitors leaked
audio and video conversations by unsuspectingaudio and video conversations by unsuspecting
familiesfamilies
❖❖ In 2016 unprotected IP camera helped toIn 2016 unprotected IP camera helped to
schedule the best time for burglary in someschedule the best time for burglary in some
companies and homes in the UScompanies and homes in the US
❖❖ There are currently around 6 billion internet-There are currently around 6 billion internet-
connected devices in use worldwide, and thatconnected devices in use worldwide, and that
figure is predicted to soar to over 20 billion byfigure is predicted to soar to over 20 billion by
2020, according to research by consultancy2020, according to research by consultancy
Gartner.Gartner.
❖❖ The EU tries to battle these security threatsThe EU tries to battle these security threats
by introducing new laws for IoT devicesby introducing new laws for IoT devices
❖❖ Keep in mind that security IS a process andKeep in mind that security IS a process and
not a statenot a state
❖❖ Keep in mind that security IS a process andKeep in mind that security IS a process and
not a statenot a state
❖❖ A device that is SECURE today, may beA device that is SECURE today, may be
UNSECURE tomorrowUNSECURE tomorrow
THANK YOUTHANK YOU
Marian HackMan Marinov <mm@siteground.com>Marian HackMan Marinov <mm@siteground.com>
Chief System ArchitectChief System Architect
SiteGround.comSiteGround.com

More Related Content

What's hot

"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security
"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security
"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT SecurityCableLabs
 
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT SecurityRyan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT SecurityRyan Wilson
 
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of Things
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of ThingsMark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of Things
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of ThingsStanford School of Engineering
 
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014Brian Knopf
 
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed Great Bay Software
 
Securing Internet of Things
Securing Internet of ThingsSecuring Internet of Things
Securing Internet of ThingsRishabh Sharma
 
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoT
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoTYour Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoT
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoTWSO2
 
The Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat
The Internet of Things: We've Got to ChatThe Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat
The Internet of Things: We've Got to ChatDuo Security
 
Internet of Things Security Patterns
Internet of Things Security PatternsInternet of Things Security Patterns
Internet of Things Security PatternsMark Benson
 
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015Daniel Miessler
 
IoT Security and Privacy Considerations
IoT Security and Privacy ConsiderationsIoT Security and Privacy Considerations
IoT Security and Privacy ConsiderationsKenny Huang Ph.D.
 
IoT Honeypots: State of the Art
IoT Honeypots: State of the ArtIoT Honeypots: State of the Art
IoT Honeypots: State of the ArtBiagio Botticelli
 
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019 IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019 Tonex
 
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT Security
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT SecurityTechnology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT Security
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT SecurityCableLabs
 
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for business
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for businessCreator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for business
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for businessPaul Evans
 
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 final
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 finalIoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 final
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 finalFrank Siepmann
 
Iot security amar prusty
Iot security amar prustyIot security amar prusty
Iot security amar prustyamarprusty
 
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016William Slater III
 
Introduction to the Internet of Things
Introduction to the Internet of ThingsIntroduction to the Internet of Things
Introduction to the Internet of ThingsAlexandru Radovici
 

What's hot (20)

"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security
"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security
"The State of IoT Security" Keynote by Shawn Henry at Inform[ED] IoT Security
 
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT SecurityRyan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
 
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of Things
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of ThingsMark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of Things
Mark Horowitz - Stanford Engineering - Securing the Internet of Things
 
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014
IoT_and_the_Impact_on_Security_Brian_Knopf_ISSA-OC_July-2014
 
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed
IoT DDoS Attacks: the stakes have changed
 
Securing Internet of Things
Securing Internet of ThingsSecuring Internet of Things
Securing Internet of Things
 
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoT
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoTYour Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoT
Your Thing is Pwned - Security Challenges for the IoT
 
The Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat
The Internet of Things: We've Got to ChatThe Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat
The Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat
 
Internet of Things Security Patterns
Internet of Things Security PatternsInternet of Things Security Patterns
Internet of Things Security Patterns
 
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015
IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015
 
IoT Security and Privacy Considerations
IoT Security and Privacy ConsiderationsIoT Security and Privacy Considerations
IoT Security and Privacy Considerations
 
