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Build a Complete Security Operations and
Compliance Program on a Graph DB
ERKANG ZHENG
Founder, JupiterOne | CISO, LifeOmic
October 2019
© 2019 JupiterOne | LifeOmic Security, LLC
Triangle InfoSeCon
Pick assessor
Perform gap assessment
Implement remediation
Collect evidences
Assess and certify
Documented data flows
Conducted risk analysis
Wrote policies and
procedures
Created infrastructure
and security
architecture diagrams
REPEATMonitor, Manage, Optimize
START
Implemented 100+ controls
Endpoint
malware
protection
Server
vulnerability
scanning
Production
change
management
SSO + MFA
Application
code scanning +
pen testing
User training
Configuration
audit
Endpoint
compliance
agents
Vendor risk
management
Firewalls
and security
groups
Data encryption
WAF + DDoS
protection
Asset inventory
and tagging
Activity and log
monitoring
SEC
COMP
AUDITOR
Our
Security
Program
HIPAA SOC 2
HITRU
ST
FDA FedRAMPCOMPLIANCE
Now what?
How? Is 100% visibility possible?
“I don’t need more controls. I need to be able to
effectively and efficiently manage what I have.”
“I need to be able to make decisions
faster, with confidence.”
DATA
+
GRAPH
+
QUERY
Pick assessor
Perform gap assessment
Implement remediation
Monitor, Manage, Optimize
Collect evidences
Assess and certify
Documented data flows
Conducted risk analysis
Wrote policies and
procedures
Created infrastructure
and security
architecture diagrams
REPEAT
START
Implemented 100+ controls
Endpoint
malware
protection
Server
vulnerability
scanning
Production
change
management
SSO + MFA
Application
code scanning +
pen testing
User training
Configuration
audit
Endpoint
compliance
agents
Vendor risk
management
Firewalls
and security
groups
Data encryption
WAF + DDoS
protection
Asset inventory
and tagging
Activity and log
monitoring
CSEC
AUDITOR
CA / CC
VISIBILITY
GOVERNANCE
ASSURANCE
Our
Security
Program
HIPAA SOC 2
HITRU
ST
FDA FedRAMPCOMPLIANCE
DATA
What data?
COLLECT AND AGGREGATE
GRAPH
• A set of vertices (or nodes) and edges
• A data structure for complex
relationships (or context)
What is graph?
Did I mention relationships / context?
Why graph?
Defenders think in lists.
Attackers think in graphs.
That’s why attackers win.
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/johnla/2015/04/26/defenders-think-in-lists-attackers-think-in-graphs-as-long-as-this-is-true-attackers-win/
QUERY
Our graph currently has
• 47,313 nodes
(entities) and
• 134,218 edges
(relationships)
Needle in a Haystack A graph of 1348 nodes
• Graph data (Neptune) – relationships
• Raw data (S3) – history and forensic analysis
• Indexed data (Elasticsearch) – speed
• Other data (DynamoDB)
Not just the graph
DATA + GRAPH + QUERY = KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge is Power
Graph
•Asset inventory
and CMDB
•Cloud
configuration
visibility
•Access analysis
•Network and
application
architecture
diagrams
•Vulnerability
management
•Alerts /
monitoring
•Metrics
reporting
•User training
status
•Incident
correlation
•Policy and
procedure
docs
•Vendor
management
•Compliance
evidence
collection
What can you do with it?
Example use cases:
• Asset inventory and CMDB
• Cloud configuration visibility
• Access analysis
• Network and application
architecture diagrams
• Vulnerability management
• Alerts / monitoring
• Metrics reporting
• User training status
• Policies and procedures documentation
• Vendor management
• Compliance evidence collection
AWS Cloud
Security
Which EC2 instances are
exposed to the Internet?
Find aws_subnet with public=true
that HAS aws_instance
that PROTECTS aws_security_group
that ALLOWS Internet
return tree
AWS Cloud
Security
Are there Internet-facing EC2
instances that are allowed access
to non-public S3 buckets?
find Internet
that ALLOWS aws_security_group
that PROTECTS aws_instance
with active=true
that USES aws_iam_role
that ASSIGNED AccessPolicy
that ALLOWS (aws_s3|aws_s3_bucket)
with classification!='public’
return tree
Cross-Account
Trust
What are the cross-account IAM trust
relationships in my AWS
environment?
