1. U N I V E R S I T Y O F C O P E N H A G E N
F A C U L T Y O F H U M A N I T I E S
Master’s Thesis
Jeppe Stavnsbo Sørensen
Everyday Expressions of Identity and Ideology in
Syria’s Civil War
A Comparative Analysis of SANA and Bashar al-Assad’s War Narratives
Supervisor: Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen
Submitted: August 1, 2016
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Resume
Dette speciale præsenterer en diskurs og framing analyse af, hvordan det syriske statslige
nyhedsbureau, SANA, implicit formidler ideologiske narrativer i deres daglige dækning af
Syriens borgerkrig. Med udgangspunkt i ideologiske stikord om det syriske fædreland (waṭan,)
den syriske samhørighed (waḥda) og deres standhaftighed (ṣumūd) undersøger specialet fire
gennemgående temaer: Syrien som offer for terrorisme, der er støttet af landets fjender; kampen
mod terrorisme og hegemoni; samhørigheden mellem Syriens befolkning, den syriske hær og
landets leder mod terrorisme samt internationale principper og resolutioners rolle i at nå frem til
en løsning af konflikten.
Analysen viser, hvordan SANA har tilpasset ovennævnte ideologiske forestillinger i
deres dækning ved at relatere eksisterende ideologiske narrativer i henhold til nutidige regionale
og internationale tendenser. Dette kommer blandt andet til udtryk i SANAs konstante
beskrivelser af den syriske opposition som udefrakommende dyriske takfīri terrorister, der
sidestilles med Israel, Tyrkiet og Saudi Arabiens mål om at underminere den syriske waḥda,
landets suverænitet og territoriale integritet til fordel for deres visioner om regional hegemoni.
SANA har ligeledes tilpasset fortællingen om den syriske waḥda ved at indarbejde religiøse
vendinger og termer med henblik på at sammenflette forestillinger om syrisk sekularisme og
religiøsitet. SANAs framing af international principper og resolutioner afslører en selektiv
tilgang, hvor segmenter af resolutioner anvendes til at positionere regimet fordelagtigt.
Specialets komparative analyse viser, hvordan SANAs implicitte hentydninger til ideologi og
identitet er i tråd Bashar al-Assads retorik. Ved at påvise, hvordan SANA understøtter regimets
fortælling og fortolkning af konflikten, understreger analyserne det tætte forhold mellem den
syriske stats og dets mobiliserende medier. Bashar al-Assad adskiller sig dog fra SANA,
eftersom han tilpasser sin retorik, ideologi og identitet i henhold til tilsigtet publikum.
Specialet vurderer, at regimets tilgang ideologi og identitet bør betragtes som et redskab,
der formidler kontinuitet trods forandringer. Yderligere bør mediers rolle ses som et led i en
sammenhæng, hvor de nationalt og internationalt konkurrerer med andre opfattelser af
konflikten. Regimets tilgang til ideologi og identitet er derfor ikke ufravigelige principper, men
et magtmiddel, der opportunistisk og dynamisk anvendes til at understøtte regimets position og
handlinger. Derfor foreslås det, at man overvejer indholdet af diskurser og framing i en politisk
og militær sammenhæng, idet de eventuelt signalerer underlæggende strategier og overvejelser.
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Note on Arabic Transliteration:
I have followed the guidelines for transliteration provided by the International Journal of
Middle East Studies (IJMES):
Arabic terms, words and phrases in the main body of the thesis are translated, italicized
and transliterated with diacritics.
Personal names, place names, names of political parties and organizations or titles of
books, newspapers and articles are transliterated without diacritics and not italicized.
If names, places and terms are commonly known in English, I have followed that
spelling.
IJMES’ transliteration guide was retrieved from
http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES_Translation_and_Transliteration_Guide.htm
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1.0 Introduction
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Syrian regime and the opposition
have been waging a ‘war of perception’ in a media landscape of ‘competing narratives’
(Fielding-Smith, 2015: 27; Iskandar, 2014: 251.) In their attempt to win ‘the hearts and minds’ of
Syrians and the international community, both sides of the spectrum have invested efforts in
constructing a narrative that fits their political goal using various platforms to disseminate their
message (Lynch, et. al, 2014: 8.) President Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian regime and their media
outlets have been consistent in their propaganda message since the beginning of the conflict: the
country is facing a crisis (azma) where the sovereignty (siyāda) of the homeland (waṭan) is
threatened by the infiltration (tasrīb) and spread (intishār or imtidād) of foreign sponsored
terrorists (irhabiyyīn.) By designating the entire spectrum of the opposition as terrorists, the
Syrian regime delegitimizes all of the opposition’s political demands. The regime’s claims are
described as ‘absurd,’ ‘delusional’ and ‘out-of-touch with reality’ by Western media and
politicians.
It is obvious that the regime’s media outlets serve as a mouthpiece for the regime.
Nonetheless, by dismissing the media claims as ‘absurd,’ we fall short of achieving an in-depth
understanding of the message, content and function of Syrian regime media. Even further, we
fall short of examining the effect of media in conflict and questioning why the regime is
spending resources on, constructing, and repeating their narrative when only 1-2 percent of
Syrians regard major government media outlets as their preferred source of information (MICT,
2014: 16.) Additionally, the lack of studies on regime-controlled media outlets during the Syrian
conflict presents an empirical and scholarly void offering inadequate conclusions of state-run
media’s purpose, consequently allowing its functions to prevail and continue to operate
unbothered.
Although this thesis analyzes Syria’s media in the midst of the civil war, a brief overview
of significant studies prior to the ongoing conflict, which have explored the effects of the Syrian
regime’s ideological messages and the state-controlled media’s role in conveying these messages
is useful, in order to situate the dynamics and possible purposes of Syrian media. In general,
these studies imply that the regime’s discourse and media produces either legitimacy or
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obedience. For example, Mordechai Kedar argues that the driving force behind Syria’s state-
controlled press is the Assad’s search for legitimacy (Kedar, 1999; Kedar 2005: 49, 61.) He
argues that the media serves as a ‘conduit for the words and messages of the regime’ (Ridolfo,
2012: 233,) which the regime utilizes to ‘mollify’ the Syrian population and ‘secure favorable
public opinion.’ The legitimacy-building is closely related to the project of nation-building of
Syria in which the press seeks to fortify and favor national unity and Pan-Arab identity of Syria
over sectarian divisions (Kedar, 2005: ix, 8, 21-27, 222.) This is accomplished by linking Syria’s
glorified past, historical leaders and military victories to the present rule and current struggle
against the West and Israel in rhetorical ‘emotional overtones’ (Kedar, 2005: 132-133.) The
press’ abundant use of emotional overtones and use of first person plural (e.g. our ‘fight’ against
an external enemy, our nation, our leader, etc.) contribute to the legitimacy of the al-Assads and
is helping to fulfill the Syrians’ ‘basic psychological need’ for identification and belonging.
Hence, Syrians identify themselves with Hafiz al-Assad’s, later Bashar al-Assad’s, ‘personality,
his pronouncements, his opinions and his decisions’ as the ‘ideal figure for identification.’
(Kedar, 2005: 24, 210, 217-219.) While Syrian media has contributed to the country’s nation-
building and functioned as a channel for disseminating the regime’s messages, Lisa Wedeen
offers a different conclusion on the effects of the regime’s rhetoric. She argues that the messages
generates obedience rather than legitimacy. She does so by complimenting her analysis of the
Syrian daily press with anthropological work through which she examines the state-rhetoric and
distinguishes between ‘public dissimulation of loyalty’ and actual belief (Wedeen, 1999: 24.)
Weeden regards the official rhetoric as a ‘system of representations’ and explores how it
produces and reproduces power through ‘taken-for-granted’ ideological practices of the
everyday. Quoting Stuart Hall, Wedeen perceives the ‘horizon of the taken-for-granted’ as
‘dominant conceptions of the world’ that subtly ‘classify the world for others’ and ultimately
define the limits of what appear ‘rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable,
within the given vocabularies of motive and action available’ (Wedeen, 1999: 12, 73-83.) Thus,
rather than perceiving the ‘success’ of the Hafiz al-Assad’s cult and its rhetoric as producing
legitimacy, she asserts the official rhetoric is a ‘disciplinary-symbolic power’ generating
obedience and structuring limits of dissent and acceptable speech rather than actual belief
(Wedeen, 1999: 145-152.) Put differently, the official rhetoric is an effect of power that provides
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Syrians the necessary vocabulary to navigate in society to act ‘as if’ they revere the leader in the
public sphere (Wedeen, 1999: 5-7, 104, 87-132.)
Despite their different views on the state rhetoric’s function, Wedeen and Kedar
acknowledge the Syrian regime’s excessive use of history and religion in the official rhetoric in
order to accommodate contemporary Syria to its past and future aspirations (Wedeen, 1999: 10,
42; Kedar, 2005: 132.) This tendency appears to have continued during Bashar al-Assad
presidency where the regime seeks to generate a ‘vernacular patriotism’ (Pinto, 2011: 191) by
‘injecting’ TV-dramas to portray the desired way of ‘being Syrian’ by conflating ‘imaginations
of sovereignty, nationalism and national leadership’ (al-Ghazzi, 2013: 588, 595.) In particular,
the regime is strategically balancing between nationalist and Islamic vocabulary in their
references to the country’s history and its leadership (Pinto, 2011: 192.) For example, whereas
the ‘cultspeak’ of Hafiz al-Assad depicted the late president as the ‘eternal leader’ or the
‘premier pharmacist,’ Bashar al-Assad’s ‘cultspeak’ has been more subtle. This is evident in how
the regime has sought to habituate the al-Assad rule by discreetly filling the everyday language
and the language of popular culture with sentimental nationalist and religious vocabulary that
intertwine the qualities of the leadership and Syria’s history, geography and its people (Magout,
2012.)
While the aforementioned underlines the importance of media’s role in mundanely
disseminating identity, ideology and power in Syria prior to the conflict, few studies have
focused on the function of the state-controlled press and everyday dissemination of identity and
ideology in the Syrian state-controlled press during the civil war. The existing literature on the
regime’s media during the war tends to focus on how Bashar al-Assad or English translations of
Syrian media narrate the war ‘here and now’ (Seema, 2015; Merz, 2014; Ghazal, 2015;
Lundgren-Jörum, 2012.) Unfortunately, scholars tend to disregard the historical formation of the
discourse, which helps explain why the regime’s narrative is shaped as it is.