IoT Security, Mirai Revisited
IoT Security, Mirai RevisitedIoT Security, Mirai Revisited
IoT Security, Mirai Revisited
 
IoT Honeypots: State of the Art
IoT Honeypots: State of the ArtIoT Honeypots: State of the Art
IoT Honeypots: State of the Art
 
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019 IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019
IoT Security Training, IoT Security Awareness 2019
 
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT Security
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT SecurityTechnology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT Security
Technology & Policy Interaction Panel at Inform[ED] IoT Security
 
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for business
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for businessCreator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for business
Creator Ci40 IoT kit & Framework - scalable LWM2M IoT dev platform for business
 
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 final
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 finalIoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 final
IoT Security Briefing FBI 07 23-2017 final
 
Iot security amar prusty
Iot security amar prustyIot security amar prusty
Iot security amar prusty
 
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016
The Mirai Botnet and Massive DDoS Attacks of October 2016
 
Introduction to the Internet of Things
Introduction to the Internet of ThingsIntroduction to the Internet of Things
Introduction to the Internet of Things
 

Viewers also liked

How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skills
How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skillsHow penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skills
How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skillsMarian Marinov
 
Comparison of foss distributed storage
Comparison of foss distributed storageComparison of foss distributed storage
Comparison of foss distributed storageMarian Marinov
 
Gluster.community.day.2013
Gluster.community.day.2013Gluster.community.day.2013
Gluster.community.day.2013Udo Seidel
 
Moving your router inside container
Moving your router inside container Moving your router inside container
Moving your router inside container Marian Marinov
 
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFS
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFSLUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFS
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFSMarian Marinov
 
Why we are migrating to Slackware
Why we are migrating to SlackwareWhy we are migrating to Slackware
Why we are migrating to SlackwareMarian Marinov
 
Protecting your data when entering the US
Protecting your data when entering the USProtecting your data when entering the US
Protecting your data when entering the USMarian Marinov
 
Io t introduction to electronics
Io t   introduction to electronicsIo t   introduction to electronics
Io t introduction to electronicsMarian Marinov
 
Lxd the proper way of runing containers
Lxd   the proper way of runing containersLxd   the proper way of runing containers
Lxd the proper way of runing containersMarian Marinov
 
Securing the network for VMs or Containers
Securing the network for VMs or ContainersSecuring the network for VMs or Containers
Securing the network for VMs or ContainersMarian Marinov
 
Computer vision for your projects
Computer vision for your projectsComputer vision for your projects
Computer vision for your projectsMarian Marinov
 
How to setup your linux server
How to setup your linux serverHow to setup your linux server
How to setup your linux serverMarian Marinov
 
Practical my sql performance optimization
Practical my sql performance optimizationPractical my sql performance optimization
Practical my sql performance optimizationMarian Marinov
 
Introduction to python
Introduction to pythonIntroduction to python
Introduction to pythonMarian Marinov
 
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10Marian Marinov
 
Make your internship "worth it"
Make your internship "worth it"Make your internship "worth it"
Make your internship "worth it"Marian Marinov
 
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networks
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networksPerformance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networks
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networksMarian Marinov
 
nftables - the evolution of Linux Firewall
nftables - the evolution of Linux Firewallnftables - the evolution of Linux Firewall
nftables - the evolution of Linux FirewallMarian Marinov
 

Viewers also liked (20)

How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skills
How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skillsHow penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skills
How penetration testing techniques can help you improve your qa skills
 
Comparison of foss distributed storage
Comparison of foss distributed storageComparison of foss distributed storage
Comparison of foss distributed storage
 
Gluster.community.day.2013
Gluster.community.day.2013Gluster.community.day.2013
Gluster.community.day.2013
 
4 Sessions
4 Sessions4 Sessions
4 Sessions
 
Moving your router inside container
Moving your router inside container Moving your router inside container
Moving your router inside container
 
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFS
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFSLUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFS
LUG-BG 2017 - Rangel Ivanov - Spread some butter - BTRFS
 
Why we are migrating to Slackware
Why we are migrating to SlackwareWhy we are migrating to Slackware
Why we are migrating to Slackware
 
Protecting your data when entering the US
Protecting your data when entering the USProtecting your data when entering the US
Protecting your data when entering the US
 
