The Caribbean and China relations and opportunities in the 21st century with brief historical discussion.

1. Topic 6
The Caribbean and Global Powers
Dr. Jacqueline LAGUARDIA MARTINEZ
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

2. China – Caribbean relations

3. The indentured servitude system was the answer to planters in the
English Caribbean (once the slave trade was eliminated and slavery
abolished) to guarantee a regular and continuous supply of cheap
and disciplined labor, restricted in its possibilities of becoming
autonomous small farmers and subject to coercive mechanisms.
• 1806: The end of the slave trade was decreed.
• 1806: The first group of Chinese arrived in Trinidad (192) on the ship
Fortitude belonging to the British East India Company.
• These early Chinese immigrants arrived as indentured servants and
found jobs in agriculture and local markets. Most of them settled in
Cocorite.
• The experiment was considered a fiasco as 61 Chinese departed on the
same ship in July 1807 and more left Trinidad in the following years.

4. • Between 1834 and 1918, 536,310 migrants were introduced into the
British West Indies.
• The policy of bringing in Chinese indentured servants by the colonial
authorities responded, in addition to the need to satisfy the shortage
of labor for agricultural work, to the intention of maintaining a certain
social hierarchy based on clearly defined ethnic criteria in order to
preserve social stability and the colonial regime.
• The laudatory descriptions of the Chinese over the Indians responded
to the interest of using this community as a "buffer" social stratum in
the colony to cushion the clashes between the white European elite on
the one hand, and the recently liberated Africans and Indian servants
on the other.
• The Chinese were seen as a stabilizing element in the societies of the
English-speaking Caribbean and their presence was functional to the
justification, reaffirmation and deepening of British rule.

5. Most active period of Chinese migration to the
West Indies (1853 - 1884).
Trips of Chinese indentured servants to Trinidad (1853 - 1866)
Ship Starting
point
Arrival date Number of
people
embarked
Number of
people who
disembarked
Women Children
Australia Shantou March 4, 1853 445 432 0 0
Clarendon Canton March 24, 1853 254 251 0 0
Lady Flora
Hastings
Shantou June 28, 1853 314 305 0 0
Maggie
Miller/Wanata
Hong Kong July 3, 1862 547 467 125 2
Montrose Canton February 18, 1865 320 313 101 2
Paria Canton May 25, 1865 289 280 76 0
Dudbrook Amoy February 12, 1866 286 272 1 0
Red Riding Hood Amoy February 24, 1866 327 325 6 0
Total 2.645 309 4
Source: Johnson, K. 2006, p. 28.

6. Beginnings of the Chinese community in Trinidad
• The process by which Chinese migrants integrated into their host
society was diverse and complex. Some Chinese returned to their
native country. The wealthier ones went on short-term visits or to
spend their old age and die. Others went to find their families
already formed or brides to marry. However, most preferred to stay
(a decision that was not difficult as Chinese contract workers were
not provided with return tickets).
• While blending into Trinidadian colonial life, the Chinese were able
to maintain their traditions and cultures, in a parallel process of
fusion and identity preservation.
• From 1890 onwards, the stage of free migration began, with the
largest arrivals between 1910 and 1940. These are the Chinese who
constitute the core of the current Chinese community.

7. Contribution to economic activity
• In the mid-1880s, most of the Chinese
community in Trinidad was engaged in two
occupations: small farming and the resale
trade.
• During the 20th century they advanced to jobs
in bakeries, laundries and small food stores.
• Occupations in the urban environment and
the service sector: small farmers and
gardeners, butchers, oyster sellers, cocoa
cultivation and trade.
• The beginnings of oil exploration in the
territory were driven by John Lee Lum, a
prosperous and versatile businessman who
owned several cocoa and coconut plantations.
John Lee Lum, photo taken
from the book An
Introduction to the History
of Trinidad and Tobago by
Bridget Brereton.

8. Caribbean for
China • Partner with the ability to provide funds for
development and investment projects, while
diversifying commercial and financial ties and
obtaining loans on better terms with less
conditionality.
• China, identifying itself as a developing country
belonging to the global South, is perceived as a
spokesperson for multilateralism capable of
promoting the interests of the least developed
countries.
• Counterbalancing dependence on the United
States and the former European metropolises in a
global environment where the Caribbean has lost
relative weight in world geopolitics.
• China is not part of the group of countries with a
colonizing past in the region.
• China's policy of neutrality, non-interference in
domestic affairs and absence of ideological
• Enforce the
principle of "One
China".
• To add support to
its projection as a
major global
player that
defends
multilateralism
and promotes
South-South
cooperation.
• Expand economic
ties.
China for the Caribbean

