As coaches, trainers and therapists we make countless decisions on a daily basis. However, have you ever wondered what sits behind this decision making process? Have you ever asked why you decided to make decision A when you could have also made decision B, C or D? While we may feel that this decision is completely within our control, this may in fact be a wonderful trick of the human mind. Examining the well established work of Kahneman and Tversky within behavioral economics, we will look at the biases and mental short-cuts that we are hard wired to use when making decisions. We will discuss the positive and negative aspects of this automatic process and share insights into strategies that can make us all better decision makers when faced with uncertainty.
10. Finished files are The re
Sult of years of scienti
Fic study combined with
The experience of years
11. How many did you
count? Did you get 6? If
not, count again…
12. …like a filter, brains limit the amount of
information that enters consciousness at any given
moment. this leads to a phenomenon known as
inattentional blindness…
13. If the mind, like the eyes, are so easily
fooled, what – or who - dictates
what we do and do not see…what
we do and do not think?
21. S2 “What happened? I can make those penalty shots in my sleep?”
S1 Hit video replay
S2 “I mean, it wasn’t even close, I put the ball into the stands.”
S1 Reasons uploaded
S2 “What can I do to ensure this never happens again?”
S1 image of Practice
S2 “yes, you’re right, keep practicing!”
S1 Image of success
22. D. Kahneman
“Sys1 continuously generates suggestions
for Sys2: impressions, intuitions, intentions,
and feelings.”
“If endorsed by Sys2, impressions & intuitions
turn into beliefs, and impulses turn into
voluntary actions.”
“When all goes smoothly, which is most of
the time, Sys2 adopts the suggestions of Sys1
with little or no modification.”
23. D. Kahneman
“sys1’s models of familiar situations are accurate”
[However], “sys1 has biases, systematic errors that
it is prone to make in specific circumstances.”
[Sys1 has a habit of answering] “easier questions
than the one it was asked, and it has little
understanding of logic and statistics.”
One final issue, “sys1 cannot be turned off”
24. The main problem is that under most circumstances, we –
system 2 – feel like we are in control, when the reality is
that we are more like spectators with a front row seat to
our consciousness.
While this works most of the time, especially for physical
tasks like jumping out of the way of a car, side-stepping a
defender, or picking up a cup of coffee, where system 1
can get us into trouble is when it steps-in to answers
questions that are best served by the abilities of system 2.
25. Heuristic are mental shortcuts that can lead
to systematic errors in judgement or biases
28. Rate the following from most likely (1) to least likely (4)
A. The Rugby player will injure their right hamstring at some
point in the season
B. the rugby player will get injured at some point in the
season
C. The rugby player will injure their right hamstring during
high-speed running at some point in the season
D. The rugby player will injure their right hamstring during
high-speed running at some point during a match in the
season
Consider the following scenarios for a rugby player with
a history of right hamstring pulls
29. Sys1 operates on association and is attracted to the most
Plausible – opposed to probable – explanation Of a given
outcome.
If sys2 does not notice an error or doesn’t deploy attentional
effort to overcome it, then sys1’s decision will Stand.
This is the case for both prediction and justification in hindsight
Representativeness Heuristic (Similarity bias)
30. observation | Most hamstring injuries occur during high speed running
conclusion | high speed running causes hamstring injuries to occur
Action | reduced programming exposure to high speed running
Error 1 | assumed correlation = causation
Error 2 | overconfidence Bias
Didn’t consider all known causes | Error 3
Didn’t consider counterfactuals | Error 4
31. observation | relatively strong athletes tend to also sprint faster
conclusion | improving relative strength should be prioritized to improve speed
Action | relative strength is prioritized within the overall program
Error 1 | assumed correlation = causation did not consider transfer of training | Error 2
1 Magnitude of Force
2 Timing of force 3Direction of force
4Range of motion
33. Availability bias (ease of recall bias)
Consider the following example:
Write down as many words as you can that end with: __ N __
Write down as many words as you can that end with: I N G
Decisions, especially those related to judging how likely
something is to happen (e.g., risk of injury), are highly
related to our past experiences and the ease with which
we can recall a given type of event occurring.
34. Coach A | History of seeing players hurt their
hamstrings during sprinting
Coach B | limited history of seeing players hurt
their hamstrings during sprinting
Coach A | does not allow sprint training to take
place outside of a rugby training context
error| overly reliant on the ease with which
they can recall sprint training = injury
error| allowing emotion – fear – to color
decision making opposed to looking at facts
Coach B | Happy to leave training as there is no
clear hamstring related issues
error | not critically evaluating program could
serve problematic in future.
error | what got us here will get us there
mentality – consider chance v choice
35. Availability bias (ease of recall bias)
Depending on ease of recall, this can be a useful heuristic
for simple decisions like deciding where you should go to
dinner, however, it is a poor proxy for judgements that
require an evidence-based decision.
In support of this point, research has shown that we will
depend more on the quality of what we can recall vs how
easy it was to recall when faced with decisions that are
motivationally important.
Just because it is easier to remember, does not make it true
38. Our decisions are colored by how we feel and the associated emotional label we tag a
context/problem with. The only way we change these system 1 ‘blink responses’ is
through pausing, re-framing and consulting with system 2 before making a decision
41. Bodenhausen (1990)
Self-identified morning vs evening people, likely a label based
on one’s sense of alertness and focus, were shown to be more
inclined to make judgement errors during the time a day they did
not identify with.
Generally speaking, we deplete the cognitive resources sys2
requires to overpower sys1 throughout the day. This is why it is
far easier to pack a salad for lunch than it is to eat it.
42. ”In general, individuals in a sad mood are more likely to
use a systematic, data-driven strategy of information
processing, with considerable attention to detail.”
“In contrast, individuals in a happy mood are more likely
to rely on preexisting general knowledge structures,
using a top-down, heuristic strategy of information
processing, with less attention to detail.”
Schwarz, N.
51. 1. Decision making is underpinned by a fast thinkingsystem 1 and a slow thinking system 2
2. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that can produce systematic errors known as biases
3. Errors emerge when the fast thinking of system 1 is not fact checked by system 2
4. Be aware of the similarity bias when trying to make predictions and identify causation
5. Be aware of the availability bias when trying to make predictions and identify likelihoods
6. Be aware of the affect Bias – our decisions are colored and influenced by mood/emotion
7. Be ware of the Zombie Biases – mindless decisions that actively pursue self-interest v Truth