Io t introduction to electronics
Io t   introduction to electronicsIo t   introduction to electronics
Io t introduction to electronics
 
Lxd the proper way of runing containers
Lxd   the proper way of runing containersLxd   the proper way of runing containers
Lxd the proper way of runing containers
 
Securing the network for VMs or Containers
Securing the network for VMs or ContainersSecuring the network for VMs or Containers
Securing the network for VMs or Containers
 
Computer vision for your projects
Computer vision for your projectsComputer vision for your projects
Computer vision for your projects
 
How to setup your linux server
How to setup your linux serverHow to setup your linux server
How to setup your linux server
 
Practical my sql performance optimization
Practical my sql performance optimizationPractical my sql performance optimization
Practical my sql performance optimization
 
Introduction to python
Introduction to pythonIntroduction to python
Introduction to python
 
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10
LUG-BG - Kostadin Slavkov - PostgreSQL 10
 
Home assistant
Home assistantHome assistant
Home assistant
 
Make your internship "worth it"
Make your internship "worth it"Make your internship "worth it"
Make your internship "worth it"
 
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networks
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networksPerformance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networks
Performance comparison of Distributed File Systems on 1Gbit networks
 
nftables - the evolution of Linux Firewall
nftables - the evolution of Linux Firewallnftables - the evolution of Linux Firewall
nftables - the evolution of Linux Firewall
 

Similar to Protecting your home and office in the era of IoT

The Universal Serial Web @HolyJS
The Universal Serial Web @HolyJSThe Universal Serial Web @HolyJS
The Universal Serial Web @HolyJSasciidisco
 
Universalserialweb
UniversalserialwebUniversalserialweb
Universalserialwebasciidisco
 
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial Web
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial WebJS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial Web
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial WebJSFestUA
 
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computers
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computersCe hv6 module 46 securing laptop computers
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computersVi Tính Hoàng Nam
 
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...Duo Security
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar Raz
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar RazCODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar Raz
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar RazCODE BLUE
 
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Virtual Private Network (VPN)Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Virtual Private Network (VPN)Devolutions
 
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...Amazon Web Services
 
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdf
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdfVirtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdf
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdfAceAtigaVallo
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)HITCON GIRLS
 
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities List
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities ListOWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities List
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities ListBishop Fox
 
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016joebursell
 

Similar to Protecting your home and office in the era of IoT (20)

The Universal Serial Web @HolyJS
The Universal Serial Web @HolyJSThe Universal Serial Web @HolyJS
The Universal Serial Web @HolyJS
 
Universalserialweb
UniversalserialwebUniversalserialweb
Universalserialweb
 
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial Web
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial WebJS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial Web
JS Fest 2019. Sebastian Golasch. The Universal Serial Web
 
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computers
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computersCe hv6 module 46 securing laptop computers
Ce hv6 module 46 securing laptop computers
 
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...
Internet of Fails: Where IoT Has Gone Wrong and How We're Making it Right by ...
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar Raz
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar RazCODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar Raz
CODE BLUE 2014 : Physical [In]Security: It’s not ALL about Cyber by Inbar Raz
 
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Virtual Private Network (VPN)Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
 
Ntxissacsc5 red 1 &amp; 2 basic hacking tools ncc group
Ntxissacsc5 red 1 &amp; 2   basic hacking tools ncc groupNtxissacsc5 red 1 &amp; 2   basic hacking tools ncc group
Ntxissacsc5 red 1 &amp; 2 basic hacking tools ncc group
 
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...
Secure Your Edge-to-Cloud IoT Solution with Intel and AWS - IOT337 - re:Inven...
 
