SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  43
Engineering Director, Cloud Security
Jason Chan
Defending Netflix from Abuse
> 86 million members
> 190 countries
> 125 million hours of streaming per day
~35% of US Internet traffic at peak
Netflix Statistics
Some Abuse-Related Background
Simplifiers
• No user-generated content
• No ads on service
• Limited member-to-member
interactions
• No directly extractable value
Abuse @ Netflix
• Use value of accounts
• Account fungibility
• Device ecosystem
• Language diversity
• Payments complexity
• Usage patterns
Complicators
“What is the Netflix password?”
• Consumer friendly
• 30 day free trial
• Easy to cancel
• Excellent consumer experience can create potential for abuse
Netflix Service
• Who will convert from free trial to paid?
• Financial projections
• How will members behave?
• Content planning
• User experience, product enhancements
Key Questions Driving Anti-Abuse
1. Obtain Netflix accounts
(without paying)
2. Monetize
• Primarily via resale
• Secondarily as bait/lure
Adversary Actions
Goals
• Free trial fraud (fake
accounts)
• Account takeover (ATO)
Methods
Free Trial Fraud
• Payments is a primary abuse differentiator (vs. free services)
• Payment method is required @ signup
• Global payments infrastructure and operations is complex
• Loopholes and unexpected failure modes occur regularly
• Adversaries search for and exploit these failures
• So, fake account management is largely a payments fraud problem
Free Trial Fraud
Free Trial Fraud: Control Approach
Initial Assessment
(Client to Site)
• VPN/proxy analysis
• Device fingerprinting
• Global merchant data
analysis
• Internal threat intel
analysis
Signup
(Payment Validation)
• Method of payment checks
• Business rules (e.g. trial
eligibility)
• Risk-dependent auth
Post-Signup
(Activity Analysis)
• BIN anomalies
• CS contacts
• Account behaviors (e.g.
cross-border streaming)
• Detect and disable within 30 days post signup (free trial period)
• Continue to shrink the detect-to-disable period
• Keep data clean
• Reduce adversary opportunity to monetize
Free Trial Fraud – Control Objectives
Account Takeover
• 3rd party breaches (password reuse)
• Phishing
• Malware
• “Friendly” compromise
ATO – Traditional Causes
Obtain
Credentials
Use
Publish
Sell
Change
Unable to
Access
Unusual
Activity
Password
Reset
Compromise Member Impact Resolution
Self
Resolution
Contact
CS
Cancel
Account
Detection, Action, & Measurement
ATO Lifecycle
• Account validators and traffic analysis
• Detect “credential stuffing”
• Credential dumps (pastebin, 3rd party)
• Customer service contacts
• Predictive model
Detecting Account Takeover
• To better identify ATO population, we began with cred dumps
• Hypothesis – Members in cred dumps who contact CS exhibit
acute signs of compromise
• Built classifier to segregate these accounts, and ranked
features of impacted accounts
• Apply to broader member population
• Additional revisions and models created to fine tune
Modeling ATO
Abuse Monetization and Markets
General Internet
Video
Social
Auctions and Forums
Typical Outcomes for Resale “Customers”
Disrupting Monetization
• Discovery and takedowns
• scumblr and partners
• Complicated by language
• Collaboration
• e.g. eBay LVIS (Licensing Verification and Information
System) and VeRO (Verified Rights Owner)
• e.g. ThreatExchange (WIP)
Monetization Controls
Darkweb
• Monitor and analyze
• Cost
• Resellers
• Overall supply
• Controlled purchases
• Analyze origins
• Upstream intel
Darkweb “Controls”
Questions?
chan@netflix.com

Contenu connexe

En vedette

The Psychology of Security Automation
The Psychology of Security AutomationThe Psychology of Security Automation
The Psychology of Security AutomationJason Chan
 
Careers in Security
Careers in SecurityCareers in Security
Careers in SecurityJason Chan
 
Amazon Web Services Security
Amazon Web Services SecurityAmazon Web Services Security
Amazon Web Services SecurityJason Chan
 
Practical Security Automation
Practical Security AutomationPractical Security Automation
Practical Security AutomationJason Chan
 
