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Cybercrime In The Deep Web
Marco Balduzzi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini
Black Hat Europe 2015
1
Dr. Vincenzo CIANCAGLINI
◎ M.Sc. in Telecommunication
Engineering
◎ Ph.D. in Computer Networking,
Peer to peer networks and next
generations protocols
◎ 10+ years experience in R&D
◎ Sr. Research Scientist for Trend
Micro
◎ Development of novel proof of
concepts and complex systems
About us
Dr. Marco BALDUZZI
◎ MSc in Computer Engineering
◎ Ph.D. in System Security with
~15 peer-reviewed papers
◎ 13+ years experience in IT
Security -- Consultant, engineer
and researcher
◎ Turned my hobby into my
profession
◎ Sr. Research Scientist for Trend
Micro
◎ Bridge scientific research and
industry needs
◎ Veteran speaker in major
conferences with 50+ talks
2
Roadmap
◎Introduction
◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA)
○ Data collection
○ Data enrichment
○ Storage and indexing
◎Illegal Trading
◎Data Analysis
◎Malware
◎Conclusions
3
◎Deep Web: Internet not indexed by traditional
search engines.
◎Dark Net: Private overlay network.
◎Dark Web: WWW hosted on Dark Nets.
4
“
The Deep Web is vast. Thousands
of times larger than the surface
web.
Alex Winter, Deep Web Documentary, 2015
5
“
The Deep Web is vast. Thousands
of times larger than the surface
web.
Alex Winter, Deep Web Documentary, 2015
6
◎ Infrastructure resilient to LE takedowns
◎ Marketplaces for cybercrime goods
◎ Safe haven for information
exchange and coordination
Our research focus
Dark Web
• TOR
• I2P
• Freenet
Custom DNS
• Namecoin
• Emercoin
Rogue TLDs
• Cesidian Root
• OpenNIC
• NewNations
• …
7
TOR
◎ First alpha in 2002
◎ Initially used to browse anonymously the Surface Web
◎ Hidden services -> effective Dark Web
◎ Onion routing: multihop routing with with host key
encryption.
8
◎ First beta in 2003
◎ Full Dark Net, no anonymous browsing to the Surface Web
◎ Garlic routing: multiple encrypted tunnels, multiple layers
of encryption (transport, tunnel, path)
I2P
9
◎ Oldest one: summer of 1999 (father of I2P)
◎ Content distribution and discovery, no service hosting
◎ Gossip protocol to lookup a resource (i.e. web page)
Freenet
10
Namecoins, Emercoins
◎Blockchain-based domain name server
◎Think bitcoins, but instead of payment transactions, DNS
registrar transaction
◎Distributed
◎Decentralised
◎No regulating institution
11
RogueTLDs & PrivateDNSes
Plain old DNS, but with custom servers
Custom registrars
Custom domains
12
Roadmap
◎Introduction
◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA)
○ Data collection
○ Data enrichment
○ Storage and indexing
◎Illegal Trading
◎Data Analysis
◎Malware
◎Conclusions
13
System Overview
14
Data Sources
User data
Pastebin
sites
Twitter
(1% feed)
Reddit
URL listing
sites
TOR
gateways
I2P host
files
Scouting
feedback
15
Deep Web Gateway
Privoxy +
TOR
anonymizer
Squid transparent proxy
Polipo +
TOR 64
instances
I2P Freenet Custom DNS resolver
Namecoin
DNS
rogueTLD DNS
Cesidian
root
Opennic NameSpace …
16
Page Scouting
Headless
browser
HAR Log
Page DOM
Screen
shot
Title
Text
Metadata
Raw
HTML
Links
Email
Bitcoin
Wallets
17
Headless Browser
◎ Scrapinghub's Splash
◎ QTWebkit browser
◎ Dockerized
◎ LUA scriptable
◎ Full HTTP traces
◎ Crawler based on Python's Scrapy +
multiprocess + Splash access
◎ Headers rewrite
◎ Shared queue support
◎ Har log -> HTTP redirection chain
◎ Extract links, emails, bitcoin wallets
18
Data Enrichment
Embedded links
classification (WRS)
•Surface Web links
•Classification and
categorisation
Page translation
•Language detection
•Non-English to English
Significant wordcloud
•Semantic clustering
•Custom algorithm
19
Significant Wordcloud
Page text
Tokenization
Filtering
Semantic
distance matrix
Hierarchical
clustering
Cluster label
and popularity
Word cloud
Scrap text from HTML, clean up, strip spaces…
Create list of (word, frequency) pairs
Keep only substantives
How “far” are words from one another?