Find aws_iam_role as a
that TRUSTS (Account|AccessRole) as b
where
a.tag.AccountName != b.tag.AccountName
return tree
S3 Bucket
Access
Are there non-public S3 bucket
access granted to anybody
outside of its account?
Find aws_s3_bucket with
classification!='public' as bucket
that ALLOWS * as grantee
where
bucket.tag.AccountName !=
grantee.tag.AccountName
return tree
SSO Access
Which Okta user is assigned what
AWS IAM role?
find okta_user
that ASSIGNED aws_iam_role
return tree
App Components
and Data Flow
Show the connections and flow
diagram from:
• CloudFront to API Gateway
• CloudFront to S3
• API GW to Lambda Functions
• Lambda to other resources
Which systems or apps are
vulnerable to what CVEs?
Find CVE that RELATES TO
(Host|HostAgent|Application)
return tree
Vulnerability
Management
Development
Insight
Which PRs did Adam open this
past week?
'Adam' that OPENED PR
with createdOn > date.now-7days
return tree
Vulnerability
in Code
Which PRs / developer
introduced new vulnerability
findings this past week?
Find User that OPENED PR
with createdOn > date.now-7days
that RELATES TO CodeRepo
that HAS (Vulernability|Finding)
with _createdOn > date.now-7days
return tree
Org Chart
What’s the reporting structure?
Find Person that manages Person
return tree
Use query to create alerts and trigger remediation
Alert rules from query with actions:
• Send Email
• Send Slack message
• Create Jira issue
• Capture Trend
Future remediation automation:
• Trigger Webhook
• Invoke Lambda Function
• etc.
Security Policy and Procedure Documents
github.com/jupiterone/security-policy-templates
• Written in Markdown
• Small, individual files –
“micro-docs” like micro-services
• Linked together via config.json
• Document reviews and approvals via PRs
• Templatized and published in HTML
Security Policy and Procedure Documents (HTML)
https://security.lifeomic.com/psp
Manual Assessments and Findings
• Covers a variety of testing
• Manual penetration testing
• Risk assessment
• Privacy impact assessment
• Threat modeling
• Assessment objects and findings written in
JSON or YAML
• Publish to graph for report and analysis
Follows the same code deploy process
when PR is merged to `master` branch
github.com/jupiterone/secops-automation-examples
- entityKey: assessment:prodsec:2019q1
entityType: prodsec_assessment
entityClass: Assessment
properties:
name: internal-pen-test-2019q1
displayName: LifeOmic Internal Penetration Test 2019Q1
summary: LifeOmic Internal Penetration Test conducted between Mar 18th - Mar 29th
description:
Performed a thorough security assessment of the LifeOmic product line.
Scope includes PHC, Life 2.0 ios/Android, Connect and LifeExtend ios/Android.
category: penetration-testing
status: complete
assessors:
- security.team@lifeomic.com
open: false
classification: confidential
completedOn: 2019-04-05
reportURL: https://bitbucket.org/lifeomic/prodsec-assessments/src...
...
- entityKey: finding:prodsec:2019q1:app-api-1
entityType: pentest_finding
entityClass: Finding
properties:
name: Some made up issue
displayName: ’[Medium] What it says’
summary: Summary of the made up issue
targets:
- Service API
description: >
Within the application API, ....
stepsToReproduce:
- '1 - Add ...’
- '2 - Use ...’
- '3 - Verify ...’
impact: ...
severity: medium
...
Vendors and External Organizations
• Maintain list of vendors as code
• Leverage product management and dev
leads to help maintain
• Trigger third party security review and
approval via PR
• Publish to graph for report and analysis
Follows the same code deploy process
when PR is merged to `master` branch
github.com/jupiterone/secops-automation-examples
- entityKey: vendor:apple
entityType: apple
entityClass: Vendor
properties:
name: Apple
displayName: Apple
category:
- software
- mobile
- development
description: >
Provides Developer account and App Store Connect account for mobile apps...
validated: true
approved: true
approvalPRLink: https://bitbucket.org/lifeomic/security-artifacts/pull-requests/2
approvalPRName: security-artifacts/2
website: https://www.apple.com
owners:
- owner.one@lifeomic.com
- owner.two@lifeomic.com
mainContactName:
mainContactEmail:
mainContactPhone:
mainContactAddress:
breachResponseDays:
linkToNDA: https://developer.apple.com/terms/apple-developer-agreement/Apple-
Developer-Agreement-English.pdf
linkToMSA: https://developer.apple.com/programs/whats-included/
linkToSLA:
criticality: 10
risk: 5
tag.PHI: false
tag.PII: true
tag.PCI: false
statusPage:
notes:
...