In order to explore the everyday maintenance and evolution of identity and ideology
during the conflict, I will in the following, conduct a discourse analysis of Syrian state-media
and assess its implications. Since the focus of the thesis is on the regime’s narrative, I have
chosen to analyze the messages of the state-controlled news agency, Syrian Arab News Agency
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(SANA.) SANA is of particular interest since it is directly associated with the Ministry of
Information and other Syrian dailies rely on SANA’s reports and newswires (George, 2003: 125-
126.) Despite the obvious link between the regime and the state-run news agency there exists no
in-depth study of SANA that explores its messages. Therefore, in order to illustrate different
components of Syrian state-media messages and their function, I will supplement my discourse
analysis with a framing analysis of SANA’s daily coverage of the Syrian Civil War. Inspired by
Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism and studies of the everyday, I will examine how SANA
utilizes and appropriates mundane expressions of ideology and identity in the everyday language
of the agency’s coverage as a means to preserve the regime’s symbolic world. Specifically, my
analysis will illustrate how SANA’s everyday language, identity and ideology construct a
recognizable language and rhetorical framework that implicitly convey, remind, maintain and
reproduce the regime’s identity and ideology in tandem with its policies. Furthermore, my
analysis of SANA’s everyday language will explore the semiotic sphere that sharply divides ‘us’
and ‘them.’ To explore the cohesion and correlation between SANA’s repetitive framework and
the regime’s overall discourse, I will compare my analysis of SANA with speeches and
interviews with Bashar al-Assad in order to illustrate how he makes use of this rhetorical
framework in his public appearances as well as how his rhetoric differs from SANA.
In the last part of the thesis, I will contextualize the findings of my analyses by assessing
the implications of the Syrian state-media and the regime’s discourse. My assessment is three-
fold: in the first section of the chapter, I will consider the possible domestic implications of the
Syrian discourse by reevaluating Kedar and Wedeen’s findings in the context of the civil war.
Secondly, I will assess the international implications of the regime’s discourse by comparing
contentious views on legitimacy and identify how different actors deploy the concept. Finally, I
consider the possible correlation between rhetoric, politics, and action.
My conclusion will show that the mundane, less ‘spectacular’, and repeating everyday
language found in SANA’s coverage is implicitly constructing a ‘schemata of interpretation’
where repetition creates connotations and imaginations that strengthen and reinforce the regime’s
idea of the Syrian state and the Syrian identity. Considering recent media studies on Syria, the
conclusion shows that SANA and Bashar al-Assad convey and adjust the ideal sense of ‘Syria’
accordingly to the country’s political fluctuations. Finally, I suggest that the everyday
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dissemination of ideology and identity may indicate a relationship between rhetoric, political
priorities and military methodologies.
I will answer the above in the following problem statement:
How is the Syrian regime’s discourse, identity and ideology implicitly framed and
repeatedly disseminated in SANA news agency’s daily coverage of the Syrian Civil War; how
does it correlate with Bashar al-Assad’s rhetoric; and what are the implications of the regime’s
discourse?
A discourse and framing analysis of SANA will go beyond any prejudiced assumptions
and judgments based on ‘anecdotal evidences’ regarding SANA as a media outlet and thus
contribute to the ‘empirical void’ of the study of Arab media (Lynch, 2008: 18, 21.)
Furthermore, by applying my findings from the analysis to the regime’s overall discourse, I am
able to explore the state-media relations as well as analyze the ‘representation of different parties
in the media sphere,’ which has largely been neglected in analyses of Arab media content
(Ayish, 2008: 108, 109.) An empirical study of SANA also adds to the complexity of William A.
Rugh’s typology of Arab media, which critics (Mellor, 2005: 54,) including Rugh himself, argue
lacks empirical evidence (Rugh, 2004: xvi.)
1.1 Limitations of Thesis
Due to the scope and length of the thesis, it does not seek to include the following
approaches: ethnographic reception study, other Syrian state-friendly media’s use of SANA, or
comparison to opposition media.
The thesis follows a media sociology approach, which considers the interrelationship
between media, institutions, and politics (Williams, 2015: 1.) This approach is appropriate in
providing a framework for regarding SANA’s coverage as a window into the ‘meaning systems’
of the regime. In particular, it offers an approach to comprehend what the regime is saying as
well as why and how it narrates its discourse and politics through text, language and rhetoric.
However, due to the limitations of the thesis, this approach unfortunately falls short of offering
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any discussion of how Syrians interpret the message. Such assessment would require an
ethnographic fieldwork that links emotions, perception, and interpretations similar to the works
of Lisa Wedeen (1999) and Christopher Phillips (2013.) Nevertheless, by synthesizing already
existing ethnographic works with the results from my analysis, I am able to make a cautious
assessment of the function of Syrian media and its potential impact.
Alan George notes the state-controlled media is characterized by its heavy reliance on
reports from SANA in their coverage (George, 2003: 125-126.) Similar to its state-controlled
counterpart, Caldwell notes that the ‘private’ Syrian media also prints articles from SANA in
addition to propagating the regime’s policies and ultimately functions as a model for ‘proper
speech’ for the population to ‘replicate’ (Caldwell, 2010: 9, 14, 18, 70.) Given that this thesis
focuses on how different forms of powers exist in relation to each other (Foucault, 1978: 93,) I
consider SANA to be the primary source for spreading the regime’s rhetoric and discourse.
Focusing on SANA and the regime allows me to analyze the nature, dynamics and function of
the state-media relations and media discourse in Syria beyond preconceived notions of the Syrian
regime as ‘evil’ (Tohme, 2013: 24.) Nevertheless, because of the exclusive focus on SANA and
the regime’s utilization of the rhetoric, the thesis fails to consider the function of other state-
controlled and private media. Additionally, the thesis also does not contemplate whether function
of the myriad opposition media ‘resemble’ (Haddad, 2015) or deviate (Lynch, et. al. 2014) from
the regime-controlled media.
1.2 Structure
The thesis is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. The forthcoming chapter will
locate the thesis’ central argument in a theoretical context. I will outline and synthesize theories
of discourse, framing, identity and power by focusing on the means that reproduce and reinforce
identity and power. In particular, the chapter highlights the importance of communicating and
repeating the frames and ‘language’ of the dominant discourse shaped by the elite. I will also
outline my empirical data and methodology in the last section of the chapter.
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Acknowledging that ‘mediated cultures’ are products of history, socio-economic
developments, and politics (Matar, 2012: 75,) chapter 3 will review works focusing on media in
Syria as well as studies of power, identity, and discourse in Syria. The literature review will
function as the point of reference, which allows me to analyze the political dynamics that have
contributed to the development and change of identity, power and imagined communities across
time and space as well as the role of state and media in disseminating identity in Syria. Thus,
focusing on the period after the 1963 Baʿth coup and especially after 1970 when Hafiz al-Assad
seized power after toppling Salah Jadid, I will briefly describe the country’s major political
transformations and their effects on the Syrian media sphere. In particular, I will synthesize
works focusing on political and media legislation development in Syria. Additionally, I will
outline the trajectory of the cult of personality during Hafiz al-Assad and later Bashar al-Assad,
its characteristics and its relations to the media. This will help me to conceptualize the ‘here’ and
‘now’ without ‘loosing historical formations’ and allow me to consider the ‘deep politicization’
of Arab media (Matar, 2012: 78; Sreberny, 2008: 12.) Additionally, the literature review will
allow me to explain media development in Syria based on the country’s unique political
experiences rather than analyzing Syria’s media from linear Western media paradigms
(Sreberny, 2008: 13, 17.)
Chapter 4 offers an analysis of SANA’s coverage of the Syrian Civil War. The chapter
categorizes SANA’s coverage into four major themes. The four themes are:
Syria as a victim of a foreign conspiracy.
Fighting terrorism and Western hegemony.
The unity of the Syrian people and religious co-existence.
The issue of international law and reaching a political settlement.
I will treat these themes within an analytical framework of discourse and framing
analysis, which focus on the use and recurrence of a specific language and words. My main
argument is that repetition is crucial for discourse maintenance in order to ‘reconsolidate its
powers and efficacy’ (Butler, 1997: 143.)
Chapter 5 offers a comparative analysis to selected speeches and interviews with Bashar
al-Assad. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to utilize my empirical findings from
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chapter 4 and demonstrate how Bashar al-Assad exploits the repetitive rhetorical framework
found in SANA’s coverage in his public appearances. Chapter 4 and 5 analyses concludes that
the everyday power and identity found in SANA’s coverage serves as a ‘referential discourse’
where banal ideological markers serve as a means to remind, reproduce and manifest the
worldview, or the dominant discourse, of the Syrian regime (Groppe, 1984: 168, 167;
Fairclough, 1989: 45, 60-62; Billig, 1995: 93.)
Chapter 6 will consider the implications of SANA of the regime’s discourse among
Syrians and internationally. The first section will assess the Syrian regime and its media’s
engagement in the ‘competing narratives’ found in the civil war. Reevaluation of the media’s
role in producing legitimacy or obedience suggests that the media intentionally prompts public
confusion regarding the conflict. In the second section, I will locate and identify normative
contentious views regarding the Syrian regime’s ‘legitimacy’ and assess how different actors.
The last part of the chapter will evaluate the correlation rhetoric, politics and actions and suggest
why rhetoric and narratives are significant in conflicts.
I will conclude my thesis by reviewing my hypothesis: the interconnectedness between
everyday reproduction of identity, ideology and power as displayed in SANA’s coverage and the
regime’s utilization of the implicit ideological referential language as well as the possible effects
of the discourse. I then discuss the possibilities for further research, such as ethnographic studies,
to test my assumptions regarding Syrian state-controlled media role in the conflict. I also call for
additional comparative analyses of Syrian state-led and opposition media content in order to
trace similarities and differences in their coverage.
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2.0 Theory, Methodology and Empirical Data
In order to approach the empirical backbone of the thesis in a desirable manner, I will in
the following sections outline the thesis’ applied theories. In particular, I will outline and
synthesize theories of discourse and framing analysis as well studies that explore the significance
of the everyday and weave them into a central argument, which highlights the importance of
discourse maintenance and its relation to power. Following my theoretical review, I will briefly
describe the empirical data gathered for the thesis and the methodology used to approach and
categorize it.
The purpose of this theoretical chapter is to establish the framework that underlines my
argument in chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6. Specifically, it highlights the importance of state-media
relations and media’s function to disseminate ideology, identity and politics and its association to
the dominant discourse in Syria. The theoretical framework also reveals some of the
shortcomings of the analysis. The most obvious shortcoming being that the audience is largely
treated as a passive receiver. This consequently dismisses the receiver’s actual interpretation of
the discourse and framing (Skye, 2009: 336.)