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product Security
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product SecurityFrom Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product Security
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product SecurityJason Chan
 
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and Scale
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and ScaleResilience and Compliance at Speed and Scale
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and ScaleJason Chan
 
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedCloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedJason Chan
 
Practical Cloud Security
Practical Cloud SecurityPractical Cloud Security
Practical Cloud SecurityJason Chan
 
Cloud Security at Netflix
Cloud Security at NetflixCloud Security at Netflix
Cloud Security at NetflixJason Chan
 
Cloud Security @ Netflix
Cloud Security @ NetflixCloud Security @ Netflix
Cloud Security @ NetflixJason Chan
 
Real World Cloud Application Security
Real World Cloud Application SecurityReal World Cloud Application Security
Real World Cloud Application SecurityJason Chan
 
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedCloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedJason Chan
 
AWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
AWS Security: A Practitioner's PerspectiveAWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
AWS Security: A Practitioner's PerspectiveJason Chan
 
Laracon Online: Grid and Flexbox
Laracon Online: Grid and FlexboxLaracon Online: Grid and Flexbox
Laracon Online: Grid and FlexboxRachel Andrew
 
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooSecurity at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooAlex Stamos
 
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons Learned
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons LearnedResilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons Learned
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons LearnedJason Chan
 
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit Perspectives
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit PerspectivesVirtualization: Security and IT Audit Perspectives
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit PerspectivesJason Chan
 
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinal
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinalIbm cloud nativenetflixossfinal
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinalaspyker
 

En vedette (20)

The Psychology of Security Automation
The Psychology of Security AutomationThe Psychology of Security Automation
The Psychology of Security Automation
 
Careers in Security
Careers in SecurityCareers in Security
Careers in Security
 
Amazon Web Services Security
Amazon Web Services SecurityAmazon Web Services Security
Amazon Web Services Security
 
Practical Security Automation
Practical Security AutomationPractical Security Automation
Practical Security Automation
 
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product Security
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product SecurityFrom Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product Security
From Gates to Guardrails: Alternate Approaches to Product Security
 
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and Scale
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and ScaleResilience and Compliance at Speed and Scale
Resilience and Compliance at Speed and Scale
 
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedCloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
 
Practical Cloud Security
Practical Cloud SecurityPractical Cloud Security
Practical Cloud Security
 
Cloud Security at Netflix
Cloud Security at NetflixCloud Security at Netflix
Cloud Security at Netflix
 
Cloud Security @ Netflix
Cloud Security @ NetflixCloud Security @ Netflix
Cloud Security @ Netflix
 
Real World Cloud Application Security
Real World Cloud Application SecurityReal World Cloud Application Security
Real World Cloud Application Security
 
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons LearnedCloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
 
AWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
AWS Security: A Practitioner's PerspectiveAWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
AWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
 
Culture
CultureCulture
Culture
 
Laracon Online: Grid and Flexbox
Laracon Online: Grid and FlexboxLaracon Online: Grid and Flexbox
Laracon Online: Grid and Flexbox
 
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at YahooSecurity at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
Security at Scale - Lessons from Six Months at Yahoo
 
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons Learned
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons LearnedResilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons Learned
Resilience and Security @ Scale: Lessons Learned
 
Analyze System and Code Interactions
Analyze System and Code InteractionsAnalyze System and Code Interactions
Analyze System and Code Interactions
 
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit Perspectives
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit PerspectivesVirtualization: Security and IT Audit Perspectives
Virtualization: Security and IT Audit Perspectives
 
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinal
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinalIbm cloud nativenetflixossfinal
Ibm cloud nativenetflixossfinal
 

Similaire à Defending Netflix from Abuse

Faster Payments on the Blockchain
Faster Payments on the BlockchainFaster Payments on the Blockchain
Faster Payments on the BlockchainKaren Hsu
 
Blockchain and Cybersecurity
Blockchain and Cybersecurity Blockchain and Cybersecurity
Blockchain and Cybersecurity gppcpa
 