9. Diplomatic relations of the Caribbean SIDS with the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China-Taiwan
Country People's Republic of China Taiwan
Antigua and Barbuda Since January 1983
Bahamas Since May 1997
Barbados Since May 1977
Belize Between 1987 and 1989 Since 1989
Cuba 1960 (Between 1902 and 1949 with China)
Dominica Between October 1985 and August 1989
Since January 2005
Between 1989 and
2005
Grenada Since January 1983
Guyana Since June 1972
Haiti Since 1956
Jamaica Since November 1972
St. Kitts and Nevis Since 1983
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Since 1981
St. Lucia
Between 1997 and 2007
Between 1984 and
1997
Since 2007
Suriname Since May 1976

10. Caribbean-China relations
• Official visit of President Xi Jinping in 2013 to Trinidad and Tobago (first visit to the
English-speaking Caribbean). He took advantage of the visit to meet with the
leaders of Suriname, Guyana, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica,
Bahamas and Grenada. The visit followed that of then Vice President Joe Biden,
and was followed by that of Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou).
• The Caribbean's potential for attracting Chinese FDI lies in agriculture, tourism,
infrastructure, mineral extraction and telecommunications.
• China-style cooperation" takes the form of grants, concessional loans and lines of
credit, technical assistance and even in-kind donations. Each cooperation project
usually combines several of these modalities.
• China is a member of the Caribbean Development Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank, and has also contributed to the Caribbean Development Fund
(CDF).
• China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum: To discuss areas of trade
promotion and investment where preferential loans are agreed for infrastructure
development, training opportunities (natural disaster mitigation and prevention)
and export increase and diversification.

11. Spaces for regional dialogue between China and the Caribbean
China-Caribbean Trade and Economic
Cooperation Forum
• It operates relatively independently
as a sub-forum within the framework
of the China-CELAC Forum.
• 2005 in Jamaica
• 2007 in Xiamen (China offered
preferential loans to the Caribbean in
the amount of 4 billion renminbi
through cooperation mechanisms).
• 2011 in Trinidad and Tobago (China
offered USD 1 billion in preferential
loans to support local economic
development and a donation of USD
1 million to the CARICOM
Development Fund).
China-Caribbean Business Conference
• Forum for closer interaction
between governments and
businesses.
• A platform to represent the voices of
the business communities made up
of companies, trade promotion
organizations and government
agencies and departments.
China-Caribbean Consultation
Mechanism
Space for dialogue between foreign
ministers of CARICOM countries with
diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China.

12. Bilateral Cooperation
Belt and Road Initiative
• China invited Latin American and Caribbean countries to
participate in the Initiative at the China - CELAC Ministerial
Forum held in Santiago in 2018.
• Nineteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have
signed up to the Initiative. Ten of them are Caribbean SIDS.
• Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China, October 2023.
The Caribbean was not represented at the highest level. China
announced its proposed Global Artificial Intelligence
Governance Initiative.

13. Belt and Road Initiative
Caribbean SIDS Date of Accession (BRI MOU)
Antigua and Barbuda 2018
Bahamas 2021: MOU for USD 12 million economic and
technical agreement. A similar MOU was signed in
2019.
Barbados 2019
Belize
Cuba 2019
Dominica 2018
Grenada 2018
Guyana 2018
Haiti
Jamaica 2019
St. Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
St. Lucia
Suriname 2018
Dominican Republic 2019
Trinidad and Tobago 2018
Nedopil, Christoph (2023): "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative"; Shanghai, Green Finance
& Development Center, FISF Fudan University, www.greenfdc.org.

14. Signatories to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and Official Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan

15. Characteristics of economic relations
• Caribbean exports to China account for about 0.3% of total LAC exports. The
Caribbean attracts less than 1% of total imports from China to LAC. Trade with
the Caribbean can be considered marginal.
• Trade is promoted through Chinese credit lines and loans. The small size of the
Caribbean market, geographic dispersion and inadequate infrastructure affect
trade compared to its Latin American neighbors.
• While some of the investee companies operate with private agents, most
operate within frameworks established through intergovernmental
negotiations involving a loan provided by a Chinese bank to pay for the
services of a Chinese contractor. The governments provide guarantees for the
repayment of the loan, which reduces the banking risk. In some cases, loans
may be repaid with commodities or government assets.
• ECLAC warns that data on Chinese FDI fail to capture the magnitude of these
investments, due to the habit of Chinese companies to channel most of their
investments through third countries, which makes it difficult to identify
bilateral investment flows.