2.1 Discourse, Power, Repetition and the Everyday
Marc Lynch calls for studies on Arab media to focus on content, framing, and agenda in
order to disclose media discourses and regimes’ utilization of media beyond preconceived
notions (Lynch, 2008: 18, 21, 23.) In a parallel argument, Muhammad Ayish notes that previous
studies of Arab media content have largely fallen short on generating an understanding of Arab
media systems, the state-media relation and the role of media in conflict in the Middle East
(Ayish, 2008: 106, 108, 109.) In an attempt not to fall within Lynch’s and Ayish’s critique, I find
it suitable to combine elements of media content and state-media relations with discourse
analysis in order demonstrate the correlations between everyday media language and utilization
by the regime elite.
Michel Foucault perceives a discourse as historically situated and socially constructed
‘truths.’ Iara Lessa summarizes Foucault’s notion of a discourse as ‘systems of thoughts
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composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct
the subjects and the worlds of which they speak’ (Lessa, 2006: 285.) In other words, discourses
are omnipresent in social life. It refers to the socially entrenched, limited and constructed habits
of thinking and speaking (Goulding, 2010: 20) and relates to ‘strategies of domination as well as
resistance’ (Diamond & Quinby, 1988: 185.) Similarly, Judith Butler states that a discourse
serves as the ‘domain of publically acceptable speech, demarcating the line between speakable
and the unspeakable’ (Butler, 1997: 77.) The demarcation of the ‘speakable’ in discourse and
censorship operates in both an explicit nature, such as legislation, and implicit nature, the passive
and unconscious submission to prevailing norms constituted and reconstituted by power (Butler,
1997: 129-130, 134.) Furthermore, the implicit demarcations found in norms and discourse have
disciplinary, regulatory and ordering elements, which ‘seek to know the individual as an object
to be known in relations to others. Thereafter, those deviating from the norm are defined as
abnormal.’ The explicit and implicit forms of demarcations constitutes an ‘arena of power’
where the socially disciplinary and regulatory power, and the sovereign power found in legal
codes, contemplate and reinforce each other (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014: 109-110.)
One of the efficacies of discourse lies in its ability to adapt, reproduce and reconstruct
power relations through different mechanisms of power. For example, in line with Butler and
Foucault, James Scott perceives the ‘rules’ of language found in social settings and in the media
as frequently occurring taken-for-granted ‘daily embodiments of domination’ and ‘small
ceremonies’ of subordination, which construct a ‘façade of cohesion’ that maintains and
reinforces the hierarchical power relations (Scott, 1990: 31, 45-46, 56, 73, 1091
.) Hence, in a
Gramscian sense, media operates within the realm of ‘hegemonic apparatuses’ where a political
elite seeks to ‘create its own speech’ with the purpose of establishing ‘homogeneity’ in society
and underline superior-subordinate relations (Buci-Glucksmann, 1975: 105-106.)
The close interconnectedness between discourse, ideology, taken-for-granted
classifications and hierarchies, language and media is the main purpose of Norman Fairclough’s
Language and Power (1989.) Fairclough emphasizes that the media is a type of ‘hidden power’
1
While I find James Scott’s description of domination useful, it is important to note that Scott’s career is dedicated
to study how subordinate groups also exploit the ‘rules’ of language and ‘available ideological resources’ to resist
and subvert systems of domination in concealed acts of everyday resistance (Scott, 1990: 85-102, 117, 196; Scott,
2013; Scott, 1989.)
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that implicitly mediates power relations by selectively including and excluding various
perspective and representations. Media’s dependence on an intended audience forces it to rely on
‘systematic tendencies’ where media reporting uses repetition to position the intended reader
(Fairclough, 1989: 41-44.) The exposure of media and its standardization of language through
repetition is of ‘great political and cultural importance in the establishment of nationhood’ since
it contributes to sustaining of common-sense ‘national language’ where rhetorical ‘cues’ make
politically defined territories and terms ‘meaningful’ and part of the everyday discourse
(Fairclough, 1989: 47, 17-18.) The standardization and naturalization of language are ‘roads’ to
the embodiment of ideologies’ which are effectively concealed as common-sense assumptions,
thus hiding underlying maintenance of power relations it produces and maintains. Consequently,
‘ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible’ (Fairclough, 1989: 71, 76-77.)
Michael Billig (1995) expands further on the significance of mundaneness in discourse
and ideology maintenance as well as how it serves to reinforce the nation-state. Following
Gramsci’s notion of ideology as ‘a form of practical activity… [and] conception of the world
that… [exists] in all manifestations of individual and collective life… ideology serves to cement
and to unify’ (Gramsci, 1971: 328,) Billig analyzes how everyday ‘cues’ or ‘flagging’ of the
nation is ‘cementing’ the idea of the nation-state. In parallel with Gramsci, Scott and Fairclough,
Billig regards that the ‘banal nationalism’ is embodied in daily habits, including language, which
‘slips our attention’ because they appear as common-sense belief (Billig, 1995: 6, 8.) The
everyday ‘flagging’ of nationalism continually reinforces the sense that ‘we’ live in nations.
Especially, the positive and ‘flattering’ stereotyping of ‘us’ and demeaning stereotyping of the
‘others’ function as an ‘act of rhetorical imagination,’ which categorize the individual and make
norms of identity associated with the nation salient (Billig, 1995: 66, 93, 102.) Hence, national
identity is based on ‘the style in which they are imagined’ (Anderson, 2006: 6) tailored by the
‘high cultures’’ selective approach to history to fit the narrative and interests of the elite in
‘creating’ one common culture (Gellner, 2006: 53-56.) The salience and naturalization of the
nation-state ultimately provides the demarcated language and framework for all political
discussions (Harris, 1990: 269.)
Billig argues that the flagging of the nation and stereotyping is dependent on repetition in
order to ‘melt into the background as “our” particular world is experienced as the world’ (Billig,
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1995: 102-103, 50.) Correspondingly, Butler and Charles Tripp also emphasize the importance
of repeating ‘structures’ in various frames in different contexts in order to ‘reconsolidate…
powers and efficacy’ (Butler, 1997: 139-140) that can ‘engender boredom and rejection as well
as familiarity and acceptance’ (Tripp, 2012: 91.) Put differently, the everyday and mundane
reiteration of ‘structures’ serves as an ‘ordering’ and ‘reminding’ mechanism of the dominant
discourse that through naturalization of language ensures ‘narrative coherence and emplotment,
which can lead to acceptance of roles’ and survival of the ‘everyday state’ (Tripp, 2012: 91,
103.) Therefore, it is necessary to observe how everyday discourses’ correspond with dominant
discourses and narratives in order to assess the ideological patterns and assumptions of power
relations (Fairclough, 1989: 23; Billig, 1995: 5; Groppe, 1984: 167; Scott, 1990: 21, 30)
2.2 Discourse and Framing: Locating Repetition and Everyday Manifestations of Identity
and Power
The above review offers a theoretical framework for discussing and analyzing language
in discourse, ideology, identity and power relations. However, it falls short on actual approaches
to locate it. Therefore, this section will review different methods of approaching and locating
everyday identity and ideology.
Billig demonstrates the occurrence of everyday flagging of the nation by analyzing how
the nation-state is mundanely expressed in the structure of British newspapers and the ‘verbal
muzak’ of politicians. He notes that politicians utilize terms such as ‘we,’ ‘the people’ and
‘popular will’ for a political purpose aimed at establishing a ‘rhetoric of hegemony’ that bolster
the concept of the nation-state by converting and reinforcing the terms as euphemisms of the
nation-state (Billig, 1995: 98-99.) Billig’s analysis follows the pattern of Fairclough’s stages of
critical discourse analysis by distinguishing between description, interpretation, and explanation
of written text as well as analyzing grammar, consistency of language, and the selected
vocabulary in order to locate the common-sense meaning of the words and how they are
associated with ‘meaning systems’ (Fairclough, 1989: 21, 55, 77.) Drawing on Habermas’ notion
of ‘ideal speech’ consisting of ‘validity claims,’ Cukier, et. al. state that the purpose of discourse
analysis is to expose how institutions ‘select and shape the presentation of messages’ rooted in
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‘deep structures, systematic communicative distortions and power relations that underlie
discourse’ (Cukier, et. al. 2009: 176-177.) In order to approach and locate a discourse, they state
that it is necessary to:
Define quantity of data, identify, and interpret it within its political context.
Conduct content analysis and coding procedure to ‘uncover the use of the rhetorical
strategy of repetition’ embedded in the ‘taken-for granted lifeworld’ by coding the use of
terms, ‘specialized language and jargon.’
Explain findings drawing on ‘the deep structures it reflects.’ (Cukier, et. al. 2009: 182-
184.)
With the purpose of uncovering the ‘rhetorical strategy of repetition’ and the political
context of SANA’s discourse embedded in the Syrian regime’s ideological ‘meaning systems,’ I
find it instructive to supplement the discourse analysis with framing analysis. Robert Entman’s
concise definition of framing constitutes the basis of several studies on framing (for example, see
Pokolava, 2010; Scheufele, 1999; Abdullah & Mokhtar, 2015; Dimitrovaa & Connolly-Ahern,
2007; Tohme, 2013.) According to Entman framing is:
“To select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such ways as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.” (Entman, 1993: 52.)
In other words, framing serves as a means to construct a reality through communication
(Nelson, et. al, 1997: 221) that promotes interpretations of events, which favor one side and
undermine the others (Entman, 2003: 414.) Additionally, in order to mobilize ‘us’ around an
issue and undermine ‘the other side,’ framing processes need to be a conduit that offers a reason
for , an assessment of and a solution to the issue(Benford & Snow, 2000: 614; Tarrow, 2011:
142.) Scholars of framing have noted that a text’s sender exploits a certain vocabulary, wording,
repetition and emphases that is situated within in a certain social, political and normative context
in an attempt to invoke connotations and guide the receiver’s interpretation of a message.
(Entman, 1993: 53; Tarrow, 2011: 144.) This formula is reinforced repeatedly in media in order
to disseminate the desired interpretation of events with the intention of making the message
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appear as common-sense and therefore memorable (Entman, 1991: 6-7.) Framing nationalist
identity is particularly effective in ‘exaggerating’ a common identity (Tarrow, 2011: 67) because
it is a ‘ready source’ filled with emotional ‘national imaginings’ (Anderson, 2006: 9)
representing the ‘essence’ of the nation (Billig, 1995: 27) rather than ‘metaphors of class
dialectics’ (Tarrow, 2011: 152-153.)