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2Sam Bowne
 
CFO Half-Day Conference
CFO Half-Day ConferenceCFO Half-Day Conference
CFO Half-Day Conferencegppcpa
 
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense Mechanisms
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense MechanismsCh 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense Mechanisms
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense MechanismsSam Bowne
 
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its Customers
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its CustomersHow Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its Customers
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its CustomersBrian Griffith
 
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small BusinessKeita Broadwater
 
CISA_WK_1.pptx
CISA_WK_1.pptxCISA_WK_1.pptx
CISA_WK_1.pptxdotco
 
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...Neo4j
 
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...Emagia
 
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...ALG Systems (АЛЖ Системс)
 
Building an Identity Management Business Case
Building an Identity Management Business CaseBuilding an Identity Management Business Case
Building an Identity Management Business CaseHitachi ID Systems, Inc.
 
E Commerce: Its role and development
E Commerce: Its role and developmentE Commerce: Its role and development
E Commerce: Its role and developmentAnubha Rastogi
 
ppt on e crime management system
ppt on e crime management systemppt on e crime management system
ppt on e crime management systemKrishna Kinkar Jha
 
Blockchain and the investment industry stack
Blockchain and the investment industry stackBlockchain and the investment industry stack
Blockchain and the investment industry stackDavid Taylor
 
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASF
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASFUsing Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASF
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASFDowney Law Group LLC
 
Innovations in AP for Community Association Management
Innovations in AP for Community Association ManagementInnovations in AP for Community Association Management
Innovations in AP for Community Association ManagementAndrea Drennen
 

Similaire à Defending Netflix from Abuse (20)

Faster Payments on the Blockchain
Faster Payments on the BlockchainFaster Payments on the Blockchain
Faster Payments on the Blockchain
 
Blockchain and Cybersecurity
Blockchain and Cybersecurity Blockchain and Cybersecurity
Blockchain and Cybersecurity
 
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2
CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications Ch 1-2
 
CFO Half-Day Conference
CFO Half-Day ConferenceCFO Half-Day Conference
CFO Half-Day Conference
 
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense Mechanisms
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense MechanismsCh 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense Mechanisms
Ch 1: Web Application (In)security & Ch 2: Core Defense Mechanisms
 
DigitalKYC_Modules.pdf
DigitalKYC_Modules.pdfDigitalKYC_Modules.pdf
DigitalKYC_Modules.pdf
 
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its Customers
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its CustomersHow Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its Customers
How Eastern Bank Uses Big Data to Better Serve and Protect its Customers
 
CAAT_Outa_Bag
CAAT_Outa_BagCAAT_Outa_Bag
CAAT_Outa_Bag
 
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business
4 Ways AI Can Help Your Small Business
 
CISA_WK_1.pptx
CISA_WK_1.pptxCISA_WK_1.pptx
CISA_WK_1.pptx
 
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...
Banking Circle: Money Laundering Beware: A Modern Approach to AML with Machin...
 
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...
Integrated Order to Cash (O2C) Automation Software for Global Shared Services...
 
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...
Сервис, ты как? Практики и подходы к мониторингу ИТ-сервисов системами инфрас...
 
Building an Identity Management Business Case
Building an Identity Management Business CaseBuilding an Identity Management Business Case
Building an Identity Management Business Case
 
E Commerce: Its role and development
E Commerce: Its role and developmentE Commerce: Its role and development
E Commerce: Its role and development
 
ppt on e crime management system
ppt on e crime management systemppt on e crime management system
ppt on e crime management system
 
Blockchain and the investment industry stack
Blockchain and the investment industry stackBlockchain and the investment industry stack
Blockchain and the investment industry stack
 
Chanchal ODSC-fraud-2017
Chanchal ODSC-fraud-2017Chanchal ODSC-fraud-2017
Chanchal ODSC-fraud-2017
 
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASF
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASFUsing Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASF
Using Technology in Your Law Practice - MO SASF
 
Innovations in AP for Community Association Management
Innovations in AP for Community Association ManagementInnovations in AP for Community Association Management
Innovations in AP for Community Association Management
 