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdf
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdfVirtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdf
Virtual private network chapter 1 PSU.pdf
 
VPN In Details
VPN In DetailsVPN In Details
VPN In Details
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
 
VPN
VPNVPN
VPN
 
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities List
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities ListOWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities List
OWASP – Internet of Things (IoT) – Top 10 Vulnerabilities List
 
What is being exposed from IoT Devices
What is being exposed from IoT DevicesWhat is being exposed from IoT Devices
What is being exposed from IoT Devices
 
Security Issues in Internet of Things
Security Issues in Internet of ThingsSecurity Issues in Internet of Things
Security Issues in Internet of Things
 
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016
OWASP Cambridge Chapter Meeting 13/12/2016
 
Vp npresentation
Vp npresentationVp npresentation
Vp npresentation
 
Vp npresentation
Vp npresentationVp npresentation
Vp npresentation
 
Ism
IsmIsm
Ism
 

More from Marian Marinov

Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & Logging
Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & LoggingDev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & Logging
Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & LoggingMarian Marinov
 
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanisms
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanismsBasic presentation of cryptography mechanisms
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanismsMarian Marinov
 
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?Marian Marinov
 
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDB
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDBIntroduction and replication to DragonflyDB
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDBMarian Marinov
 
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQ
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQMessage Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQ
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQMarian Marinov
 
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdf
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdfHow to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdf
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdfMarian Marinov
 
How to survive in the work from home era
How to survive in the work from home eraHow to survive in the work from home era
How to survive in the work from home eraMarian Marinov
 
Improve your storage with bcachefs
Improve your storage with bcachefsImprove your storage with bcachefs
Improve your storage with bcachefsMarian Marinov
 
Control your service resources with systemd
 Control your service resources with systemd  Control your service resources with systemd
Control your service resources with systemd Marian Marinov
 
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storage
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storageComparison of-foss-distributed-storage
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storageMarian Marinov
 
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?Marian Marinov
 
Securing your MySQL server
Securing your MySQL serverSecuring your MySQL server
Securing your MySQL serverMarian Marinov
 
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDK
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDKDoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDK
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDKMarian Marinov
 
Challenges with high density networks
Challenges with high density networksChallenges with high density networks
Challenges with high density networksMarian Marinov
 
SiteGround building automation
SiteGround building automationSiteGround building automation
SiteGround building automationMarian Marinov
 
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel tracking
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel trackingPreventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel tracking
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel trackingMarian Marinov
 
Managing a lot of servers
Managing a lot of serversManaging a lot of servers
Managing a lot of serversMarian Marinov
 
Let's Encrypt failures
Let's Encrypt failuresLet's Encrypt failures
Let's Encrypt failuresMarian Marinov
 

More from Marian Marinov (20)

Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & Logging
Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & LoggingDev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & Logging
Dev.bg DevOps March 2024 Monitoring & Logging
 
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanisms
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanismsBasic presentation of cryptography mechanisms
Basic presentation of cryptography mechanisms
 
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?
Microservices: Benefits, drawbacks and are they for me?
 
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDB
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDBIntroduction and replication to DragonflyDB
Introduction and replication to DragonflyDB
 
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQ
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQMessage Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQ
Message Queuing - Gearman, Mosquitto, Kafka and RabbitMQ
 
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdf
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdfHow to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdf
How to successfully migrate to DevOps .pdf
 
How to survive in the work from home era
How to survive in the work from home eraHow to survive in the work from home era
How to survive in the work from home era
 
Managing sysadmins
Managing sysadminsManaging sysadmins
Managing sysadmins
 
Improve your storage with bcachefs
Improve your storage with bcachefsImprove your storage with bcachefs
Improve your storage with bcachefs
 
Control your service resources with systemd
 Control your service resources with systemd  Control your service resources with systemd
Control your service resources with systemd
 
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storage
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storageComparison of-foss-distributed-storage
Comparison of-foss-distributed-storage
 
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?
Защо и как да обогатяваме знанията си?
 
Securing your MySQL server
Securing your MySQL serverSecuring your MySQL server
Securing your MySQL server
 
Sysadmin vs. dev ops
Sysadmin vs. dev opsSysadmin vs. dev ops
Sysadmin vs. dev ops
 
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDK
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDKDoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDK
DoS and DDoS mitigations with eBPF, XDP and DPDK
 
Challenges with high density networks
Challenges with high density networksChallenges with high density networks
Challenges with high density networks
 
SiteGround building automation
SiteGround building automationSiteGround building automation
SiteGround building automation
 
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel tracking
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel trackingPreventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel tracking
Preventing cpu side channel attacks with kernel tracking
 
Managing a lot of servers
Managing a lot of serversManaging a lot of servers
Managing a lot of servers
 