Entman asserts that framing is essential for maintaining the general discursive domain
since framing’s inherent features of emphases and repetition seek to establish common-sense
assumptions regarding certain issues while at the same time downplay other interpretations
(Entman, 1991: 18; Entman, 1993: 55.) This process of establishing ‘common-sense
assumptions’ ultimately naturalizes ideology by generating ‘fixed meanings’ of words where
they, at first glance, appear to lose their ideological content and are thereby perceived as natural
and legitimate (Fairclough, 1989: 62, 76, 78.) Thus, framing analysis reveals the parameters and
structures of text as an ‘effect of power’ (Fairclough 1989: 76, 78.) The repeating structures of
framing as an ‘effect of power’ is thereby closely related to John Groppe’s assumption that
repetition serves as an implicitly ‘ordering’ and ‘reminding’ device that reinforce the dominant
discourse through common-sense assumptions (Groppe, 1984: 167.)
Framing is of particular interest for the thesis because it looks thoroughly at the presence
of‘meaning systems’ in texts (referred to as ‘belief systems’ by Entman, 1993: 52) situated
within a discourse’s social, cultural, and political context (Entman, 1993: 53.) Specifically,
Entman’s focus on how media’s wording and framing reinforce the dominant discourse by
‘patrol[ling] the boundaries of culture and keep discord within conventional bounds’ (Entman,
2003: 428) serves as a specific approach to media within the larger discussion of discourse.
Hence, framing analysis is inevitably intertwined with discourse analysis. Therefore, it is
inadequate to analyze framing’s ‘perceived reality’ found in text as ‘ritualized structure of
perceptions and expectations’ (Bausinger, 1984: 344) without referring to the embeddedness of
discourse and meaning systems articulated in framing in order to disclose its functions (Entman,
1993: 53; Fairclough, 1989: 23, 124; Butler, 1997: 35-36, 158; Mitchell, 1990: 567, 572.)
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2.3 Empirical Data and Methodology
The foundation of the analysis is empirically grounded. I have collected and analyzed 230
articles in Arabic from SANA’s website, www.sana.sy, from December 15, 2015 to January 15,
2016. However, I did not collect the entire body of articles since this would include financial
news, weather reports, scores on high school basketball matches and international soccer results.
While these articles serve as daily ‘flagging’ of the nation-state (Billig, 1995: 109, 121; Skye,
2009: 332) and an attempt to portray life in areas under the regime’s control as ‘normal’ (see
Abdulrahim, 2015,) I did not find them useful for the research purpose of the thesis.
As the main purpose of the thesis is to analyze everyday expressions of identity, ideology and
power in extraordinary situations and its correlation with Bashar al-Assad’s rhetoric, I narrowed
the search by only collecting articles that dealt with the civil war in one way or another. In order
to illustrate how everyday flagging of identity, ideology and power is present in SANA’s
coverage of the civil war, I categorized the articles in major themes in order to ‘unearth’ the most
prominent themes in SANA’s coverage at different levels (Attride-Stirling, 2001: 387.) The
major themes are: Syria as victim of foreign international terrorist conspiracy; fighting terrorism
and Western hegemony; and the unity of the Syrian people and religious coexistence and the
issue of international law and reaching a political settlement.
The comparative analysis in chapter 5 is based on selected interviews and speeches by
Bashar al-Assad from March 2011 until February 2016. The purpose of the comparative analysis
is to illustrate how Bashar al-Assad utilizes and appropriates SANA’s everyday language in his
public appearances and interviews with different media outlets. However, following Billig’s
notion of extraordinary, politically and emotionally charged ‘hot nationalism’ (1995: 44,) my
hypothesis is that Bashar al-Assad’s expressions of identity are more explicit in comparison with
the banal expressions of identity found in SANA’s coverage.
Although I primarily analyze SANA’s articles and Bashar al-Assad’s rhetoric through a
discourse and framing approach, I will support my findings with commentaries from Syrian
journalists who I interviewed. My first interview was an in-person interview on April 6, 2016. I
interviewed Lilas Hatahet who has worked as head of communications at the Damascus Opera
and Rafa al-Masri who has worked at al-Thawra newspaper in Damascus. Lilas and Rafa also
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facilitated contact with a news writer currently working at SANA in Damascus who I had an on-
off conversation with via Facebook Messenger. Since the person requested anonymity, I will
refer to her as Amal.
The empirical data does present some limitations. Most notably, since the collected data
is restricted to one month during the civil war and to speeches since 2011, it fails to offer any
comparative analysis of SANA’s everyday dissemination of power and identity prior to the civil
war based on an empirical account. However, based on prior research on politics and media in
Syria, I am able to offer a scholarly founded account of the function of Syrian state-controlled
media and discuss it in comparison to the results of the thesis’ analysis.
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3.0 Structures and Messages of Syrian State Media: An Overview
Mamoud Fandy notes that ‘Arab media are inherently political’ and cannot be separated
from its historical and political context (Fandy, 2007: 4, 138.) Following this assumption, this
chapter offers a brief historical overview of major political transformations and institutional
structures of the media in Baʿth rule Syria from 1963. The chapter characterizes the Syrian media
system as ‘mobilizing’: a revolutionary press that propagates its anti-imperialist message and
policy of change and force of modernization in attempts to ‘create’ citizens and ‘shape a narrow
national identity, orientated towards and controlled by, respective political regimes.’ The control
of the media is also characterized in legislative measures that prevents and restricts any real
expression of opposition or diversity of opinions and enforces self-censorship (Rinnawi, 2006:
13, xvi; Sottimano, 2008: 8; Rugh, 2004: 31, 51-58; Khazen, 1999: 87.) By outlining the
structures and ‘mobilizing’ messages of Syrian media, I am able to consider state-media relations
as a domain of power where restricting sovereign measures and habituated disciplinary
mechanisms demarcate the boundaries of expression and induce compliance (Butler, 1997;
Entman, 2003; Wedeen, 1999.) Furthermore, the exploration of the Syrian regime’s media
system and its trajectory allows me to consider the historical and political foundations that has
contributed to how its messages and meaning systems are shaped, framed and adjusted according
to varying political realities.
3.1 Hafiz al-Assad’s Media
The Baʿth Party’s coup in March 1963 marked an end to the free press in Syria
(Caldwell, 2010: 1; al-Asʿad, 2013: 39.) Shortly after the Baʿth Party ascended to power, the
Revolutionary Leadership Council transferred press and publishing establishments to the
Ministry of Information and created a ‘special body’ to ‘oversee the affairs of the press’ (George,
2003: 124; Dajani, 2011: 49-50.) In 1965, the regime established SANA under the Ministry of
Information ‘as a means of controlling the flow of information’ (Mellor, 2005: 26.)
Simultaneously, the regime passed a law which stated that the press is ‘expected to be guided by
the “service of the people and operate within a socialist nationalist orientation”’ (Dajani &
Najjar, 2003: 304.) Additionally, the Revolutionary Council limited the freedom of press and
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speech by amending the 1962 Emergency Law which suspended the 1973 constitution until it
was lifted in 2011. The Emergency Law functioned as a pretext to abolish all privately owned
press (Kawakibi, 2010: 1.) and placed the country in a ‘permanent state of war’ (alkarama,
2010.) The Law also allowed the state apparatus to limit the individual’s freedom by arresting
anyone suspected of threatening the ‘security of the state and public safety’ (amn al-dawla wa-l-
salāma al-ʿāma) and censoring publications on this same basis (Nus al-Qanun al-Tawariʾ al-Suri,
1962: Article 4, 6.) In parallel with the Emergency Law, Legislative Decree No. 6 of 1965
criminalized any opposition to the ‘aims of the revolution’ (Amnesty International, 2011.) Ergo,
even prior to Hafiz al-Assad’s presidency, the ambiguous borders of acceptable speech which
forced journalists to balance between ‘responsibility,’ preserving ‘national morals’ and ‘freedom
of expression’ in their reporting was already in place (Wedeen, 1999: 19, 153, 87; Kedar, 2005:
276; Mellor, et. al. 2011: 17.)
Once in power, Hafiz al-Assad prioritized Syria’s information policies as ‘part… of [his]
main concerns’ (Perthes, 1995: 237) and thus attuned the media to his favor. Two years after the
1973 October War, Hafiz al-Assad issued a presidential decree that established the Tishreen
Organization for Press and Publishing, who was tasked with printing and distributing the state-
owned dailies, al-Baʿth, al-Thawra and Tishreen. The purpose of the Tishreen Organization was
to streamline the focus on the ‘need to struggle imperialism and Zionism’ (George, 2003: 125.)
In parallel developments, Hafiz al-Assad appointed the journalist and former editor-in-chief of
SANA, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad as his Minister of Information in 1974 (Moubayed, 2005: 135.)
Iskandar Ahmad later became known as ‘the inventor of the cult’ due to his streamlining of
Syrian media to ‘constant recital’ of the glory of Hafiz al-Assad and his ability to ‘catch the trend
of Assad’s thinking and prepare opinion for changes of policy.’ As a result of Iskandar Ahmad’s
endeavors, claims about Zionism and neocolonialism accompanied with depictions of Hafiz al-
Assad as a ‘superman,’ ‘god-like’ and other blatantly ‘absurd’ statements about him increased by
the late 1970s and 1980s in the midst of an economic recession and growing domestic Islamic
oppositions and persisted through the 1990s (Seale, 1988: 339-340; Wedeen, 1999: 35, 38, 41,
152.)
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3.2 Bashar al-Assad and the Media: Signs of Hope
When Bashar al-Assad came to power following his father’s death in 2000, the
‘cultspeak’ of Hafiz al-Assad and the Baʿth Party was ‘exhausted’ (Magout, 2012; al-Ghazzi,
2013: 590; Wedeen, 2014) and hopes for a new media atmosphere were high. For instance, in an
interview with the Washington Post, the newly appointed Minister of Information, ʿAdnan
ʿOmran said that Bashar had issued new guidelines for the state-controlled press to stop the
‘fawning praise and frequent [printing of] presidential photos’ and that the president wants the
media to ‘respect [the] citizens and their feelings.’ He added that Bashar al-Assad ‘wants to
concentrate on issues with objectivity’ (Schneider, 2000.) However, Kedar notes that the Syrian
media hardly followed this ‘guideline’ in practice and continued to print daily stories and photos
of his doings. Nonetheless, contrary to Hafiz al-Assad depiction as a ‘macho politician,’ the
media portrayed Bashar al-Assad as a modern, popular, pious, ordinary and young president
(Kedar, 2005: 243, 258, 233.) Paulo Pinto argues that the purpose of the interconnectedness
between the portrayal of Bashar al-Assad as a ‘modern, popular leader’ and ‘pious Muslim’ is to
transform the official state rhetoric into a mundane ‘vernacular patriotism’ where everyday
expressions juxtapose the leadership, religion and Syria as a nation with the purpose of
habituating and cementing the al-Assad rule (Pinto, 2011: 192; Magout, 2012.) In addition to
news coverage and billboard campaigns (Pinto, 2011: 190, 195; Caldwell, 2010: 19, 31,) Syrian
TV-dramas were also ‘injected’ with conflations of ‘imaginations of sovereignty, nationalism
and national leadership’ that offered ideal Syrian ‘national culture constructions’ (Salamandra,
2004: 104) ready to be replicated in everyday life (al-Ghazzi, 2013: 588, 595.)
