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Avoiding DNS amplification attacks
Who am I?

@deassain

Security Advisor at a Big 4 company

security.stackexchange.com contributor

cloud101.eu
What is DNS amplification?

Distributed Denial of Service Attack

Abusing flaw in the DNS protocol's architecture

Spamhaus 300 Gbit/s
Reasons

DNS request vs DNS response (UDP)

Open resolving name servers

No implementation of BCP38
DNS Request vs Response Size

30 byte request → up to 500 byte response

1 Mbit on your machine → 17 Mbit at the target machine

Amplification
Open resolvers

Resolves DNS queries for any host

Spoof UDP source to target IP address

Tons of DNS responses end up at the target

Get your machines and disable recursion from the internet! (or
the crypto bear will kick your ass )
BCP38: Ingres Filtering

Works for IPv4

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2827

Upstream providers only allow traffic for IP blocks for which
their clients are configured

Cooperation between ISPs

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Avoiding dns amplification attacks

  • 2. Who am I?  @deassain  Security Advisor at a Big 4 company  security.stackexchange.com contributor  cloud101.eu
  • 3. What is DNS amplification?  Distributed Denial of Service Attack  Abusing flaw in the DNS protocol's architecture  Spamhaus 300 Gbit/s
  • 4. Reasons  DNS request vs DNS response (UDP)  Open resolving name servers  No implementation of BCP38
  • 5. DNS Request vs Response Size  30 byte request → up to 500 byte response  1 Mbit on your machine → 17 Mbit at the target machine  Amplification
  • 6. Open resolvers  Resolves DNS queries for any host  Spoof UDP source to target IP address  Tons of DNS responses end up at the target  Get your machines and disable recursion from the internet! (or the crypto bear will kick your ass )
  • 7. BCP38: Ingres Filtering  Works for IPv4  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2827  Upstream providers only allow traffic for IP blocks for which their clients are configured  Cooperation between ISPs