Let's Encrypt failures
Let's Encrypt failuresLet's Encrypt failures
Let's Encrypt failures
 

Recently uploaded

"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...
"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ..."Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...
"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...Erbil Polytechnic University
 
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTES
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTESCME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTES
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTESkarthi keyan
 
Engineering Drawing section of solid
Engineering Drawing     section of solidEngineering Drawing     section of solid
Engineering Drawing section of solidnamansinghjarodiya
 
Virtual memory management in Operating System
Virtual memory management in Operating SystemVirtual memory management in Operating System
Virtual memory management in Operating SystemRashmi Bhat
 
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdf
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdfPaper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdf
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdfNainaShrivastava14
 
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptx
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptxPython Programming for basic beginners.pptx
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptxmohitesoham12
 
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptx
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptxEnergy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptx
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptxsiddharthjain2303
 
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdfHafizMudaserAhmad
 
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument method
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument methodLevelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument method
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument methodManicka Mamallan Andavar
 
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending Actuators
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending ActuatorsNovel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending Actuators
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending ActuatorsResearcher Researcher
 
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTFUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTSneha Padhiar
 
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event Scheduling
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event SchedulingSystem Simulation and Modelling with types and Event Scheduling
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event SchedulingBootNeck1
 
multiple access in wireless communication
multiple access in wireless communicationmultiple access in wireless communication
multiple access in wireless communicationpanditadesh123
 
Main Memory Management in Operating System
Main Memory Management in Operating SystemMain Memory Management in Operating System
Main Memory Management in Operating SystemRashmi Bhat
 
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________Romil Mishra
 
Input Output Management in Operating System
Input Output Management in Operating SystemInput Output Management in Operating System
Input Output Management in Operating SystemRashmi Bhat
 
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdf
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdfCS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdf
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdfBalamuruganV28
 
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTIONTHE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTIONjhunlian
 
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overview
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overviewArtificial Intelligence in Power System overview
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overviewsandhya757531
 

Recently uploaded (20)

"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...
"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ..."Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...
"Exploring the Essential Functions and Design Considerations of Spillways in ...
 
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTES
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTESCME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTES
CME 397 - SURFACE ENGINEERING - UNIT 1 FULL NOTES
 
Engineering Drawing section of solid
Engineering Drawing     section of solidEngineering Drawing     section of solid
Engineering Drawing section of solid
 
Virtual memory management in Operating System
Virtual memory management in Operating SystemVirtual memory management in Operating System
Virtual memory management in Operating System
 
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdf
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdfPaper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdf
Paper Tube : Shigeru Ban projects and Case Study of Cardboard Cathedral .pdf
 
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptx
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptxPython Programming for basic beginners.pptx
Python Programming for basic beginners.pptx
 
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptx
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptxEnergy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptx
Energy Awareness training ppt for manufacturing process.pptx
 
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf
11. Properties of Liquid Fuels in Energy Engineering.pdf
 
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument method
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument methodLevelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument method
Levelling - Rise and fall - Height of instrument method
 
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending Actuators
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending ActuatorsNovel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending Actuators
Novel 3D-Printed Soft Linear and Bending Actuators
 
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTFUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
 
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event Scheduling
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event SchedulingSystem Simulation and Modelling with types and Event Scheduling
System Simulation and Modelling with types and Event Scheduling
 
multiple access in wireless communication
multiple access in wireless communicationmultiple access in wireless communication
multiple access in wireless communication
 
Main Memory Management in Operating System
Main Memory Management in Operating SystemMain Memory Management in Operating System
Main Memory Management in Operating System
 
Designing pile caps according to ACI 318-19.pptx
Designing pile caps according to ACI 318-19.pptxDesigning pile caps according to ACI 318-19.pptx
Designing pile caps according to ACI 318-19.pptx
 
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________
Gravity concentration_MI20612MI_________
 
Input Output Management in Operating System
Input Output Management in Operating SystemInput Output Management in Operating System
Input Output Management in Operating System
 
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdf
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdfCS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdf
CS 3251 Programming in c all unit notes pdf
 
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTIONTHE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
 
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overview
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overviewArtificial Intelligence in Power System overview
Artificial Intelligence in Power System overview
 