In the legal realm, as a part of Bashar al-Assad’s aspirations for ‘modernizing’ media
institutions (Syria RTV, 2013,) there were brief signs of openness after new publications laws
were introduced in 2000 and 2001 (Becker, 2005: 77.) Most promising was that these new laws
allowed privately owned publications (Ridolfo, 2012: 233; Caldwell, 2010a.) However, while the
publications laws allowed an independent press, the text of the laws were filled with both
restrictions and vague definitions. For example, they stipulate that journalists can face
imprisonment and financial penalties for spreading ‘inaccurate information’ that stirs ‘public
unrest, disrupts international relations, violates the dignity of the state of national unity, affects
the morale of the armed force, or inflicts harm on the national economy and the safety of the
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monetary system.’ Similar to Decree No. 6 of 1965, the new Penal Code permits the state to
punish anyone who spreads information which ‘opposes the goals of the revolution’ (Carnegie
Endowment, 2008: 11-12.) The ambiguous restrictions alongside the Emergency Law
consequently functioned as a pretext to clamp down on the Damascus Spring intellectuals and
impose frequent censorship in the newly established newspapers such as ʿAli Ferzat’s satirical
newspaper al-Dumari (Lesch, 2005: 81-97; Hammond, 2002.) As a result, the Syrian media
landscape under Bashar al-Assad continues to represent and reflect the policies and narratives of
the regime (Caldwell, 2010.)
3.3 Messages of Everyday Ideology and Identity
The mundane ‘ritualized spectacles’ (Wedeen, 1999: 158) of Hafiz al-Assad’s press were
expressed through daily conflation of ‘consensually held beliefs’ on changing perceptions on
Zionism and Western imperialism intertwined with the qualities of leadership, the nation, and the
people that could ‘justify’ participation in the ‘cultspeak’ (Kedar, 2005: 15; Wedeen, 1999: 17,
41, 46, 68.) Thus, Hafiz al-Assad’s media sought to ‘introduce a reality… through a citation of
existing convention’ (Butler, 1997: 33) based on the political, cultural and social ‘genealogies’ of
the country (Matar, 2012: 78.) However, while the state rhetoric may appear fixed, scholars have
argued that the relatively vague ideological foundations of the Baʿth Party have allowed the elite
to pragmatically adapt and redefine symbols of nationhood to fit their historical and ideological
narrative of continuity into different political realities (Freitag, 1999; Owen, 2004: 142;
Sadowski, 2002: 138.) Some of the most prominent ideological imaginations that have been
accustomed to fit different political contexts in the Syrian media message since the 1970s are
narratives of waṭan (homeland,) waḥda (unity) and ṣumūd (steadfastness.)
Since the late 1970s, the waṭan (homeland) discourse has arguably been more prevalent
than Pan-Arab notions of qawmiyya (nationalism) or umma (nation) in the sense that the official
rhetoric has positioned Syria as the pinnacle and symbol of the Pan-Arab project by directly
associating Syria’s experience to the Pan-Arab cause (See Zisser, 2006; Kedar, 2005: 35-36.) Put
differently, the Syrian regime has invested heavily in promoting a distinct Syrian-Arab identity
that seeks to service the project of the state (Phillips, 2013: 28, 41) through a ‘narrative of
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glorification of Syria’s past, molding an Arab Islamic… pre-Islamic and pre-Arab past into a
historical ethos for the Syrian state… [which] claim that Bilad al-Sham was the cradle of world
civilization… [and] Arabism.’ (Zisser, 2006: 184.)
Closely associated with the waṭan discourse is the message of waḥda (unity.) The press
introduces the Syrian waḥda through different rhetorical techniques. For example, Kedar notes
that the press gives an impression of Syrian waḥda through its excessive use of first person plural
such as ‘our army’ (jayshnā) or ‘our homeland’ (waṭanā.) Additionally, in a ‘cloak of Arabism’
(Zisser, 2006: 183) and ‘accommodation’ of local identity into the state identity (Pinto, 2011:
195,) the regime have used messages of the Syrian waḥda (unity) to present a narrative of the
Assad-loyal ‘Syrian collective family’ (Haugbølle, 2008: 264.) This portrayal of the waḥda as a
coherent pillar have functioned as a pretext for the regime to pursue its own interests by
equalizing them to the interest of the ‘people.’ In other words, the purpose of the waḥda and
waṭan narratives are to banally ‘incorporate [Syria’s] disparate groups into a nation-state,
minimizing conflict and promoting consensus’ (Wedeen, 1999: 40) by intentionally ‘intersperse
images of the leaders with national flags and symbols, supporting and reinforcing’ identity
discourses (Phillips, 2013: 49.)
In terms of political discourse, scholars have noted that Arab governments use media as
an ‘arm in their foreign policy’ to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the population by mediating
national imaginations in their coverage of foreign affairs (Sakr, 2007: 1; Mellor, 2005: 60; Matar
& Harb, 2013: 3.) In order to justify their actions, regimes have embedded their policy messages
in existing structured ideological meaning systems situated in a ‘cultural language’ that ‘correlate
concept and ideas with familiar… written text’ (Riyadh Bseiso, 2013:135, 137.) In the Syrian
context, Raymond Hinnebusch notes that the regime has made use of the country’s ‘damaging
historical experiences at the hands of external powers’ in their foreign policy (Hinnebusch, 2006:
396.) Likewise, Ulrike Freitag notes that the Syrian regime has utilized the country’s history as a
means of ‘social engineering’ of the people through a ‘concrete revision of history [that]
systematically define a particular set of symbols and interpretations’ centered around the regime
in order to justify its policies and rule (Freitag, 1999: 3.) For example, this is evident in the
entrenched visions of the waṭan and waḥda narratives where the media often depicted Hafiz al-
Assad as directly linked to previous historical leaders and their victories against the crusaders,
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the Ottoman Empire and French colonialism. In this chain of Syrian leaders fighting external
powers, Hafiz al-Assad’s struggle against Israel and Western imperialism (istiaʿmār) restored the
‘glory’ of the Syrian people and made them ‘masters after slavery… after a long period of
subjugation and humiliation’ (Kedar, 2005: 133, 137; Wedeen, 1999: 188f62.) Accompanied
with its anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist policy and message, Syria has historically followed a
‘traditional’ interpretation of the principle sovereignty and territorial integrity, in the sense that
the right to non-intervention is the pinnacle of the UN Charter at all costs2
(Seybolt, 2007: 8-9.)
Thus, in order to portray Syria as a staunch defender of these principles (Dawisha, 1984: 234,)
the regime has often deployed the narrative of ṣumūd (steadfastness) when the country has faced
external threats that supposedly seeks to undermine the waṭan and waḥda. Framed as an innate
quality of the Syrian leadership and people’s stance against any foreign aggression, the narrative
of ṣumūd seeks to disseminate a message saying that foreign countries cannot impose their will
on Syria and that the country’s policy is principled and is in accordance with the Syrian people
(Kedar, 2005: 163; Zisser, 1997: 78.)
In summary, the messages of waṭan, waḥda, and ṣumūd are an attempt to manufacture an
imagined Syrian identity with distinct qualities based on the country’s leadership, people and
history (Phillips, 2013: 52; Zisser, 2006: 192.) The role of the press is to function as a conduit
that disseminates these messages and the politics within the narratives, which sets the guidelines
for the citizens’ behavior (Zisser, 2006: 185; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015; Phillips, 2013.) By
conflating the history of Syria, qualities of the Syrian leadership, the people and the nation, the
media seeks to naturalize and facilitate the leadership and cultivate a meaningful shared identity
(Wedeen, 1999: 157; Fairclough, 1989.) For the external audience, the messages of the media
signal the regime’s political stances and willingness to steadfastly struggle (niḍāl) and sacrifice
(taḍḥīya) against any external threat that seeks to undermine their sovereignty (siyāda) and
independence (istiqlāl.)
2
Unlike the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which argues that states loses their sovereignty if they fail to
protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (see e.g. ICISS, 2001)
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3.4 The Purpose of the Syrian State-Media
The abovementioned outline the legal and disciplinary measures that have defined the
‘red line’ of acceptable speech in Syria. The above demonstrates that while legislative measures
prevent any publications from the ‘aims of the revolution,’ the press also seeks to facilitate an
identity based on a narrative that intertwine the history of Syria, its leadership, its people and
their qualities. This is achieved most notably through habituation and adjustments of the
personality of cult and the messages of waṭan, waḥda and ṣumūd.
Expanding on Seale’s argument that the media ‘prepares’ the public opinion for the
regime’s policy and policy changes, I believe that the Syria’s media has an ‘educational’ purpose
(Kedar, 2005: 6; Zisser, 2006: 185; Mellor, 2011: 19; Rinnawi, 2006: 13.) Thus, following
Timothy Mitchell’s ‘enframing’ analysis of modern schooling, we can regard the Syrian media
system and its repetitive dissemination of the official rhetoric as implicit ‘arranged… instructions
for use.’ The individual ‘master’ and organize life around these taken-for-granted instructions
and practices may appear rational and instinctive but are essentially ideological, cultural and
integral with power (Mitchell, 1990: 560, 562, 571, 572; Sottimano, 2008: 8.) In this sense, the
Syrian media serves as a means to ‘fuse [Syrians] in a melting pot, which will serve the basic
goals of the Party’ by ‘steering… public opinion’ and ‘build the new man… educate him to
noble values… [and] norms of the socialist system’ as proclaimed in two separate articles from
al-Baʿth and al-Thawra (Kedar, 2005: 5-7.) In other words, the educational purpose of the media
is to instruct the official rhetoric in order to make people ‘fluent’ in its rhetoric and ensure
compliance by compelling people to act ‘as if’ they supported the regime’s policies (Wedeen,
1999: 46, 67-86, 92; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015: 82.) Therefore, we can argue that the
normalization and reiteration of the ideological language (Fairclough, 1989; Havel 1985;
Sottimano, 2008) serves as a ‘seatbelt’ or regulatory mechanism in which ‘involvement’ with the
rhetoric is perceived as ‘normal’ and non-involvement as abnormal and punishable (Wedeen,
1999: 46, 76; Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014: 109.)