Group similar words
Label clusters, sum frequencies
Draw using summed frequencies
20
Example: Russian Forum
21
Collected Data
◎Running since 11/2013 (2 years)
◎40.5 M Events
◎611,000 URLs
◎20,500 domains
22
“
Demo time!
23
Roadmap
◎Introduction
◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA)
○ Data collection
○ Data enrichment
○ Storage and indexing
◎Illegal Trading
◎Data Analysis
◎Malware
◎Conclusions
24
Guns
25
Drugs! Drugs! Drugs!
26
Passports and Fake IDs
27
Counterfeit Money
28
Credit Cards
29
◎ Higher balance = higher price
Paypal & Ebay Stolen Accounts
30
Doxing
31
Assassins
32
Crowdfunding evil
33
Roadmap
◎Introduction
◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA)
○ Data collection
○ Data enrichment
○ Storage and indexing
◎Illegal Trading
◎Data Analysis
◎Malware
◎Conclusions
34
◎ By publicly sourced URLs
Protocols (no HTTP/S)
35
172
17
7
Active Portscan
36
IRC IRCS SSH
49 31 855
#freeanons 15 [+Cnt] This channel is created to support arrested Anons
and act with solidarity in Anons. No MoneyFags, No Famefags, No PowerManiacs, No
LeaderFags! Another Anons was arrested in France: http://www.ladepeche.
fr/article/2015/10/10/2194982-enquete-de-la-dgsi-sur-du-piratage-informatique.html
* - We are based on anarchistic control so nobody haz power certainly not power
over the servers or
* - domains who ever says that this or that person haz power here, are trolls
and mostly agents of factions
* - that haz butthurt about the concept or praxis where the CyberGuerrilla
Anonymous Nexus stands for.
Languages per domain
37
Languages per domain (2)
38
http://wyzn2fvcztadictl.onion:80/viewtopic.php?pid=16452
French forum: Weapon sale
39
Pages Embedding Suspicious Links
40
Email Identification
41
bankofamerica@mail2tor
42
Exilio forum 1/2
43
http://ogatl57cbva6tncg.onion:80/index.php
?t=msg&th=833&goto=4445&#msg_4445
Exilio forum 2/2
44
Automated Bitcoin Identification
1200+ bitcoin wallets found in our data (not
counting the obfuscated ones)
45
http://tumbly5lisxnjozd.onion:80/
Bitcoin Tumblers
46
http://tfsux6hiihj7qvxh.onion:80/
Bitcoin Multiplier 1/2
47
Bitcoin Multiplier 2/2
48
Roadmap
◎Introduction
◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA)
○ Data collection
○ Data enrichment
○ Storage and indexing
◎Illegal Trading
◎Data Analysis
◎Malware
◎Conclusions
49
Malware: Its adoption in the Deep Web
◎ Modern malware is network-dependent
◎ @ infection-time: Exploit kits
◎ @ propagation-time: 2nd stage malware
◎ @ operational-time: C&C servers
◎ Goals :
◎ Make botnets resilient against LEA operations, e.g.
takedowns
◎ Conceal payment pages
◎ Untraceable money transfers
◎ Additional readings:
◎ Brown in Defcon 18
◎ Hunting Down Malware on the Deep Web (infosec institute)
50
SkyNet
◎ Malware with DDoS, bitcoin mining and
banking capabilities (©G-Data/Rapid7)
◎ ZeuS bot
◎ Bitcoin mining tool (CGMiner)
◎ GPU libraries for hash cracking
◎ TOR client per Windows
◎ Use /gate.php as landing page to store the
harvested credentials
◎ Path monitoring ….
51
SkyNet: Dynamic TOR-based C&Cs
52
Dyre Banking Trojan
◎ BHO that MiTMs online-banking pages at
browser-level
◎ Back-connects from victim to attacker (kind-of
reverse-shell approach)
◎ DGA generation of C&C domains on Clearnet
◎ Use I2P as backup option (:80/443)
◎ nhgyzrn2p2gejk57wveao5kxa7b3nhtc4saoonjpsy65mapycaua.b32.i2p
(already known to SecureWorks on 17 December 2014)
◎ oguws7cr5xvl5jlrhyxjktcdi2d7k5cqeulu4mdl75xxfwmhgnsq.b32.i2p
◎ 4nhgyzrn2p2gejk57wveao5kxa7b3nhtc4saoonjpsy65mapycaua.b32.i2p
53
Dyre’s Infection Evolution
54
Vawtrack Banking Trojan
55
◎ Spreads via phishing emails
◎ C&C servers (IPs) are retrieved by downloading
the ‘favicon.ico’ icon-file from websites
hosted on the TOR network
◎ IPs are steganographically hidden
Vawtrack Banking Trojan (cont.)