Protecting your home and office in the era of IoT

  • 2. ❖❖ Who am I?Who am I? - Chief System Architect of SiteGround.com- Chief System Architect of SiteGround.com - Sysadmin since 1996- Sysadmin since 1996 - Organizer of OpenFest, BG Perl- Organizer of OpenFest, BG Perl Workshops, LUG-BG and othersWorkshops, LUG-BG and others - Teaching Network Security and- Teaching Network Security and Linux System AdministrationLinux System Administration courses in Sofia Universitycourses in Sofia University and SoftUniand SoftUni
  • 3. ❖❖ What is an IoT device?What is an IoT device? - a Thermostat- a Thermostat - a WiFi enabled light bulb- a WiFi enabled light bulb - Smart TV- Smart TV - Smart toys- Smart toys - home/office IP camera- home/office IP camera - home/office WiFi router- home/office WiFi router - home/office NAS- home/office NAS
  • 4. ❖❖ What information may leakWhat information may leak from IoT devices?from IoT devices?
  • 5. ❖❖ Presence informationPresence information (are you at home/office/car)(are you at home/office/car)
  • 7. ❖❖ What devices are you usingWhat devices are you using at your networkat your network
  • 8. ❖❖ Voice and videoVoice and video conversationsconversations (streaming audio/video)(streaming audio/video) Samsung privacy statement:Samsung privacy statement: http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv/http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv/
  • 10. ❖❖ Private filesPrivate files (pictures, documents and(pictures, documents and videos)videos)
  • 11. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? * most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices have poor securityhave poor security
  • 12. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? * most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices have poor securityhave poor security - manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with usabilityusability
  • 13. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? * most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices have poor securityhave poor security - manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with usabilityusability - the HW does not allow them to do a lot more- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more
  • 14. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? * most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices* most of the WiFi/Radio/Bluetooth IoT devices have poor securityhave poor security - manufacturers were more concerned with- manufacturers were more concerned with usabilityusability - the HW does not allow them to do a lot more- the HW does not allow them to do a lot more - use of default passwords is widespread- use of default passwords is widespread
  • 15. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? - >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai nst-itself/nst-itself/
  • 16. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? - >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai nst-itself/nst-itself/ - security of the low cost devices is almost non-- security of the low cost devices is almost non- existentexistent
  • 17. ❖❖ IoT Security?IoT Security? - >5000 IoT devices attack their own network- >5000 IoT devices attack their own network http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agaihttp://www.zdnet.com/article/how-iot-hackers-turned-a-universitys-network-agai nst-itself/nst-itself/ - security of the low cost devices is almost non-- security of the low cost devices is almost non- existentexistent - and to top all that, there is the Shodan search- and to top all that, there is the Shodan search engine, which helps to search for such devicesengine, which helps to search for such devices
  • 18. ❖❖ The number of attacks made by IoT devicesThe number of attacks made by IoT devices is increasing while businesses and customersis increasing while businesses and customers are searching for easier to use devices...are searching for easier to use devices...
  • 19. ❖❖ Most of the IoT devices work in "The Cloud"Most of the IoT devices work in "The Cloud" - your data is as secure as the company that- your data is as secure as the company that keeps itkeeps it - your devices are sharing information with- your devices are sharing information with other companies via APIsother companies via APIs - some of your devices can not function without- some of your devices can not function without "The Cloud""The Cloud"
  • 20. ❖❖ IoT device updatesIoT device updates - some of these devices get no updates- some of these devices get no updates - most of the Chinese devices will NEVER get- most of the Chinese devices will NEVER get software updatessoftware updates - some of the very small IoT devices don't even- some of the very small IoT devices don't even have a mechanism for over the air upgradehave a mechanism for over the air upgrade - a lot of the devices that do support updates,- a lot of the devices that do support updates, do not have a mechanism to actually verify thedo not have a mechanism to actually verify the update images, so anyone can provide falseupdate images, so anyone can provide false imagesimages
  • 21. ❖❖ IoT as TrojansIoT as Trojans - single compromised IoT device can be used to- single compromised IoT device can be used to circumvent company firewalls and open yourcircumvent company firewalls and open your networks to a lot of different attacksnetworks to a lot of different attacks