In regards to the study of the regime’s policies, Hinnebusch’s ‘upgraded structuralism’
offers a useful account that consider the impact of imperialism, external interference and global
hierarchy as factors in the ‘frustration’ found in identity politics that have been pivotal for
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shaping policy and ‘periodic mobilization of grievances’ in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2011:
240.) Considering the historicity of Syria and perception of its media as ‘an arm’ in the country’s
foreign policy, we can analyze the foundations of the regime’s discourse. From a media research
perspective, Hinnebusch’s approach allows us to explore how the regime pursue and justify its
realist policies (Perthes, 2004: 6.) Hinnebusch frames the regimes interests in constructivist
terms, which conflates ‘consensually held beliefs’ and qualities of the leadership, the nation and
the people. In particular, the changing perceptions and messages of waṭan, waḥda and ṣumūd
work as a means that ‘manage the symbolic world’ (Wedeen, 1999: 32) by portraying these
ideological charged terms as inherent qualities of the people while signaling the country’s
historical uncompromising political principles on external interference in Syrian domestic
affairs.
Based on last chapter’s theoretical outline and the above reflections on Syrian media’s
ideological role, the forthcoming chapters will analyze how the Syrian regime has repeated and
adjusted the narrative of its messages to fit the country’s current situation.
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4.0 Analysis of the Syrian Arab News Agency3
The following chapter will analyze mundane and implicit expressions of ideology and
identity in Syrian Arab News Agency’s (SANA) coverage of the Syrian Civil War by focusing
specifically on how the agency repeatedly deploys specific terms and words with the purpose of
maintaining and reconsolidating the framework of the Syrian regime’s ideological and political
discourse (Butler, 1997; Entman, 2003; Groppe, 1984.)
In order to ‘unearth’ how narratives of waṭan (homeland,) waḥda (unity) and ṣumūd
(steadfastness) are framed mundanely in the agency’s coverage, the analysis will focus on four
dominant themes: Syria as a victim, fighting terrorism and Western hegemony, the unity and
religious coexistence of the Syrian people, and a solution to the conflict, including the role of the
international community. It is worth mentioning that these categorizations function as ideal types
and that the themes often intertwine with one another. As noted in the introduction, the analysis
is two-fold. Hence, the current chapter’s focus on banal ideology and identity offers an analytical
framework for the forthcoming chapter, which examines Bashar al-Assad utilization and
appropriation of the ideological terminology found in the agency’s coverage.
4.1 About SANA
From the 1920s until the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958,
Syria was dependent on French and English news agencies in their coverage of regional and
international events. However, Syrian and Arab journalists and editors perceived the news
agencies from former colonial powers as a means of French and British ‘pro-Zionist’
‘propaganda battle’ against Arab nationalism. Therefore, the editors and journalists approached
and used Western newswires selectively to suit their own political purposes (McFadden, 1953:
484, 485, 489.) During the years of the UAR, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser perceived
Syria’s relatively free media sphere as a potential threat. As a response Nasser’s appointed Fathi
Radwan as minister for ‘National Guidance’ and merged Syrian and Egyptian broadcast stations
3
Since many of the articles referred to in the analysis are no longer available online, please visit
https://goo.gl/Dzau9i for downloaded PDF copies of the articles.
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as a means of imposing control. (Podeh, 1999: 54.) Following the 1961 dissolution of the UAR
and the 1963 coup, the new Baʿth regime established the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) in
1965. Similar to its predecessors in the UAR, the new Syrian regime was eager to control the
information flow and thus established the agency with the purpose of covering the
‘achievements’ of the Socialist state and creating a state-centralized national identity (Mellor,
2005: 36, 40, 45; Alan, 2003: 124-125; Rinnawi, 2013: 13.)
Since being founded, the agency has operated under the umbrella of the Ministry of
Information as a means of guidance for the regime’s policies by producing and distributing
newswires to other Syrian dailies (Rugh, 2004: 40; Ghadbian, 2001: 76; Alan, 2003: 125.)
Celebrated as ‘soldiers of truth’ by the Minister of Information, ʿUmran al-Zoʿubi
(Syriasteps.com, 2012,) SANA’s correspondents cover local, regional, and international news
through a ‘balanced, objective approach’ in line with ‘Syria’s national firm stances and its
support to the Arab and Islamic causes… with the aim of presenting the real civilized image of
Syria’ (SANA English, N.D.) Put differently, SANA is quite obviously a prime example of
Rugh’s ‘mobilization press’ system in that it is directly conveying the messages of the regime.
This is evident in how the majority of the agency’s reports quote or paraphrase the Syrian elite or
its allies, with the intention of portraying itself as a vanguard of the nation (Rugh, 2004: 31, 33.)
The dominant type of SANA’s reporting follows Kedar’s concept of ‘framework reporting;’ It
reports on events ‘laconically, without going to substantial detail, whilst concentrating on its
insignificant framework details’ (Kedar, 2005: 50-51.)
In terms of SANA’s organizational structure, Amal, the journalist working at the agency
in Damascus, explained to me that there are many ‘circles’ of management and editing. She
described that the agency consists of news writers, several editors, head of sections at the
department of news topics (such as local news or the military media department,) proof readers,
secretary editors, editing managers and the editor-in-chief or General Director, Ahmad Dawa.
She noted that Dawa’s day-to-day management consists of approving publication of ‘sensitive
issues’ (Interview, 2016, April 10.) According to Syrian journalists Lilas Hatahet and Rafa al-
Masri, the head of any Syrian media outlet is appointed by the regime is most likely an Alawi.
Because this is the religious minority that the president belongs to, appointing an Alwai as head
ensures loyalty (Interview, 2016, April 6.) Although I have not been able to confirm their claim
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independently, it is likely that Dawa has personal affiliations with the regime elite considering
former Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad’s past at the agency and his proximity to
Hafiz al-Assad. Additionally, scholars have noted that the Political Security Directorate (Idārat
al-Amn al-Siyāsī) of the intelligence services (al-Mukhābarāt) supervise the press and control
social communication (Cline, 2004: 630-631; Todd & Bloch, 2003: 167.) Following these
assumptions, the layers of management and editing procedures at SANA as well as legislative
prohibiting measures indicate a regime that is preoccupied with framing messages to make their
point of view salient while simultaneously undermining other views. Discursively, the
organizational structure and extensive editing process shows that SANA operates thoroughly
with implicit and explicit ‘strategies of domination’ (Diamond & Quinby, 1988: 185) to ensure
that its reporting is coherent within the ‘acceptable speech’ (Butler, 1997: 77) of the dominant
narrative.
With the above in mind, the following paragraphs seek to explore how objectivity
confined within ‘Syria’s national firm stances’ are expressed mundanely and are implicit in
SANA’s coverage of the Syrian Civil War. It is important to note that even though ‘flaggings’ of
the state perhaps appear ‘overt’ to the external audience they may be regarded as ‘normal’
everyday features by the local population (Phillips, 2013: 49, 159.) For instance, while
recognizing SANA’s proximity to the Syrian regime, Lilas referred to the agency’s language as
‘formal’ and ‘boring’ (Interview, 2016, April 6.)
4.2 Immediate Context of the Analysis
Cukier et. al. emphasize the importance of defining the corpus of the analysis within its
political context (Cukier, et. al, 2009: 182.) Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis, I will
outline a concise overview of the immediate political and military context of December 2015 and
January 2016 in which the analysis takes places4
.
4
For an accessible and lenghty description of the trajectory of the Syrian conflict, see e.g. Lynch, Marc. 2013. The
Arab Uprisings The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (Public Affairs: New York) & Lynch, Marc. 2016.
The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (Public Affairs: New York.)
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In the political realm, approximately a hundred delegates from various armed and
political opposition factions met for a conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in early December
2015. The purpose of the conference was to create a ‘High Negotiations Committee’ (HNC,) a
body of thirty-four delegates, which should represent the opposition in forthcoming proximity
talks with the Syrian regime in Vienna (Lund, 2015, 2015a.) To the Syrian regime’s dismay, the
Riyadh conference was the first meeting to include armed factions, most notably Jaysh al-Islam
(Army of Islam) and Ahrar al-Sham (The Free Men of the Levant) (Suwayid, 2015.) As a
response to the Riyadh conference, the regime initiated its own conference entitled Ṣawt al-
Dākhil (Voice of the Inside) set up to delegitimize the conference in Riyadh (Lund, 2015a.) In
line with this policy, Syrian state-media emphasized the foreign backing of some of the
participating groups in Riyadh and claimed that the Damascus conference represented the real
and independent opposition (SANA, 2015: 12/12; al-Watan, 2015.) Despite the regime’s protest,
the conference in Riyadh concluded with a final statement delivered to the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) on December 11. In the statement, the delegates expressed readiness to
negotiate a political solution in accordance with the 2012 Geneva Communique, the 2015 Vienna
Communique and related international resolutions. The final statement also stresses that ‘Bashar
al-Assad and the senior officials and figureheads of his rule should leave power at the outset of
the transitional phase’ (UNSC, 2015, 11/12.) A week after the conferences, the UNSC
unanimously adopted resolution 2253 and 2254, which respectively seeks to ‘suppress financing
of terrorism’ and endorses the facilitation of a ‘roadmap’ for a ceasefire and Syrian-led political
peace process beginning early January 2016 based on the 2012 Geneva Communique and the
Vienna Statements (UNSC, 2015, 17/12; 18/12.)