Compliance Evidence
Collection
• Compliance framework and control
requirements defined in JSON
• Map policy procedures to each control
requirement
• Map query questions to each control
requirement
• Write positive case queries and negative
case queries for automated gap analysis
• Include evidence associated with manual
processes
{
"standard": "SOC 2",
"version": "2019",
"sections": [
{
"title": "Access Controls",
"requirements": [
{
"ref": "SOC2-01",
"title": "Single Sign On",
"summary": "SSO for all users ..."
},
...
]
}
]
”domains": [
{
"title": ”Control Domain A",
”controls": [
{
"ref": ”A-01",
"title": ”A technical control",
"summary": ”control description ..."
},
...
]
}
]
}
{
"title": "Which user accounts do not have multi-
factor authentication enabled?",
"description": ”...",
"queries": [
{
"name": "bad",
"query": "Find User with mfaEnabled != true that !(ASSIGNED|USES|HAS) m
fa_device"
},
{
"name": "good",
"query": "Find User with mfaEnabled = true"
},
{
"name": "goodToo",
"query": "Find User that (ASSIGNED|USES|HAS) mfa_device"
}
],
"compliance": [
{
"standard": "CIS Controls",
"requirements": [
"4.5",
"12.11",
"16.3"
]
},
{
"standard": "HITRUST CSF",
"controls": [
"01.b",
"01.j",
"01.q"
]
},
{
"standard": "PCI DSS",
"requirements": [
"8.2",
"8.3"
]
}
]
}
github.com/jupiterone/security-policy-templates/tree/master/templates/standards
Data driven compliance dashboard
Metrics and charts built with queries
Users
and Access
Metrics and charts built with queries
Development
Insights
Metrics and charts built with queries
Cloud
Resources
Metrics and charts built with queries
Data
Security
Metrics and charts built with queries
Data
Security
Metrics and charts built with queries
Risk
Management
Knowledge is Power
Knowledge =
Information (data) +
Insights (understanding of that data)
The graph is now the core of my
entire security program.
A knowledgebase, a foundation that
allows me to take actions with
confidence, faster.
GRAPH
•Asset inventory and
CMDB
•Cloud configuration
visibility
•Access analysis
•Network and
application
architecture diagrams
•Vulnerability
management
Questions? Live Demo?
jupiterone.com
Contact me for a copy of the presentation. And, I’m hiring!

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Build a complete security operations and compliance program using a graph data model

  • 1. Build a Complete Security Operations and Compliance Program on a Graph DB ERKANG ZHENG Founder, JupiterOne | CISO, LifeOmic October 2019 © 2019 JupiterOne | LifeOmic Security, LLC Triangle InfoSeCon
  • 2. Pick assessor Perform gap assessment Implement remediation Collect evidences Assess and certify Documented data flows Conducted risk analysis Wrote policies and procedures Created infrastructure and security architecture diagrams REPEATMonitor, Manage, Optimize START Implemented 100+ controls Endpoint malware protection Server vulnerability scanning Production change management SSO + MFA Application code scanning + pen testing User training Configuration audit Endpoint compliance agents Vendor risk management Firewalls and security groups Data encryption WAF + DDoS protection Asset inventory and tagging Activity and log monitoring SEC COMP AUDITOR Our Security Program HIPAA SOC 2 HITRU ST FDA FedRAMPCOMPLIANCE
  • 3. Now what? How? Is 100% visibility possible? “I don’t need more controls. I need to be able to effectively and efficiently manage what I have.” “I need to be able to make decisions faster, with confidence.”
  • 4. DATA + GRAPH + QUERY Pick assessor Perform gap assessment Implement remediation Monitor, Manage, Optimize Collect evidences Assess and certify Documented data flows Conducted risk analysis Wrote policies and procedures Created infrastructure and security architecture diagrams REPEAT START Implemented 100+ controls Endpoint malware protection Server vulnerability scanning Production change management SSO + MFA Application code scanning + pen testing User training Configuration audit Endpoint compliance agents Vendor risk management Firewalls and security groups Data encryption WAF + DDoS protection Asset inventory and tagging Activity and log monitoring CSEC AUDITOR CA / CC VISIBILITY GOVERNANCE ASSURANCE Our Security Program HIPAA SOC 2 HITRU ST FDA FedRAMPCOMPLIANCE
  • 7.