◎ Runs ‘openresty/1.7.2.1’ as web-server
◎ Return code on ‘favicon.ico’ is 403 Forbidden
◎ `ws=‘openresty1.7.2.1’ && ∃(‘favicon.ico’) &&
retcode=403` returns a list of 23:
56
Vawtrack Banking Trojan (cont.)
57
Ransomware in the Deep Web
◎ Ransomware seem to love the Deep Web
◎ It provides a hidden and robust “framework” for cashouts
and illicit money transfers
58
59
TorrentLocker
◎ A variant of
cryptolocker
◎ Payment page hosted
in the Deep Web
◎ Cashout via Bitcoins
TorrentLocker (cont.)
◎ Malware generates univocal IDs
◎ wzaxcyqroduouk5n.onion/axdf84v.php/ user_code=qz1n2i&user_pass=9019
◎ wzaxcyqroduouk5n.onion/o2xd3x.php/user_code=8llak0&user_pass=6775
◎ Tracking on specific query string’s parameters
◎ path=’/[a-z0-9]{6}.php/user_code=[a-z0-9]{6}&user_pass=[0-9]{4}’
60
Breakdown by victims and country
61
NionSpy
◎ Steals confidential information like keystrokes,
passwords and private documents
◎ Records video and audio, suitable for
espionage programs
◎ Detection Feature:
◎ Popularity in the number of values associated
to parameters (in the query string)
62
Automated Detection
63
NionSpy: GET’s query string analysis
◎ xu experienced a quick surge in popularity: 1700+
values
◎ si.php?xu=%e0%ee%a8%e5%f2%e9%e5%e4%f2[...]
◎ URL-encoded binary blob representing the
leaked data
◎ si.php?xd={“f155”:“MACHINE_IP”, “f4336”:
“MACHINE_NAME”,“f7035”:“5.9.1.1”,“f1121”:
“windows”,“f2015”:“1”}
◎ Reports a new infection
64
NionSpy: New victims and leakages
◎ Blue (xd): # of new victims / day
◎ Green (xu): amount of leaked information
(bytes)
65
Black Hat Sound Bytes
◎ We built a system for data collection and
analysis in the Deep Web.
◎ We used it to quickly identify cybercriminal
activities, such as trading of illegal goods,
underground marketplaces, scams and
malware infrastructures.
◎ We run it operationally and automatically to
detect new threats.
66
Thanks! Q&A time...
Marco Balduzzi -- @embyte
Vincenzo Ciancaglini -- @ziovic
67

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Cybercrime In The Deep Web

  • 1. Cybercrime In The Deep Web Marco Balduzzi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini Black Hat Europe 2015 1
  • 2. Dr. Vincenzo CIANCAGLINI ◎ M.Sc. in Telecommunication Engineering ◎ Ph.D. in Computer Networking, Peer to peer networks and next generations protocols ◎ 10+ years experience in R&D ◎ Sr. Research Scientist for Trend Micro ◎ Development of novel proof of concepts and complex systems About us Dr. Marco BALDUZZI ◎ MSc in Computer Engineering ◎ Ph.D. in System Security with ~15 peer-reviewed papers ◎ 13+ years experience in IT Security -- Consultant, engineer and researcher ◎ Turned my hobby into my profession ◎ Sr. Research Scientist for Trend Micro ◎ Bridge scientific research and industry needs ◎ Veteran speaker in major conferences with 50+ talks 2
  • 3. Roadmap ◎Introduction ◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA) ○ Data collection ○ Data enrichment ○ Storage and indexing ◎Illegal Trading ◎Data Analysis ◎Malware ◎Conclusions 3
  • 4. ◎Deep Web: Internet not indexed by traditional search engines. ◎Dark Net: Private overlay network. ◎Dark Web: WWW hosted on Dark Nets. 4
  • 5. “ The Deep Web is vast. Thousands of times larger than the surface web. Alex Winter, Deep Web Documentary, 2015 5
  • 6. “ The Deep Web is vast. Thousands of times larger than the surface web. Alex Winter, Deep Web Documentary, 2015 6
  • 7. ◎ Infrastructure resilient to LE takedowns ◎ Marketplaces for cybercrime goods ◎ Safe haven for information exchange and coordination Our research focus Dark Web • TOR • I2P • Freenet Custom DNS • Namecoin • Emercoin Rogue TLDs • Cesidian Root • OpenNIC • NewNations • … 7