During the period of the analysis, the military developments mostly favored the Syrian
regime. Enabled by Russian air support, regime forces were able gain territory in Latakia
province. This advance included capturing the city of Salma on January 12, which had been in
control of rebels since 2012. Additionally, regime forces supported by airstrikes managed to
capture Khan Tuman and al-Khalidiyya in the Aleppo province. The latter village was a
significant capture because it overlooks the Aleppo-Damascus highway, an important supply line
for the Syrian rebels in Aleppo (agathocledesyracuse.com, 2015.) One of the most significant
local developments during the period of research was the alleged Russian airstrike that killed
Zahran ‘Allush, the leader of Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) (al-Ashqar, 2015) in Eastern
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Ghouta in the countryside of Damascus. In the following weeks after ‘Allush’s death, regime
forces managed to advance further into Eastern Ghouta and capture Marj al-Sultan and al-
Bilaliya, located a few kilometers away from Jaysh al-Islam’s stronghold, Douma (Suleiman,
2016.) South of Damascus, 23 kilometers north from Deraa city, regime forces managed to
recapture 55-60 percent of Sheikh Miskin, strategically located between Deraa, al-Suweida and
al-Quneitra, in an offensive that started in mid-November 2015 (see Atallah, 2016, al-Khadir,
2016, Syriahr.com, 2015.)
With the exception of the Riyadh conference, the above developments were prominent
stories that SANA covered and reported (for Salma coverage, see: SANA, 12/1, 12/1a, 13/1, 15,
15a; Khan Tuman: SANA, 20/12, 22/12, 22/12a; Zahran ‘Allush: SANA, 25/12, 25/12a, 27/12.)
The following will analyze how they reported these events, among others, by looking at the
discourse and framing of the coverage.
4.3 Terrorism and Media
Scholars who focus primarily on Western media coverage and policies have suggested
that the emotional and fear-provoking connotations associated with terrorism in most cultural
settings in the wake of the 9/11 attacks offer governments an easy ‘opportunity’ to frame their
adversaries negatively by utilizing the ill-defined social and legal constructed meanings
connected to the word (Nagar, 2010; Chagankerian, 2013.) Since the ‘T-word’ is often perceived
as an imminent threat to international society, governments arguably have an incentive to deploy
the term in order to ‘disguise’ any underlying political issues or their adversaries’ demands by
framing a conflict as a threat to the nation-state system and international security. Ultimately,
framing issues within the ‘war on terror’ narrative may legitimize the use of military response
and the initiation of security measures that are otherwise considered illegitimate (Pokolava,
2010; Reinares, 1998.)
In order to further justify actions and delegitimize adversaries’ claims, media and
politicians have adopted a ‘consistent pattern of dehumanizing metaphor[s]’ where adversaries
are framed in animalistic or non-human terms (Bandura, 2004: 135; Steuter & Wills, 2010.)
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Additionally, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ and his famous ‘either you are with us, or you
are with the terrorists’ ultimatum created a central theme in the rhetoric of post-9/11 political and
media frame where ‘we’ are mobilized against ‘them,’ the terrorists (Falcous & Silk, 2005: 62.)
However, Aurora Sottimano suggests that this media paradigm is not exceptional to Western
coverage and argues that Arab leaders ‘have adopted a set of slogans which mirror Western
attitudes towards terrorism’ as a means for ‘authoritarian self-preservation’ (Sottimano, 2016:
12.)
4.4 SANA’s Coverage of Terrorism: Syria as Victim of Terrorism
The issue of terrorism is by far the most prominent theme in SANA’s coverage of the
Syrian Civil War. Derivations of terrorism (irhāb) occurred 2830 times and was nearly
mentioned in every article collected from SANA. The high prevalence of terrorism in the
agency’s coverage implies the Syrian regime’s preoccupation with portraying the conflict as a
fight against terrorists who use illegitimate means. In other words, SANA is playing into a post-
9/11 narrative by framing the Syrian conflict in the terminology of the ‘war on terror’ (al-Jazeera
English, 2015.) However, as I will demonstrate, SANA has balanced and supplemented this
narrative by ‘injecting’ the framing and terminology of its coverage with nationalist sentiments,
imaginations of sovereignty, and a conspiracy of foreign sponsored plots against the country,
which originate from the regime’s ideological background.
Throughout SANA’s coverage, the ‘war on Syria’ (al-ḥarb ʿala Sūriyya) recurred and
most often juxtaposed with ‘terrorist war’ (al-ḥarb al-irhābiyya) (SANA, 19/12.) SANA
described the objectives (al-ahdāf) of the war as numerous and often conflated the war with
imaginations of Syria’s regional role. For example, while the Syrian stance (al-mawqif al-surī)
on the ‘Palestinian cause’ (al-qaḍiyya al-filasṭīniyya) appeared less significant now than during
Hafiz al-Assad (Kedar, 2005: 197-200,) it still occasionally occurred as a quality of Syria’s
steadfastness (ṣumūd.) In the context of the Syrian conflict, terrorists seeking to undermine
Syria’s ṣumūd on the Palestinian issue were consistently associated with the objectives of the war
on Syria (ahdāf al-ḥarb ʿala Sūriyya.) For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad
and Minister of Information ‘Umran al-Zoʿubi claimed in separate meetings with Ahmad
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Majdalani, member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, that the war posed on Syria by
terrorists seeks to divert the attention away from the Palestinian people’s suffering under Zionist
racism. Despite the terrorists attempt to break the will of Syrians, they stressed that Syria will not
abandon ‘them’ despite ‘the war on our country’ because it is their ‘nationalist stances’
(muwāqifuha al-qawmiyya) to support the Palestinians (SANA, 15/12, 16/12.) At another
occasion Yusif Ahmad, member of the Regional Command of the Baʿth Party, stressed that the
objective of the war is to cause internal fragmentation with the purpose of distracting focus from
the Palestinian cause (SANA, 10/1.) This was after Ahmad made numerous references to Russia
and Syria’s efforts against terrorism. As a result of the country’s embracement of the resistance
(al-muqāwama,) its stances on the Arab nationalist project (mashruʿ al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya)
and the Palestinian cause, al-Zoʿubi (SANA, 6/1,) Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassun
(SANA, 21/12) and Assistant Foreign Minister Hamid Hassan (SANA, 5/1) asserted that Syria is
‘paying the price’ (tadfaʿ fatūra) of the war on terrorism that targets ‘its unity’ (waḥdatihā.)
Regardless of the terrorist threat (al-tahdīd al-irhābī,) Syria will continue to defend civilization
against takfīri terrorism and triumph against terrorism, which is fueled by the ‘forces of
imperialism and Zionism’ (quwwa al-istiaʿmār wa-l-ṣahiunīa.) (SANA, 7/1.)
Thus, the conflation between the ‘Palestinian cause’ and terrorist war on Syria is highly
related to the narrative of imperialism and Zionism. An amplified example of the conflation of
the narratives of the ‘Palestinian cause,’ the terrorist war on Syria and the imperial and Zionist
project was SANA’s coverage of the death of Samir al-Quntar, a senior Hezbollah official. Cited
as a resistance martyr (al-shahīd al-muqāwwim) and martyr of Arabism (al-ʿurūba) who loved
Palestine (SANA, 21/12a,) SANA quoted and paraphrased Syrian (SANA, 22/12b, 20/12a,)
Hezbollah (SANA, 21/12a,) Russian (SANA, 21/12b) and Iranian officials stating that Israel
targeted the axis of resistance and the steadfastness (maḥūr al-muqāwwama wa-l-ṣumūd) by
assassinating al-Quntar. Throughout the articles there is a constant shifting between referring to
the attack as an act of terrorism (ʿamaliyyat al-irhabiyya) and assassination (ightiāl) that targeted
a residential building (mabna sakani.) Additionally, paraphrasing Bashar al-Assad’s political and
media advisor, Buthaina Shaʿban, SANA reports that Israel’s history of assassinations is not any
different from terrorist attacks in Syria as they serve the same goal (SANA, 22/12b.)
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The conflated narratives of imperialist, Zionist, and terrorist conspiracies is not restricted
to extraordinary incidents such as the death of al-Quntar. Rather it is an everyday feature of
SANA’s coverage. While the regime follows the general notion that the ‘terrorists’ are sponsored
and facilitated by foreign entities, the specific agents behind terrorist’s crimes (jarāʾim) and their
sponsors are categorized systematically dependent on the location. For example, in SANA’s
daily update describing the army’s daily accomplishments, it was repeatedly mentioned that
groups southern provinces of Deraa, al-Suweida and al-Quneitra are ‘associated with the Israeli
enemy’ (murtabita bi-l-ʿadu al-israʾilī) or ‘occupying entity’ (kiyān al-iḥtilāl) (SANA, 18/12,
27/12, 30/12, 31/12, 1/1, 6/1a, 7/1a, 8/1, 9/1, 11/1, 13/1.) These references were deployed quite
casually and did not offer any substantial details proving the accusation. The groups allegedly
supported were most often just referred to as takfīri terrorists, terrorists organizations (taniẓmāt
or majmuʿāt) or mercenaries (murtaziqa) ‘falling under the leadership’ (munḍawiyya taḥt
zʿāmat) of the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (the Victory Front) (SANA, 7/1a, 8/1.)
Another prevalent theme was the alleged Turkish and Saudi involvement further north,
from the countryside of Damascus to Aleppo and Latakia provinces. In ninety-eight instances,
SANA exclusively asserted that Turkey and Saudi Arabia sponsor ‘terrorists’ such as Jaysh al-
Islam, Jaysh al-Fatah, Ahrar al-Sham, Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamiyya, and Tajmaʿ al-ʿAzza
who have infiltrated Syria across the Jordanian and Turkish borders. When mentioning the
Turkish government, SANA refers to the Erdogan regime (niẓām) (see e.g. SANA, 24/12, 7/1a,
10/1a) and occasionally provides ideological markers such as Erdogan’s Brotherhood (al-
ikhwāni) (SANA, 23/12, 9/1a) regime or murderous (al-sifāḥ) regime (e.g. SANA, 15/12a,
26/12, 27/12, 6/1a.) Similarly, Saudi Arabia also has its own ideological indicators. Most
commonly, the Saudis are referred as a Wahhabi regime (SANA, 22/12a, 4/1, 13/1a,) the Islamic
doctrine that the Saudi political system is based upon, or the āl-Saʿūd regime (SANA, 28/12, 2/1,
3/1,) in reference to the ruling family.