  • 9. • A set of vertices (or nodes) and edges • A data structure for complex relationships (or context) What is graph?
  • 10. Did I mention relationships / context? Why graph? Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs. That’s why attackers win. https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/johnla/2015/04/26/defenders-think-in-lists-attackers-think-in-graphs-as-long-as-this-is-true-attackers-win/
  • 11. QUERY
  • 12. Our graph currently has • 47,313 nodes (entities) and • 134,218 edges (relationships) Needle in a Haystack A graph of 1348 nodes
  • 13. • Graph data (Neptune) – relationships • Raw data (S3) – history and forensic analysis • Indexed data (Elasticsearch) – speed • Other data (DynamoDB) Not just the graph
  • 14. DATA + GRAPH + QUERY = KNOWLEDGE Knowledge is Power
  • 15. Graph •Asset inventory and CMDB •Cloud configuration visibility •Access analysis •Network and application architecture diagrams •Vulnerability management •Alerts / monitoring •Metrics reporting •User training status •Incident correlation •Policy and procedure docs •Vendor management •Compliance evidence collection What can you do with it? Example use cases: • Asset inventory and CMDB • Cloud configuration visibility • Access analysis • Network and application architecture diagrams • Vulnerability management • Alerts / monitoring • Metrics reporting • User training status • Policies and procedures documentation • Vendor management • Compliance evidence collection
  • 16. AWS Cloud Security Which EC2 instances are exposed to the Internet? Find aws_subnet with public=true that HAS aws_instance that PROTECTS aws_security_group that ALLOWS Internet return tree
  • 17. AWS Cloud Security Are there Internet-facing EC2 instances that are allowed access to non-public S3 buckets? find Internet that ALLOWS aws_security_group that PROTECTS aws_instance with active=true that USES aws_iam_role that ASSIGNED AccessPolicy that ALLOWS (aws_s3|aws_s3_bucket) with classification!='public’ return tree
  • 18. Cross-Account Trust What are the cross-account IAM trust relationships in my AWS environment? Find aws_iam_role as a that TRUSTS (Account|AccessRole) as b where a.tag.AccountName != b.tag.AccountName return tree
  • 19. S3 Bucket Access Are there non-public S3 bucket access granted to anybody outside of its account? Find aws_s3_bucket with classification!='public' as bucket that ALLOWS * as grantee where bucket.tag.AccountName != grantee.tag.AccountName return tree
  • 20. SSO Access Which Okta user is assigned what AWS IAM role? find okta_user that ASSIGNED aws_iam_role return tree
  • 21. App Components and Data Flow Show the connections and flow diagram from: • CloudFront to API Gateway • CloudFront to S3 • API GW to Lambda Functions • Lambda to other resources
  • 22. Which systems or apps are vulnerable to what CVEs? Find CVE that RELATES TO (Host|HostAgent|Application) return tree Vulnerability Management
  • 23. Development Insight Which PRs did Adam open this past week? 'Adam' that OPENED PR with createdOn > date.now-7days return tree
  • 24. Vulnerability in Code Which PRs / developer introduced new vulnerability findings this past week? Find User that OPENED PR with createdOn > date.now-7days that RELATES TO CodeRepo that HAS (Vulernability|Finding) with _createdOn > date.now-7days return tree
  • 25. Org Chart What’s the reporting structure? Find Person that manages Person return tree
  • 26. Use query to create alerts and trigger remediation Alert rules from query with actions: • Send Email • Send Slack message • Create Jira issue • Capture Trend Future remediation automation: • Trigger Webhook • Invoke Lambda Function • etc.