Dernier

How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanDatabarracks
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationSlibray Presentation
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc
 
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsScanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsRizwan Syed
 
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo Day
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo DayH2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo Day
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo DaySri Ambati
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Commit University
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxhariprasad279825
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clashcharlottematthew16
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionDilum Bandara
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brandgvaughan
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyAlfredo García Lavilla
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfRankYa
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek SchlawackFwdays
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 

Dernier (20)

How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
 
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL CertsScanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
Scanning the Internet for External Cloud Exposures via SSL Certs
 
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo Day
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo DayH2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo Day
H2O.ai CEO/Founder: Sri Ambati Keynote at Wells Fargo Day
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 

Defending Netflix from Abuse

  • 1. Engineering Director, Cloud Security Jason Chan Defending Netflix from Abuse
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6. > 86 million members > 190 countries > 125 million hours of streaming per day ~35% of US Internet traffic at peak Netflix Statistics
  • 7.
  • 9. Simplifiers • No user-generated content • No ads on service • Limited member-to-member interactions • No directly extractable value Abuse @ Netflix • Use value of accounts • Account fungibility • Device ecosystem • Language diversity • Payments complexity • Usage patterns Complicators
  • 10. “What is the Netflix password?”
  • 11. • Consumer friendly • 30 day free trial • Easy to cancel • Excellent consumer experience can create potential for abuse Netflix Service
  • 12. • Who will convert from free trial to paid? • Financial projections • How will members behave? • Content planning • User experience, product enhancements Key Questions Driving Anti-Abuse
  • 13. 1. Obtain Netflix accounts (without paying) 2. Monetize • Primarily via resale • Secondarily as bait/lure Adversary Actions Goals • Free trial fraud (fake accounts) • Account takeover (ATO) Methods
  • 15. • Payments is a primary abuse differentiator (vs. free services) • Payment method is required @ signup • Global payments infrastructure and operations is complex • Loopholes and unexpected failure modes occur regularly • Adversaries search for and exploit these failures • So, fake account management is largely a payments fraud problem Free Trial Fraud
  • 16. Free Trial Fraud: Control Approach Initial Assessment (Client to Site) • VPN/proxy analysis • Device fingerprinting • Global merchant data analysis • Internal threat intel analysis Signup (Payment Validation) • Method of payment checks • Business rules (e.g. trial eligibility) • Risk-dependent auth Post-Signup (Activity Analysis) • BIN anomalies • CS contacts • Account behaviors (e.g. cross-border streaming)
  • 17. • Detect and disable within 30 days post signup (free trial period) • Continue to shrink the detect-to-disable period • Keep data clean • Reduce adversary opportunity to monetize Free Trial Fraud – Control Objectives
  • 19. • 3rd party breaches (password reuse) • Phishing • Malware • “Friendly” compromise ATO – Traditional Causes
  • 20. Obtain Credentials Use Publish Sell Change Unable to Access Unusual Activity Password Reset Compromise Member Impact Resolution Self Resolution Contact CS Cancel Account Detection, Action, & Measurement ATO Lifecycle
  • 21. • Account validators and traffic analysis • Detect “credential stuffing” • Credential dumps (pastebin, 3rd party) • Customer service contacts • Predictive model Detecting Account Takeover
  • 22. • To better identify ATO population, we began with cred dumps • Hypothesis – Members in cred dumps who contact CS exhibit acute signs of compromise • Built classifier to segregate these accounts, and ranked features of impacted accounts • Apply to broader member population • Additional revisions and models created to fine tune Modeling ATO
  • 25. Video
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 33.
  • 34.
  • 35. Typical Outcomes for Resale “Customers”
  • 36.
  • 37.
  • 39. • Discovery and takedowns • scumblr and partners • Complicated by language • Collaboration • e.g. eBay LVIS (Licensing Verification and Information System) and VeRO (Verified Rights Owner) • e.g. ThreatExchange (WIP) Monetization Controls
  • 41.
  • 42. • Monitor and analyze • Cost • Resellers • Overall supply • Controlled purchases • Analyze origins • Upstream intel Darkweb “Controls”