  • 8. TOR ◎ First alpha in 2002 ◎ Initially used to browse anonymously the Surface Web ◎ Hidden services -> effective Dark Web ◎ Onion routing: multihop routing with with host key encryption. 8
  • 9. ◎ First beta in 2003 ◎ Full Dark Net, no anonymous browsing to the Surface Web ◎ Garlic routing: multiple encrypted tunnels, multiple layers of encryption (transport, tunnel, path) I2P 9
  • 10. ◎ Oldest one: summer of 1999 (father of I2P) ◎ Content distribution and discovery, no service hosting ◎ Gossip protocol to lookup a resource (i.e. web page) Freenet 10
  • 11. Namecoins, Emercoins ◎Blockchain-based domain name server ◎Think bitcoins, but instead of payment transactions, DNS registrar transaction ◎Distributed ◎Decentralised ◎No regulating institution 11
  • 12. RogueTLDs & PrivateDNSes Plain old DNS, but with custom servers Custom registrars Custom domains 12
  • 13. Roadmap ◎Introduction ◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA) ○ Data collection ○ Data enrichment ○ Storage and indexing ◎Illegal Trading ◎Data Analysis ◎Malware ◎Conclusions 13
  • 15. Data Sources User data Pastebin sites Twitter (1% feed) Reddit URL listing sites TOR gateways I2P host files Scouting feedback 15
  • 16. Deep Web Gateway Privoxy + TOR anonymizer Squid transparent proxy Polipo + TOR 64 instances I2P Freenet Custom DNS resolver Namecoin DNS rogueTLD DNS Cesidian root Opennic NameSpace … 16
  • 17. Page Scouting Headless browser HAR Log Page DOM Screen shot Title Text Metadata Raw HTML Links Email Bitcoin Wallets 17
  • 18. Headless Browser ◎ Scrapinghub's Splash ◎ QTWebkit browser ◎ Dockerized ◎ LUA scriptable ◎ Full HTTP traces ◎ Crawler based on Python's Scrapy + multiprocess + Splash access ◎ Headers rewrite ◎ Shared queue support ◎ Har log -> HTTP redirection chain ◎ Extract links, emails, bitcoin wallets 18
  • 19. Data Enrichment Embedded links classification (WRS) •Surface Web links •Classification and categorisation Page translation •Language detection •Non-English to English Significant wordcloud •Semantic clustering •Custom algorithm 19
  • 20. Significant Wordcloud Page text Tokenization Filtering Semantic distance matrix Hierarchical clustering Cluster label and popularity Word cloud Scrap text from HTML, clean up, strip spaces… Create list of (word, frequency) pairs Keep only substantives How “far” are words from one another? Group similar words Label clusters, sum frequencies Draw using summed frequencies 20
  • 22. Collected Data ◎Running since 11/2013 (2 years) ◎40.5 M Events ◎611,000 URLs ◎20,500 domains 22
  • 24. Roadmap ◎Introduction ◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA) ○ Data collection ○ Data enrichment ○ Storage and indexing ◎Illegal Trading ◎Data Analysis ◎Malware ◎Conclusions 24
  • 29. Credit Cards 29 ◎ Higher balance = higher price
  • 30. Paypal & Ebay Stolen Accounts 30
  • 34. Roadmap ◎Introduction ◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA) ○ Data collection ○ Data enrichment ○ Storage and indexing ◎Illegal Trading ◎Data Analysis ◎Malware ◎Conclusions 34
  • 35. ◎ By publicly sourced URLs Protocols (no HTTP/S) 35 172 17 7
  • 36. Active Portscan 36 IRC IRCS SSH 49 31 855 #freeanons 15 [+Cnt] This channel is created to support arrested Anons and act with solidarity in Anons. No MoneyFags, No Famefags, No PowerManiacs, No LeaderFags! Another Anons was arrested in France: http://www.ladepeche. fr/article/2015/10/10/2194982-enquete-de-la-dgsi-sur-du-piratage-informatique.html * - We are based on anarchistic control so nobody haz power certainly not power over the servers or * - domains who ever says that this or that person haz power here, are trolls and mostly agents of factions * - that haz butthurt about the concept or praxis where the CyberGuerrilla Anonymous Nexus stands for.