  • 27. Security Policy and Procedure Documents github.com/jupiterone/security-policy-templates • Written in Markdown • Small, individual files – “micro-docs” like micro-services • Linked together via config.json • Document reviews and approvals via PRs • Templatized and published in HTML
  • 28. Security Policy and Procedure Documents (HTML) https://security.lifeomic.com/psp
  • 29. Manual Assessments and Findings • Covers a variety of testing • Manual penetration testing • Risk assessment • Privacy impact assessment • Threat modeling • Assessment objects and findings written in JSON or YAML • Publish to graph for report and analysis Follows the same code deploy process when PR is merged to `master` branch github.com/jupiterone/secops-automation-examples - entityKey: assessment:prodsec:2019q1 entityType: prodsec_assessment entityClass: Assessment properties: name: internal-pen-test-2019q1 displayName: LifeOmic Internal Penetration Test 2019Q1 summary: LifeOmic Internal Penetration Test conducted between Mar 18th - Mar 29th description: Performed a thorough security assessment of the LifeOmic product line. Scope includes PHC, Life 2.0 ios/Android, Connect and LifeExtend ios/Android. category: penetration-testing status: complete assessors: - security.team@lifeomic.com open: false classification: confidential completedOn: 2019-04-05 reportURL: https://bitbucket.org/lifeomic/prodsec-assessments/src... ... - entityKey: finding:prodsec:2019q1:app-api-1 entityType: pentest_finding entityClass: Finding properties: name: Some made up issue displayName: ’[Medium] What it says’ summary: Summary of the made up issue targets: - Service API description: > Within the application API, .... stepsToReproduce: - '1 - Add ...’ - '2 - Use ...’ - '3 - Verify ...’ impact: ... severity: medium ...
  • 30. Vendors and External Organizations • Maintain list of vendors as code • Leverage product management and dev leads to help maintain • Trigger third party security review and approval via PR • Publish to graph for report and analysis Follows the same code deploy process when PR is merged to `master` branch github.com/jupiterone/secops-automation-examples - entityKey: vendor:apple entityType: apple entityClass: Vendor properties: name: Apple displayName: Apple category: - software - mobile - development description: > Provides Developer account and App Store Connect account for mobile apps... validated: true approved: true approvalPRLink: https://bitbucket.org/lifeomic/security-artifacts/pull-requests/2 approvalPRName: security-artifacts/2 website: https://www.apple.com owners: - owner.one@lifeomic.com - owner.two@lifeomic.com mainContactName: mainContactEmail: mainContactPhone: mainContactAddress: breachResponseDays: linkToNDA: https://developer.apple.com/terms/apple-developer-agreement/Apple- Developer-Agreement-English.pdf linkToMSA: https://developer.apple.com/programs/whats-included/ linkToSLA: criticality: 10 risk: 5 tag.PHI: false tag.PII: true tag.PCI: false statusPage: notes: ...
  • 31. Compliance Evidence Collection • Compliance framework and control requirements defined in JSON • Map policy procedures to each control requirement • Map query questions to each control requirement • Write positive case queries and negative case queries for automated gap analysis • Include evidence associated with manual processes { "standard": "SOC 2", "version": "2019", "sections": [ { "title": "Access Controls", "requirements": [ { "ref": "SOC2-01", "title": "Single Sign On", "summary": "SSO for all users ..." }, ... ] } ] ”domains": [ { "title": ”Control Domain A", ”controls": [ { "ref": ”A-01", "title": ”A technical control", "summary": ”control description ..." }, ... ] } ] } { "title": "Which user accounts do not have multi- factor authentication enabled?", "description": ”...", "queries": [ { "name": "bad", "query": "Find User with mfaEnabled != true that !(ASSIGNED|USES|HAS) m fa_device" }, { "name": "good", "query": "Find User with mfaEnabled = true" }, { "name": "goodToo", "query": "Find User that (ASSIGNED|USES|HAS) mfa_device" } ], "compliance": [ { "standard": "CIS Controls", "requirements": [ "4.5", "12.11", "16.3" ] }, { "standard": "HITRUST CSF", "controls": [ "01.b", "01.j", "01.q" ] }, { "standard": "PCI DSS", "requirements": [ "8.2", "8.3" ] } ] } github.com/jupiterone/security-policy-templates/tree/master/templates/standards
  • 33. Metrics and charts built with queries Users and Access
  • 34. Metrics and charts built with queries Development Insights
  • 35. Metrics and charts built with queries Cloud Resources
  • 36. Metrics and charts built with queries Data Security
  • 37. Metrics and charts built with queries Data Security
  • 38. Metrics and charts built with queries Risk Management
  • 39. Knowledge is Power Knowledge = Information (data) + Insights (understanding of that data) The graph is now the core of my entire security program. A knowledgebase, a foundation that allows me to take actions with confidence, faster. GRAPH •Asset inventory and CMDB •Cloud configuration visibility •Access analysis •Network and application architecture diagrams •Vulnerability management
  • 40. Questions? Live Demo? jupiterone.com Contact me for a copy of the presentation. And, I’m hiring!