It is notable that the support the terrorists groups and mercenaries receive from Turkey
and Saudi Arabia was explained in greater detail than it was the case with Israel. For example, in
SANA’s reports on clashes in northern Latakia and Aleppo, ‘terrorist and foreign mercenaries’
were often described as ‘fleeing’ across the border to their Financier (mumawwil) in the Erdogan
Brotherhood regime (SANA, 18/12, 25/12b.) Their Mumawwil facilitates them by supplying US-
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made TAO missiles (SANA, 22/12a) and providing them with training camps (SANA, 25/12c,
14/1.) Additionally, referring to ‘tens of intelligence reports’ and ‘analyses’ (SANA, 10/1a,)
SANA added its coverage with clauses stating that the Turkish involvement also extends to
Erdogan’s Brotherhood family (ʿāʾilat Erdogān al-ikhwāniyya) who buy ‘stolen oil’ from Dāʿish
– the Islamic State (ISIL) – smuggled from Syria. Similar to the Turkish involvement, SANA
also repeatedly mentioned that Saudi Arabia finances terrorists and that it sent some of its
citizens to fight in the terrorists ranks (SANA, 31/12, 13/1.) More often, the two countries’
support for terrorist groups were tarred with the same brush by asserting that terrorist
organizations are ‘associated with al-Saud and Erdogan regime’ (niẓāmay āl-Saʿūd wa Erdogān)
(SANA, 29/12, 29/12a, 31/12.) Furthermore, SANA also paid attention to the ideological
orientation of these groups. Unlike Western media’s focus on ‘salafism’ and ‘jihadism’ in Syria,
SANA focused exclusively on the ‘Wahhabi thought’ (al-fikr al-Wahābi) and often juxtaposed it
with takfīri and terrorism (SANA, 19/12a, 24/12, 7/1b, 13/1b.) Specifically, SANA emphasized
that Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room ‘embrace’ (tʿataniq)
the Wahhabi takfīri thought and that they receive support from Saudi Arabia (SANA, 23/12a,
24/12.) Moreover, SANA frequently made causal links between terrorists or foreign mercenaries
receiving Saudi support to the crimes these groups commit against civilians by supplying the
coverage with one hasty sentence. For example:
“The organization "Army of Islam" (Jaysh al-Islam) is a terrorist organization that follows the
Wahhabi thought and receives arms and funding (al-taslīḥ wa-l-tamawil) from the Al Saud
regime. Its mercenaries besieges (yuḥāṣir murtaziqatuhu) thousands of people in Eastern Ghouta
and targets residential neighborhoods (al-ahīaʾ al-sakaniyya) in Damascus with its mortar
grenades, which cause several to rise to martyrdom (shuhadaʾ,) majority of them being women
and children (al-nisāʾ wa-l-aṭfāl.)” (SANA, 25/12a: see also 25/12, 6/1b.)
Within SANA’s explicit accusation that foreign states facilitate and sponsor terrorism in
Syria, we find an implicitly framed narrative that is well-known in the Syrian regime’s discourse:
the narrative of victimhood and victimization of Syria by external powers and agents. In other
words, Syria’s ‘past sacrifices are invoked in the name of the present’ where external enemies
threaten ‘our’ way of living (Billig, 1995: 77, 101.) During Hafiz al-Assad’s rule, the official
narrative of victimhood was portrayed through ‘outrages of Western colonialism and Zionist
occupation’ as well as through portraying the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood campaign against the
regime from 1976-1982 as ‘criminal’ agents of the West who ‘brutally’ kill Syrian citizens
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(YouTube: Suriya Allah Hamiha, 2011; Wedeen, 1999: 41, 44, 46, 47.) Thus, following Billig, it
appears that SANA draws on already existing images and clichés in its description of the
regime’s contemporary adversaries. However, SANA contextualizes the contemporary ‘external
threat’ within a new framework: the war on terrorism (al-ḥarb ʿala al-irhāb.) In other words, the
regime’s discourse of portraying its adversaries as a foreign conspiracy is a primed and
naturalized ‘armament’ of the regime and its media, which has been maintained throughout the
years of the al-Assad rule ‘ready for use in battle’ (Billig, 1995: 5, 7.) Due to the four decade-
long naturalization of Israel as an ‘external threat,’ SANA does not need to offer any substantial
detail on the presupposed Israeli support. Instead, SANA amplifies its existing narrative on Israel
by repeatedly deploying ‘terrorism’ in its coverage in order to fit its narrative with international
trends and shifts in ‘balances of forces’ (Fairclough, 1989: 72.) Hence, the casual references to
terrorists groups ‘associated with the Israeli enemy,’ (SANA, 30/12, 1/1) ‘Erdogan Brotherhood
regime’ (SANA, 9/1a) or the ‘al-Saud Wahhabi regime’ (SANA, 29/12) function as an implicit
means to double-down on its justification of military response by referring to two familiar and
habituated enemies with ideological markers simultaneously.
While the Israeli narrative is cemented in the regime’s discourse (Frisch, 2004: 401-404,)
the Turkish and Saudi sponsored terrorist ‘aggressions’ (al-iʿtidaʾāt) are more novel. Therefore,
in order to ‘chain’ and ‘adjust’ the narrative according to the context and within the regime’s
ideological conventions, SANA seeks to position the reader by placing and repeating clauses that
supplement some degree of detail in regard to the nature of the Turkish and Saudi support
(Fairclough, 1989: 41-44, 65-69.) They do this by referring to Erdogan as a ‘financier’ (SANA,
18/12) or ending a paragraph stressing details on the nature of the Turkish and Saudi support
(SANA, 4/1, 8/1.) The processes of naturalization and stereotyping is implicitly organizing and
strengthening ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ by describing the ‘crimes’ (jarāʾim) of the foreign
Wahhabi terrorists acting on behalf of foreign interests as something ‘they do’ in contrast to what
‘we,’ the Syrians who are victimized by these groups (Van Dijik, 1995: 248-249; Van Dijik,
2006: 371; Billig, 1995: 81; Smulders 2008.) In my conversation with Lilas and Rafa, they
stressed that the regime and SANA situate its consistent portrayal of the entire opposition as
terrorists within the ideological framework of ‘external threats to Syria’ in order to exclusively
blame the ‘other’ for the hardships and sufferings of Syrians (Interview, 2016, April 6.) Hence,
in blaming the other, SANA implicitly justifies the regime’s military campaign while at the same
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time neglect any responsibility of the Syrian regime’s wrongdoings. SANA’s use of emphases
and vocabulary – such as juxtaposition the Muslim Brotherhood, regional states’ involvement,
Wahhabism and takfīrism – implicitly plays into the larger discursive realm of the regime’s
message and its overarching policy of perceiving the opposition as external enemies (Entman,
2003.)
Researching narratives of victimization, Kirkland Smulders suggests that narratives of
victimhood also function as a mechanism to legitimize violence and supplement an ‘alternative
identity’ such as an ‘identity of resistance’ (Smulders, 20013: 179,) which in Syria is closely
related to the anti-imperialist sense of Arabism (Zisser, 2006.) Hence, the framing function of the
victimhood message is two-fold: it neglects responsibility and real political claims, and justifies
military measures against adversaries (Poklova, 2010) in the name of Arabism. Following this
argument, the next section will focus on how SANA reports the military campaign and the war
on terrorism and how it seeks to justify its action through repetitive rhetorical means.
4.5 Justifying Military Response and Dehumanizing the Enemy
Scholars note that news media play a role in denigrating the enemy and ‘promoting an
“aura of victory”’ in its coverage of war and conflict by solely stressing the ‘positive
developments’ (Mellor, 2005: 59-60; Rugh, 1975: 311.) Similarly, Oliver Boyd-Barrett argues
that media’s coverage of war tends to reflect point of view and policies of the country in which
they are based (Boyd-Barrett, 2004: 29.) It is also worth noting that the 2011 Syrian media law
prohibits publication of any information about the armed forces except for reports issued by the
army (Article 12, 3.) Additionally, Amal from SANA told me that the General Staff of the Army
and Armed Forces (GSAA) is the sole source providing information related to military
operations. She added that journalists and the head of section of the ‘military media department’
edit the information received from the GSAA in order to make it ‘readable and understood by the
audience.’ She also mentioned that General Director Ahmad Dawa has to approve the
publication of sensitive issues ‘such as military actions’ (Interview, 2016, April 10.) Thus, we
can anticipate that SANA’s coverage of the military campaign directly depicts the regime and the
army’s discourse of the war. It also explains why SANA’s articles on the military almost
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exclusively paraphrase and quote what a ‘military source’ (maṣdar ʿaskarī) says. During the
period of data collection, nearly 30 percent of SANA’s coverage of the civil war is devoted to
covering military developments. Almost daily, SANA published a lengthy update describing the
latest military developments throughout the country. In addition to the daily update, the agency
published shorter updates as well as extraordinary updates. As analyzed below, while these
updates described military developments, the coverage also sought to justify the military
campaign. For example, SANA consistently invokes narratives of waḥda by tacitly describing
the proximity between army, the Syrian people and the leadership as diametrically different from
the terrorists’ relation to the people.
Following the trend of ‘promoting an aura of victory,’ SANA described in detail how
army units, armed forces, occasionally supported by the National Defense Forces (al-Difāʿ al-
Shaʿbiyya) (SANA, 31/12, 1/1, 4/1) or ‘supportive forces,’ (al-quwa al-muʿāzara) (SANA,
22/12a, 5/1a) seize control (ṣayṭara ʿala) and regain control (istʿāda al-ṣayṭara) over strategic
villages, hilltops and districts from terrorists (SANA, 18/12, 8/1, 10/1a.) Russian air support was
rarely mentioned in its battlefield coverage (SANA, 26/12a, 3/1a, 11/1a) but the amount of
Russian jet sorties was covered elsewhere (SANA, 15/1a.) In contrast to the terrorists who
brutally (waḥshī) besiege civilians, commit massacres (SANA, 23/12a, 29/12, 11/1b, 12/1b) and
destroy Syria (19/12b, 23/12b,) SANA’s battlefield reports consistently explained how the army
carries out precise (ʿamaliyāt daqīqa) and special operations (ʿamaliyāt nawiyya) as well as use
tactics that protect citizens and infrastructure (taktiyāt khāṣa li-ḥimāya al-muwātinīn wa-l-binā
al-taḥtiya) (SANA, 8/1.) Additionally, when the army was not regaining control of territory and
restoring security, it was thwarting (iḥbāṭ) terrorist group’s attacks and attempts to infiltrate
cities and villages (SANA, 23/12c, 26/12a, 6/1a.) SANA’s battlefield updates consistently
applied the term ‘extirpate’ or ‘annihilate’ (al-qadāʿ) when it referred to causalities among
terrorist ranks or targeting of ‘nests’ (aukār) or ‘pits’ (buʾar) belonging to terrorists (e.g. SANA,
20/12, 22/12a, 23/12c.) On the contrary, it is notable that not a single article described any
setbacks or casualties among the regime’s armed forces.
When SANA mentioned the armed forces in their general coverage, there are constant
ideological references to the features and qualities of the army. For instance, there were several
articles where officials emphasized that the Syrian Arab Army are heroes (al-abṭāl) who make