  • 45. Automated Bitcoin Identification 1200+ bitcoin wallets found in our data (not counting the obfuscated ones) 45
  • 49. Roadmap ◎Introduction ◎Deep Web Analyzer (DeWA) ○ Data collection ○ Data enrichment ○ Storage and indexing ◎Illegal Trading ◎Data Analysis ◎Malware ◎Conclusions 49
  • 50. Malware: Its adoption in the Deep Web ◎ Modern malware is network-dependent ◎ @ infection-time: Exploit kits ◎ @ propagation-time: 2nd stage malware ◎ @ operational-time: C&C servers ◎ Goals : ◎ Make botnets resilient against LEA operations, e.g. takedowns ◎ Conceal payment pages ◎ Untraceable money transfers ◎ Additional readings: ◎ Brown in Defcon 18 ◎ Hunting Down Malware on the Deep Web (infosec institute) 50
  • 51. SkyNet ◎ Malware with DDoS, bitcoin mining and banking capabilities (©G-Data/Rapid7) ◎ ZeuS bot ◎ Bitcoin mining tool (CGMiner) ◎ GPU libraries for hash cracking ◎ TOR client per Windows ◎ Use /gate.php as landing page to store the harvested credentials ◎ Path monitoring …. 51
  • 53. Dyre Banking Trojan ◎ BHO that MiTMs online-banking pages at browser-level ◎ Back-connects from victim to attacker (kind-of reverse-shell approach) ◎ DGA generation of C&C domains on Clearnet ◎ Use I2P as backup option (:80/443) ◎ nhgyzrn2p2gejk57wveao5kxa7b3nhtc4saoonjpsy65mapycaua.b32.i2p (already known to SecureWorks on 17 December 2014) ◎ oguws7cr5xvl5jlrhyxjktcdi2d7k5cqeulu4mdl75xxfwmhgnsq.b32.i2p ◎ 4nhgyzrn2p2gejk57wveao5kxa7b3nhtc4saoonjpsy65mapycaua.b32.i2p 53
  • 55. Vawtrack Banking Trojan 55 ◎ Spreads via phishing emails ◎ C&C servers (IPs) are retrieved by downloading the ‘favicon.ico’ icon-file from websites hosted on the TOR network ◎ IPs are steganographically hidden
  • 56. Vawtrack Banking Trojan (cont.) ◎ Runs ‘openresty/1.7.2.1’ as web-server ◎ Return code on ‘favicon.ico’ is 403 Forbidden ◎ `ws=‘openresty1.7.2.1’ && ∃(‘favicon.ico’) && retcode=403` returns a list of 23: 56
  • 58. Ransomware in the Deep Web ◎ Ransomware seem to love the Deep Web ◎ It provides a hidden and robust “framework” for cashouts and illicit money transfers 58
  • 59. 59 TorrentLocker ◎ A variant of cryptolocker ◎ Payment page hosted in the Deep Web ◎ Cashout via Bitcoins
  • 60. TorrentLocker (cont.) ◎ Malware generates univocal IDs ◎ wzaxcyqroduouk5n.onion/axdf84v.php/ user_code=qz1n2i&user_pass=9019 ◎ wzaxcyqroduouk5n.onion/o2xd3x.php/user_code=8llak0&user_pass=6775 ◎ Tracking on specific query string’s parameters ◎ path=’/[a-z0-9]{6}.php/user_code=[a-z0-9]{6}&user_pass=[0-9]{4}’ 60
  • 61. Breakdown by victims and country 61
  • 62. NionSpy ◎ Steals confidential information like keystrokes, passwords and private documents ◎ Records video and audio, suitable for espionage programs ◎ Detection Feature: ◎ Popularity in the number of values associated to parameters (in the query string) 62
  • 64. NionSpy: GET’s query string analysis ◎ xu experienced a quick surge in popularity: 1700+ values ◎ si.php?xu=%e0%ee%a8%e5%f2%e9%e5%e4%f2[...] ◎ URL-encoded binary blob representing the leaked data ◎ si.php?xd={“f155”:“MACHINE_IP”, “f4336”: “MACHINE_NAME”,“f7035”:“5.9.1.1”,“f1121”: “windows”,“f2015”:“1”} ◎ Reports a new infection 64
  • 65. NionSpy: New victims and leakages ◎ Blue (xd): # of new victims / day ◎ Green (xu): amount of leaked information (bytes) 65
  • 66. Black Hat Sound Bytes ◎ We built a system for data collection and analysis in the Deep Web. ◎ We used it to quickly identify cybercriminal activities, such as trading of illegal goods, underground marketplaces, scams and malware infrastructures. ◎ We run it operationally and automatically to detect new threats. 66
  • 67. Thanks! Q&A time... Marco Balduzzi -- @embyte Vincenzo Ciancaglini -- @ziovic 67