16. Economic Estimates
• Caribbean trade with China increased from USD 1 billion in 2002 to USD 8
billion in 2019, with an estimated USD 6.1 billion in Chinese exports and USD
1.9 billion in imports.
• Estimates show that, between 2005 and 2018, LAC accumulated loans with
the China Development Bank and the Exim Bank exceeded USD 140 billion.
• Between 2005 and 2022, China has invested more than US$10 billion in six
Caribbean SIDS in tourism, transportation, mining, agriculture and energy.
 Jamaica: 3.16 billion
 Guyana: 3.01 billion
 Trinidad and Tobago: 2.28 billion
 Antigua and Barbuda: 1 billion
 Cuba: 740 million
 Bahamas: 350 million
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-snapshot-project-the-caribbean/

17. China-Caribbean trade balance (2000-2015)
(USD millions)

18. China's investments in the Caribbean
Typology of Chinese
investments in the Caribbean.
• Group I. In consolidated
economic sectors such as
tourism in the Bahamas and
Barbados, and booming
sectors such as the oil
industry in Guyana.
• Group II: Industries in
retreat such as bauxite in
Jamaica.
• Group III. Infrastructure
development, which may
be: (i) to promote goodwill;
(ii) economic function and;
(iii) political purposes.
• Construction and repair of stadiums
(Cricket World Cup 2007): Antigua and
Barbuda, Jamaica and Grenada.
• Expansion of ports and airports: Antigua
and Barbuda, Guyana.
• Road construction: Bahamas, Jamaica
• Construction and rehabilitation of hotels
and resorts: Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana.
• Development of government buildings
and hospitals: Antigua and Barbuda,
Trinidad and Tobago.
• Construction of convention centers and
auditoriums: Antigua and Barbuda,
Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.
• Construction of industrial parks: Antigua,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.

19. https://www.cijn.org/chinas-opaque-caribbean-trail-dreams-deals-and-debt/
Investments in CARICOM countries
• Cuba and Jamaica have bilateral investment treaties with China
• China has signed doble taxation treaties with Barbados, Cuba,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

20. https://www.refworld.org/docid/597862ae4.html

21. Chinese presence in Guyana
• Chinese companies: Bosai Minerals Group; China Railway Road; China
Harbour Engineering Corporation (CHEC); Beijing Construction Group or
Eddie Boyer's National Hardware, China Railway First Group, China State
Construction and Engineering, Huawei.
• In 2006, Bosai Minerals Group took control of Omai Bauxite Mining Inc. in
Linden, Guyana, after acquiring 70% of its shares. The rest remained in the
hands of the Guyanese State.
• China gave the Guyana Defense Force a Y-12 military transport aircraft,
vehicles, police cars, motorcycles and other equipment.
• Bilateral relations deepened following the discovery and exploitation of oil
in Guyana's territorial waters by a consortium led by Exxon-Mobil. China
National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) entered as a 25% partner in the
Exxon-led consortium.
• Guyana seeks to deepen its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative by
negotiating the signing of the "BRI Cooperation Plan" and is evaluating the
establishment of the Guyana-China Investment and Economic Cooperation
Working Group to promote Chinese projects in the country.

22. • There is a certain animosity associated with the negative view of the
performance of Chinese companies involved in infrastructure projects
due to non-compliance with environmental standards, low quality of
finished works, hiring of Chinese labor, use of Chinese goods,
technologies and services to the detriment of local supply, poor
technology transfer and accusations of labor rights violations of Chinese
workers arriving in the country.
• The trade relationship is based on the import of manufactured goods
from China and the export of raw materials from the Caribbean (neo-
extractivism). Cheaper Chinese imports can displace local products.
• Increase in the trade deficit.
• Such criticisms are often accompanied by denunciations of the
expansionist interests of China, which they label as a new colonizing
power that will impose an onerous debt on the country.
Criticism of China's presence in the Caribbean

23. China in global geopolitics
• China's special diplomatic political interest in the region (snatching
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan and avoiding changes in alliances).
• Security issues and military cooperation, although marginal in scope,
are issues that China also considers. Future developments in this area
may involve friction and resistance with traditional partners of the
Caribbean community, especially the United States.
• Presence of members of the Chinese military in the MINUSTAH
military contingent between 2004 and 2012. First time outside
mainland China (8 officers killed in the 2010 earthquake).
• First visit of the Chinese Navy hospital ship to the Western
Hemisphere in September 2011 to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
• Vocational training in Chinese military institutions to assist local
armies.
• Donation of non-lethal military equipment.

24. Other cooperation actions
• COVID - 19.
• The Caribbean Music Festival in China.
• Athletes at the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games.
• Chinese tourism.
• Young people have received scholarships from the
Chinese government to study in China.
• Confucius Institutes in Cuba, Jamaica, Bahamas,
Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Grenada and Suriname.

25. Shared Vision of Pragmatism in Foreign Policy
• Current "low profile" scenario.
• The Caribbean does not want to be forced to choose between
China and the US.
• China does not want the US to perceive it as a direct threat in
its immediate backyard. It is an observer at the OAS.
• Two China Policy Papers on Latin America and the Caribbean
(2008, 2016) refer to a comprehensive and cooperative
partnership involving mutual equality and cooperation.
• Belt and Road Initiative.
• China's strategic framework for advancing its "community of
common destiny": the Global Development Initiative, the
Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative.
• China and the US compete (technology) and cooperate in the
Caribbean.