  • 22. ❖❖ A lot of these missing security features areA lot of these missing security features are because adding the security would actuallybecause adding the security would actually introduce complexity for the customersintroduce complexity for the customers
  • 23. ❖❖ Once compromised the devices are no longerOnce compromised the devices are no longer under your controlunder your control
  • 24. ❖❖ Sometimes compromised devices maySometimes compromised devices may remain under your control but simply waitingremain under your control but simply waiting for a command by the C&C serversfor a command by the C&C servers
  • 25. ❖❖ What am I doing to protect my selfWhat am I doing to protect my self and to protect the Internet from me?and to protect the Internet from me?
  • 26. ❖❖ I personally, try to avoid devices that requireI personally, try to avoid devices that require access to the manufacturer's sitesaccess to the manufacturer's sites
  • 27. ❖❖ I personally, try to avoid devices that requireI personally, try to avoid devices that require access to the manufacturer's sitesaccess to the manufacturer's sites ❖❖ This prevents the possibility of remotelyThis prevents the possibility of remotely disabling or changing my devicedisabling or changing my device
  • 28. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address
  • 29. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address ❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled
  • 30. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address ❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled ❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs and allow only themand allow only them
  • 31. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address ❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled ❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs and allow only themand allow only them ❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not require thatrequire that
  • 32. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address ❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled ❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs and allow only themand allow only them ❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not require thatrequire that ❖❖ When I need to update the SW or FW of theWhen I need to update the SW or FW of the device I allow them Internet accessdevice I allow them Internet access
  • 33. ❖❖ Every new device I connect to my network isEvery new device I connect to my network is given static IP addressgiven static IP address ❖❖ Every device is initially firewalledEvery device is initially firewalled ❖❖ I check what are the addresses that it needsI check what are the addresses that it needs and allow only themand allow only them ❖❖ I do not allow traffic to devices that do notI do not allow traffic to devices that do not require thatrequire that ❖❖ When I need to update the SW or FW of theWhen I need to update the SW or FW of the device I allow them Internet accessdevice I allow them Internet access ❖❖ After upgrade I test what the device is tryingAfter upgrade I test what the device is trying to access againto access again
  • 34. ❖❖ I would never give internet access to VoiceI would never give internet access to Voice and Video devicesand Video devices
  • 35. ❖❖ In 2015 unprotected baby monitors leakedIn 2015 unprotected baby monitors leaked audio and video conversations by unsuspectingaudio and video conversations by unsuspecting familiesfamilies
  • 36. ❖❖ A lot of surveillance give you false sense ofA lot of surveillance give you false sense of security by providing you user/passwordsecurity by providing you user/password prompts, but their video streams are protectedprompts, but their video streams are protected with DEFAULT users and passwordswith DEFAULT users and passwords
  • 37. ❖❖ In 2015 unprotected baby monitors leakedIn 2015 unprotected baby monitors leaked audio and video conversations by unsuspectingaudio and video conversations by unsuspecting familiesfamilies ❖❖ In 2016 unprotected IP camera helped toIn 2016 unprotected IP camera helped to schedule the best time for burglary in someschedule the best time for burglary in some companies and homes in the UScompanies and homes in the US
  • 38. ❖❖ There are currently around 6 billion internet-There are currently around 6 billion internet- connected devices in use worldwide, and thatconnected devices in use worldwide, and that figure is predicted to soar to over 20 billion byfigure is predicted to soar to over 20 billion by 2020, according to research by consultancy2020, according to research by consultancy Gartner.Gartner.
  • 39. ❖❖ The EU tries to battle these security threatsThe EU tries to battle these security threats by introducing new laws for IoT devicesby introducing new laws for IoT devices
  • 40. ❖❖ Keep in mind that security IS a process andKeep in mind that security IS a process and not a statenot a state
  • 41. ❖❖ Keep in mind that security IS a process andKeep in mind that security IS a process and not a statenot a state ❖❖ A device that is SECURE today, may beA device that is SECURE today, may be UNSECURE tomorrowUNSECURE tomorrow
  • 42. THANK YOUTHANK YOU Marian HackMan Marinov <mm@siteground.com>Marian HackMan Marinov <mm@siteground.com> Chief System ArchitectChief System Architect SiteGround.comSiteGround.com